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Abstract
In the medical scenario, electronic information management and wireless computer
networks provide ubiquitous access possibilities to medical databases which may
comprise hundreds of thousands of electronic patient records (EPRs). Such records
may contain personal and highly sensitive patient data, and it is therefore necessary
to limit the accessibility of such data to only concerning medical personnel. Criteria
for granting (or authorization) of EPR access should be based on legitimacy and
the need-to-know principle, meaning that only medical personnel that is going to
provide medical care to a given patient should be granted access to the necessary
medical data of the concerning patient they are going to provide care for.
EPR access control based on such criteria would help to prevent illegitimate
persons from accessing patient data. This could be implemented by means of patient
consent, where EPR access is provided to legitimate medical practitioners due to the
consent of the pertaining patient. It could also be implemented by group consensus,
where the consensus of a minimum number of concerned participants could qualify
for authorization of EPR access. Hence, a given number of associated medical
practitioners, e.g., a medical team, could be recognized as a proper basis for trust.
Since medical care is often provided by medical teams, the consensus of a minimum
number of the team members would thus act as a qualifying criterion for such teams
to acquire EPR access.
The hierarchical ranking of medical practitioners is significant, since higher rank-
ing implies more privileges. Medical practitioners of higher ranking (e.g., medical
doctors) are accordingly in position to be entrusted access to more sensitive medical
data than practitioners of lower ranking (e.g., nurses). An essential hierarchical se-
curity requirement is to ensure that the medical practitioners are only granted access
to EPR data whose confidentiality level is in agreement with the user ranking, and
to EPR data associated with the underlying confidentiality levels.
In addition to the mentioned accessibility issues, protection of communicated
data to and among multiple users is likewise of essential interest in the medical
scenario. In this thesis, we present a number of cryptographic methods for secure
establishment of EPR access according to the mentioned issues, and methods for
secure transmission of medical data over insecure wireless networks.
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Part I
Introduction
1

Chapter 1
Introduction
As the use of information technology has progressed in health care, there has been
an increased focus on security and confidentiality issues of electronic patient records
(EPR) in medical environments, and the need for secure and confidential manage-
ment, handling and storage of such [3, 6–8]. Electronic information management
and computer networks enable ubiquitous access possibilities to medical databases
which may comprise hundreds of thousands of electronic patient records (EPRs).
Such records may contain personal and highly sensitive patient data, which could
include sensitive data about AIDS/HIV status, sexual transmittable diseases, emo-
tional problems, psychiatric illnesses, sexual divergencies, genetic predispositions to
diseases, information about toxic addictions, and so on [6]. It is therefore necessary
to limit the accessibility of such data to concerning medical personnel only. Since
there would be a continuously flow of patients being hospitalized, access cannot be
based on long-term, predefined permission assignments between medical practition-
ers and EPRs, but must rather be established dynamically according to needs.
Two important issues in this context concern proper authorization of EPR ac-
cess and secure communication, including secure group communication since the
group aspect plays an important role in the medical scenario. We consider the need-
to-know principle as a criterion for authorization of EPR access, since only medi-
cal practitioners providing medical care to a given patient (or patients) should be
granted only access to the necessary medical data of the concerning patient they are
providing care to. Concerning what type of personnel should be in charge of grant-
ing EPR access, we consider 1) patients, 2) security administrators, and 3) medical
personnel.
It has become a widely recognized principle that patients have a right to exert
control over their own medical data [1, 2, 4, 5]. That is, EPR access authorization
carried out due to patient consent. Alternatively, security administrators acting as
a trusted third party could grant medical personnel access to the EPR of a patient
they are going to provide care to on behalf of the patient. This would particularly
be relevant in emergency situations where the patient could be unconscious.
Since medical care is often given by practitioners in medical teams working for the
same cause, the group aspect can by itself be recognized as a proper basis for trust.
Group consensus could conveniently act a qualifying criterion for a minimum number
of associated medical practitioners to acquire access to a given EPR. Enforcement
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of such an requirement, for instance by means of a threshold cryptosystem, would
conveniently prevent single individuals from illegitimately accessing patient data.
In this thesis, we present several cryptographic schemes for EPR authorization
based on group consensus and patient consent, and which are well-suitable for wire-
less networks. There are two schemes for EPR authorization based on patient con-
sent. An essential feature of the first is that it provides secure storage of medical
data due to that each EPR is encrypted on a long-term basis with a unique key
on the EPR server. There is no accompanying table of cryptokeys. By means of
the partial computations of the consenting patient and the medical practitioners of
the granted team, relevant EPR cryptokeys are securely reconstructed on the EPR
server out of reach of any of the involved participants. The EPR cryptokeys enable
subsequent decryption of the EPRs of the granting patients. The second patient
consent-based scheme provides patient anonymity. It could in some cases be desir-
able to hide associations between meaningful identifies such as patient names, social
security numbers, etc., and the patient record. This could especially be desirable
in cases of celebrities, politicians and for particularly sensitive data, like AIDS/HIV
status, etc. The scheme thus allows patients to be in charge of granting EPR access
while still remaining anonymous.
The hierarchical ranking of medical practitioners is also of significance, since
higher ranking implies more privileges and that access to information of high sen-
sitivity could be entrusted. For example, doctors would be hierarchically ranked
higher than nurses, and would reasonably be entrusted access to more sensitive
data. Since the medical practitioners are hierarchically ranked according to their
job positions, user hierarchies would play an essential role regarding what kind of
information that practitioners should be granted access to.
The thesis also includes a number of general-purpose cryptographic protocols for
secure group communication with applicability for wireless medical networks and the
medical scenario. For example, a hierarchical key establishment scheme is proposed
for secure group communication and data distribution. It prevents participants
of a given ranking to access information (encrypted with a pertaining hierarchical
session key) that is classified above their ranking, while they can obtain information
pertaining to their own and lower levels.
Chapter 2
Preliminaries to Information
Security in the Medical Scenario
2.1 Introduction
With the emergence of information technology in health care, there has been much
focus on security and confidentiality issues of electronic patient records (EPR) in
medical environments. Medical records contain confidential personal information
which could even include sensitive data about AIDS/HIV status, sexual transmit-
table diseases, emotional problems, psychiatric illnesses, sexual divergences, genetic
predispositions to diseases, information about toxic addictions, and so on [6]. Due
to the sensitivity of medical data, it is therefore essential that such information is
protected from disclosure except when medical practitioners require access to pa-
tient records in order to provide medical care to patients. An important issue in
this context concerns proper establishment (i.e., authorization) of EPR access. A
basic criterion for this should be legitimacy, meaning that only medical personnel
going to provide care to a given patient (or patients) should only be granted access
to the necessary medical data of the concerning patient they will providing care
to. Another significant security issue concerns secure and confidential management,
handling, transport and storage of personal medical information [8].
Security of medical networks and preservation of privacy of medical data have
for one or two decades been topics of concern and scrutiny, since almost every
person would have at least one patient record containing personal and confidential
medical information. Since the manual record keeping systems of the past lacked
automatic enforcement of access control, medical practitioners would necessarily not
be prevented to access arbitrary patient records. Thus, the confidentiality of patients
was resting considerably on the discretion of each individual medical practitioner and
legal enforcement.
Today, medical data is in general managed by networked computer systems
which have replaced paper-based patient records and manual record keeping sys-
tems. Health organizations and hospitals are administrating large databases of such
personal electronic patient records. Computerized medical databases have a number
of advantages compared to paper-based systems concerning flexibility, functionality
5
6 Security in Wireless Medical Networks
and a more effective data management due to the possibly ubiquitous accessibility
of data, independently of location and time. This complies well with decentralized
organizations since data can be easily transferred within and across health estab-
lishments by means of wired and wireless computer networks.
In agreement with common medical ethics and due to the confidential nature of
medical data, access to medical data should rest on the basis of need-to-know and
legitimacy. In other words, the medical data of a patient should only be disclosed
to medical personnel that has a legitimate need to access the medical data of the
patient, in order to provide proper medical care to that patient. Proper measures
should be taken to confine the accessibility of the data in agreement with the ”need-
to know”-principle. The large amounts of medical data ubiquitously accessible due
to computerized data management and networking raise important needs and re-
quirements concerning the security and privacy of medical data and confidentiality
of patients.
Threats and violations to the privacy medical data could just as well come from
within the health organization than from outside, and it is essential that proper ac-
cess control mechanisms and data protection should be facilitated. In this chapter,
we discuss relevant security and privacy aspects that are investigated in this thesis,
and also solutions for and enforcements of such. Issues of interest include among
others authorization and granting of EPR access, patient consent, EPR access ac-
quisition, teams, user hierarchy, and other related issues.
2.2 Patient confidentiality
The necessity to protect patients’ privacy is a focal point of importance. The same
goes for the importance of protecting patients’ medical records that may contain
very sensitive personal information as noted. Electronic medical database systems
and networking may provide efficient data management and opportunities for ubiq-
uitous data accessibility, which may create needs for strengthening ethical and legal
requirements correspondingly.
2.2.1 Patients’ rights
A significant factor related to patient confidentiality is the right the patient has to
decide the course of action to be undertaken in regard to the medical practition-
ers. With respect to patient confidentiality and patient consent, American Medical
Association (AMA) [1] states that
the physician’s duty to maintain confidentiality means that a physician
may not disclose any medical information revealed by a patient or dis-
covered by a physician in connection with the treatment of a patient...
The physician generally should not reveal confidential communications
or information without the patient’s express consent unless required to
disclose the information by law.
Patients’ rights for self-determination may include:
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1. An informed basis for medical treatment and medical procedures to be under-
taken.
2. An informed basis of who is requesting access to the EPR of the patient, and
having the right to grant or deny it.
3. An informed basis of the motivations and purpose for medical and scientific
research that involves access to medical data, including the identities of the
individuals undertaking the inquiry.
In the latter case, patient anonymity would be useful to preserve the confidential-
ity of concerning patients. By means of anonymization, public identifiers such as
names, addresses, social security numbers, etc., would be hidden and replaced by
pseudonyms that can be randomly selected, e.g., random numbers. Pseudonyms can
be issued on a long-term basis, but a long-term association between a pseudonym
and an EPR would lower its effectiveness in the long run. Temporary or session-
wise pseudonyms would on the other hand effectively prevent that the association
between an EPR and a pseudonyms can be discovered over time.
2.2.2 Issues relevant to patient confidentiality
A security system with proper access control facilities would be required to ensure
a minimum level of patient confidentiality. Access control would, however, raise
questions such as what would be the criteria for access to patient records to be
granted? Who should grant access? Should the patient be able to influence how
and to whom access to his or her EPR is to be granted? In what way should user
roles or the job position of the user, for example whether the user is a nurse, doctor
or specialist, infer restrictions on what parts or data modules of a granted EPR
that the user may be allowed to access? Should user roles impose any restrictions
on operations (read, write, etc.) to be employed on the granted data? How should
access control be managed regarding medical teams? Concerns should also be taken
about the confidentiality of stored medical data, and about the confidentiality and
integrity of data that is in transfer over networks.
2.3 Players in the medical scenario
In this thesis, we recognize the main players in the medical scenario to be as follows:
• The owner of the EPR, i.e., the patient. Each patient is represented by one
EPR that he or she imposes ownership onto.
• Medical practitioners like doctors and nurses. Two or more medical practi-
tioners can be associated, forming medical teams. We distinguish between ad
hoc (short-term) medical teams, and long-term medical teams.
• Information security administrators, whose role as a trusted third party could
be to provide and assign required credentials (i.e., assign user roles and provide
corresponding long-term user keys) to the main players. Another function
could be to grant medical practitioners access to relevant data.
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The medical practitioners providing care to a patient are to be dynamically assigned
or granted access to the electronic patient record of this patient. Such assignments
form short-term, temporary relationships between a given EPR and the pertaining
medical practitioners, whereof the duration would be in accordance to the period of
treatment.
2.4 Authorization and granting of EPR access
As previously noted, the need-to-know principle is a proper criterion for authoriza-
tion of EPR access to medical teams, since this ensures that only those who provide
medical care to a certain patient are to be granted access to this patient’s medical
data. Although given such a criterion, somebody has to be in position of granting
medical practitioners access to relevant medical data.
The principle of separation of duty requires a minimum number of participants
to carry out some types of tasks or transactions in order to prevent fraud or errors
[9]. Enforcement of separation of duty would thus prevent individuals to carry
out such tasks or transactions on their own. Typical applications for this principle
can be found in banking, where for example two employees, one manager and one
clerk, could be required to carry out some financial transaction. Access to the
bank vault is also a good example. It may not be desirable that individuals could
solely access the vault due to the risk of fraud, robbery and extortion. The safety
would be considerably improved by a threshold-oriented security system, where the
participation of at least 2 or 3 arbitrary persons out of for instance 4, each holding
a unique and secret key, is required in order to unlock the vault.
This is an example where the consensus of a specific minimum number of asso-
ciated people is required to carry out the action. Threshold-oriented cryptosystems
are suitable to enforce requirements of group consensus, since such cryptosystems
require the participation of minimum t of n associated users in order to carry out a
cryptographic computation. Enforcing a threshold requirement can be an effective
way to prevent fraud or other actions that could be in violation to a security pol-
icy. The threshold requirement is a special case of the separation of duty principle.
Examples of such cryptosystems can be found in [20–26].
In this thesis, we consider the consensus of a minimum number of relevant par-
ticipants to be a useful criterion for authorizing access to medical data. We consider
patients, medical practitioners and security administrators to be relevant to be in
position of authorizing EPR access. This yields the following cases:
• Medical practitioners or a medical team can obtain access to a relevant EPR
as a function of the consent of the concerning patient to whom they are going
to provide medical care.
• Medical practitioners or a medical team can obtain access to a relevant EPR
due to the consensus of a minimum number of security administrators.
• A medical team can obtain access to a relevant EPR due to the consensus of
a minimum number of its members.
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In the following subsections, we discuss the function of consensus of each of these
three types of players as a criterion for to grant or acquire EPR access.
2.4.1 Patient consent
EPR access could be granted based on patient consent. This has become an impor-
tant principle in medical ethics, since it has be broadly recognized that patients have
a right to exert control over whom is to access their medical data. It is therefore rea-
sonable that patients should decide who that should (and should not) access their
EPR by means of consent, and thereby exert control over their respective EPRs.
This would permit the patient to grant specific medical personnel access his or her
EPR. This has in the past been implemented manually by means of written consent
from the patient in many health establishments. Such manual practice would rely
in individuals discretion, and would have no automatic control enforcement. In elec-
tronic patient record data systems, patient consent could be securely enforced by
means of an automatic security system and cryptographic methods. Access control
schemes based on patient consent are proposed in Paper G and I. Also see [2, 4, 5]
for further discussion.
2.4.2 Trusted third parties
Security administrators are trusted parties that may authorize medical personnel
access to EPRs on behalf of patients. However, such an arrangement would entail
that the administrators may have access to all patient records at that given institu-
tion, or even less desirable, to a number of associated institutions due to networking.
Such unconditional access to highly confidential information of a large number of
people is in general an undesirable situation.
This possible security weakness would be minimized by requiring group consensus
by means of a threshold-based cryptosystem. Such a cryptosystem would be suitable
for enforcing the consensus requirement of two or more security administrators for
providing EPR access to specific medical practitioners on behalf of the pertaining
patients.
It should be noted that an EPR access granting scheme that is based on patient
consent as discussed in the previous subsection, should also support the possibility
of EPR granting by a trusted third party due to the emergency case. In emergency
situations, patients may be unconscious and are thus unable to actively consent to
EPR authorization. EPR access authorization carried out by security administra-
tors, possibly threshold-based, could thus be an appropriate alternative to ensure
patient confidentiality. Paper G includes a group-oriented scheme enabling secure
EPR access granting by trusted third parties for the emergency case.
2.4.3 Data access acquisition
Medical care is typically provided by medical personnel organized in teams. Since a
team consists of a number of associated medical practitioners working for the same
cause, this by itself could be recognized as a proper basis for trust. Group consensus
could thus be recognized as a qualifying criterion for medical personnel to acquire
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EPR access. This criterion could conveniently be enforced by means of an appropri-
ate threshold cryptosystem. Enforcement of such a requirement would accordingly
prevent that individuals may snoop and arbitrarily read personal medical data un-
less holding special privileges. A team-oriented EPR access acquisition scheme is
proposed in Paper H.
2.4.4 Threshold-oriented cryptosystems
Threshold secret sharing is a cryptographic approach that provides enforcement of
group consensus requirements. According to this method, a secret number (for
example, a cryptographic key) is split into n unique user ”shares”. One such share
is handed to one person so that in a group of n persons, each is holding a share.
The secret number can only be computed by means of at least t arbitrary such
shares, where t−1 or less user shares reveal nothing of the secret number. The term
threshold denotes the minimum number of participants of the group whose user
shares are required to compute the secret number. Threshold-orientation provides
flexibility in contrast to that all n participants, i.e., a fixed set of participants, are
required to carry out such a computation, since one or more of the n participants
could be unavailable or absent at the moment.
Threshold cryptosystems are relevant in scenarios where group consensus is re-
quired, for example that an originator of some sensitive information like a secret
key, is only willing to let it be disclosed due to the consensus of a given number of
the associated individuals. Accordingly, it is prevented that single individuals can
obtain the secret on their own.
An instance of a threshold secret sharing scheme is basically useful only once,
since the participants have to reveal their secret user shares to subsequently compute
the shared secret number. And once this is computed and revealed, it is revealed
once and for all. However, threshold secret sharing is in practice used as a building
block in threshold-oriented cryptographic schemes, where typical applications are
threshold decryption and threshold signatures. There also exists conference key
agreement schemes based on threshold secret sharing (e.g., [27]). Note that in such
schemes, the user share of each participant is protected from being revealed to the
other participants.
Threshold cryptosystems are commonly based on the Shamir secret sharing
scheme [30]. Threshold decryption is a class of such cryptosystems, where a group
of n member is each given a secret user share. The group is represented by a cor-
responding public key which allows encryption of plaintexts. Decryptions can only
be carried out due to the partial computations of t arbitrary group members, in
agreement with the threshold requirement. Examples of such schemes are found
in [20, 25, 26]. Threshold signatures (e.g., [23, 24]) is another class of threshold
cryptosystems enforcing that t arbitrary participants are required to compute such
signatures in agreement with the threshold requirement.
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NONSENSITIVE
SENSITIVE
HIGHLY SENSITIVE
Nurse
General physician
Chief physician
Figure 1: Example of a totally ordered hierarchy.
2.5 Hierarchical aspects
In medical organizations, medical practitioners and other employees are ranked ac-
cording to their job positions in agreement with a hierarchical structure. Such a
hierarchical organization implies that higher ranking correspond to more privileges
and responsibilities. Medical practitioners of higher ranking (e.g., medical doctors)
would accordingly be in position to be entrusted access to more confidential in-
formation than practitioners of lower ranking (e.g., nurses). Correspondingly, it is
reasonable or even necessary that practitioners of lower rankings should be privi-
leged access to less sensitive or confidential medical information than those of higher
rankings.
Electronic patient record systems provide opportunities for fine-grained access
control with regard to the sensitivity of the data. Depending on the desired level
of fine-grainedness, each data field, data block or data module of the EPR, could
be each assigned a confidentiality level (or sensitivity level) from a small range, for
instance [0-3] where 0 denotes none or low confidentiality level and 3 denotes high.
Alternatively, the confidentiality levels could be classified as open, nonsensitive, sen-
sitive, and highly sensitive. Each data item could be individually marked according
to its confidentiality level, or grouped into modules according to confidentiality level.
It is necessary to have a reasonable agreement between the user rankings and
the confidentiality level of each blocks of an EPR. An essential security requirement
would be that the medical practitioners should only be granted access to data whose
confidentiality level is in agreement with the user ranking, and to data blocks of
underlying confidentiality levels. It must accordingly be prevented that participants
may obtain access to data whose confidentiality level is above the privilege level of
that participant.
An example is showed in Figure 1, where each EPR is categorized into three con-
fidentiality levels. There are three levels of user rankings; nurse, general physician
and chief physician, that agree with the EPR confidentiality levels. The structure is a
totally-ordered, meaning there is only one class of users for each level. Alternatively,
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LEVEL 1
LEVEL 2
Nurse
General physician
Specialist A
LEVEL  5
Specialist B
Chief physician
LEVEL 4, SP.A LEVEL 4, SP.B
LEVEL 3
Figure 2: Example of a partially ordered hierarchy.
since there may be a number of types of medical specialists, compartmentalization
of a given level into two or more user classes could be useful. An example is showed
in Figure 2, where level 4 is compartmentalized into two classes. Accordingly, con-
fidential data pertaining to one specialist area would not be accessible to specialists
of other areas. Also note that chief physicians would have access to all of the EPR
data.
Proper permissions concerning which data operators to be permitted used by
the users in agreement with the confidentiality levels must be assigned. Typical
permissions would be read, write and delete. Using Figure 2 as an example, the
General Practitioners are assigned read, write for data level 2, and read, write,
delete for data level 1.
A cryptographic EPR access control scheme based on patient consent for hierar-
chical medical teams is presented in Paper I. General hierarchical key establishment
schemes are presented in Papers A and C.
2.6 Securing medical data
The EPR servers must authenticate users that are logging on before access to medical
data can be provided. After a user has been successfully authenticated, access
control has to be carried out in order for possible EPR access authorization to take
place, meaning a given user must be validated to be granted access to the requested
data or not. The access authorization would determine which data that the user
could be allowed to access, and what operations that the user would be allowed
to use. The server would then securely communicate the data to the user. Secure
communication can be achieved by cryptographic key establishment protocols for
secure establishment of secret session keys shared among the pertaining parties for
subsequent encryption of the communicated data.
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In this chapter, we point at the following for protecting data in a network:
• User authentication and access control.
• Preserving confidential communication between two entities.
• Preserving confidentiality of stored data.
2.6.1 User authentication
A user that is going to communicate with one or more users over an insecure net-
work needs to make sure that the other users are really those who he or she thinks
they are since they cannot see each other physically. Otherwise, an adversary may
successfully masquerade as a peer user, and thereby obtain confidential information.
A server needs to authenticate users logging on before confidential access can be
provided. Likewise, a user needs to make sure the authenticity of a server when
logging onto the server before supplying personal data to the server.
Secure user authentication can be achieved by means of cryptographic authenti-
cation protocols. Such protocols enable unilateral authentication; meaning authen-
tication of one user towards another user, or mutual authentication; enabling both
users to authenticate each other.
2.6.2 Access control
In the medical scenario, after a medical practitioner has been successfully authen-
ticated by an EPR server, it has to validate the credentials of the person to decide
whether access to the requested data can be granted or not. This would also in-
clude determining what operations that the user would be allowed to perform on
the data. If the authentication and access control succeed, the subsequent commu-
nication should be protected.
2.6.3 Secure communication
It is essential that data communicated over computer networks are protected to pre-
vent unauthorized individuals from eavesdropping, and to preserve the integrity of
the communicated data. Secure communication is normally achieved by encryption,
and normally requires the use of security protocols that have to provide relevant
security properties. Cryptographic key establishment protocols provide secure es-
tablishment of session keys shared among the users that are going to securely com-
municate over the network by subsequent encryption of the communicated data.
Many such protocols also provide user authentication.
Security protocols are designed with the assumption that the concerning com-
puter networks are insecure, i.e., with the possible presence of an adversary. Such
an adversary could be passive or active. This is a most reasonable assumption for
wireless networks due to the broadcast-orientation, where any broadcasted message
can be easily eavesdropped by anyone present. A passive adversary would have the
ability to eavesdrop the communication over the network, whereas an active adver-
sary would be able to change, replace or suppress data that is in transfer. A type of
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active attacks is replay attacks where an adversary attempts to subvert a security
protocol by replaying former messages. Measures like incorporating MACs or digital
signatures should be taken to ensure that the integrity of data is intact.
The proposed security schemes in this thesis are designed for secure communi-
cation over wireless networks.
2.6.4 Secure data storage
It could be desirable to preserve a more overall level of information confidentiality,
not only with respect to access control mechanisms and on what basis should grant-
ing of EPR access take place (that is, what should be the criteria and conditions
for granting EPR access), but also concerning the long-term storage of the medical
data.
It could be argued that long-term encryption of medical data may increase the
overall security level of the information system than if stored as plaintext. This
assumes that the corresponding cryptokeys would have to be ”out of reach”, since
encryption imposes the problem of secure key management and key storage. If a
cryptokey is compromised, its encrypted data would correspondingly be considered
compromised. Storage and management of EPR cryptokeys would therefore impose
a potential security risk since whoever controls such keys also controls the corre-
sponding data. The subsequent storage and management of those cryptokeys would
therefore directly reflect the actual achieved security.
The security schemes presented in Paper G and Paper H assume that the stored
EPRs are encrypted by unique and distinct cryptokeys that are secret to all. In-
stead of employing tables containing EPR cryptokeys, these schemes enable secure
temporarily establishment of an EPR cryptokey as a function of the computations
of the users, and without revealing it to others than the EPR server.
2.7 Cryptographic building blocks
2.7.1 Secure binding of users and data
User-oriented security and data-oriented security are two relevant aspects related to
the medical scenario:
• Data-oriented security includes preservation of secrecy and confidentiality of
data, integrity of data, data authentication and non-repudiation of data.
• User-oriented security includes user authentication and ensuring proper access
control.
Thirdly, secure association between users and data is perhaps of most inter-
est here due to the protection of EPRs associated to individual patients, and the
temporary associations between such data and legitimately medical practitioners.
This secure binding is established between the pertaining data and a personal
long-term cryptographic key representing a user. Such binding is realized by en-
cryption methods and digital signature methods, where such methods are based on
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shared- and public key cryptography. Particularly the latter plays an important role
in the methods presented in this thesis and in the recent literature in general.
2.7.2 Shared key cryptography
Symmetric key ciphers (i.e., shared key ciphers) have the advantage of relatively
short keys and the ability of high rates of throughput. In such systems, secret cryp-
tokeys must be shared among those entities that are to communicate confidentially,
so regarding two-party communication, the key must remain secret in both ends. In
large networks, there would be many keys to be managed, and each user would have
to securely manage a list containing the key pairs for each of his or her contacts.
This could be impractical and troublesome, and lack flexibility concerning new and
leaving users.
Sharing long-term secret keys among a number of users is an impractical and
troublesome assumption due to increased vulnerability from the aging of keys, and
lack of flexible user constellations due to the shared keys. This could be mitigated
by an online trusted third party (TTP) so that all communication goes through the
TTP that shares a secret key pair with all relevant users. Nevertheless, this would
in many cases be undesirable. It would correspondingly be a problem to distribute
and establish new shared keys to new contacts over an insecure network if the key
distribution protocol (that is, the key establishment protocol) is based on symmetric
key ciphers, since this would require that a symmetric key is already shared between
the distributor and the receiver.
In practice, symmetric key ciphers is mostly applied session-wise due to their
capabilities of high throughput and efficiency. The shared session keys would be
established by means of some secure key establishment protocol. Such protocols
could be based on symmetric key ciphers or public key ciphers. However, a key
establishment protocol based on symmetric key ciphers would still require that the
two parties going to establish a shared secret session key still share a long-term
secret key. Key establishment protocols based on public key ciphers eliminate the
disadvantages of sharing long-term secret keys.
2.7.3 Public key cryptography
In public key systems, each user has a personal public/private key pair where the
public key is publicly representing the pertaining user. This eliminates the disad-
vantage of sharing long-term secret keys. However, the downside of such systems
would be lower throughput rates than symmetric key schemes, and relatively large
key sizes.
Secure data transfer is achieved by means of encrypting a message with the
public key of the receiver. By means of the corresponding private key, the receiver
would be able to decrypt the pertaining cryptotext. The receiver would however
not be able to authenticate the sender unless the sender provides a digital signature
of the message. Examples of popular public key cryptosystems are RSA [29] and
ElGamal [28].
The authenticity of public keys could be provided, so that it can be certified
that a given public key is actually representing the users that it is claimed to do.
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Otherwise, an adversary could substitute such a key with his or her own public
key, and then be capable to subsequently decrypt confidential information that was
intended for another person. Digital certificates are a means for establishing the
authenticity of public keys. Digital certificates basically contain the identity and
the public key of the user, and a digital signature of a TTP, typically the party
issuing the public key. By means of the digital signature, the public key can be
subsequently verified.
Due to the inefficiency of such cryptosystems, a prior agreement of a secret shared
session key would be more adequate for communication of multiple messages. Key
establishment protocols based on public key ciphers are significantly more preferable
than those based on shared keys since they do not, for instance, require an online
third party. An example of a popular two-party key agreement protocol that is based
on public key cryptography is the Diffie-Hellman protocol [31]. It does not provide
user authentication, but is used as a building block in many other cryptographic
protocols.
2.8 Cryptographic protocols
Cryptographic protocols comprise a wide range of methods for provision of secure
computation to two or more participants connected to a computer network. More
precisely, a cryptographic protocol is a distributed algorithm defined by a sequence of
steps precisely specifying the actions required of two or more entities to achieve a spe-
cific security objective [15, p. 33]. Such actions would require use of cryptographic
primitives. There are cryptographic protocols for secure user authentication, secure
key establishment, secure voting, electronic cash, anonymous transaction schemes
and so on. See for example [13,14,16,17] for overviews.
Many times, the objective for data security also includes user security. For exam-
ple in the case of secure communication where two users would like to communicate
securely over an insecure network, each of them would first have to make sure that
the other party is who he or she claims to be. Since the parties cannot see each
other physically, user authentication has to be performed over the insecure network.
Secondly, the parties would have to agree on some secret shared cryptographic ses-
sion key for subsequent secure communication. Most practical user authentication
schemes and key agreement schemes with user authentication are based on public
key cryptosystems in contrast to symmetric key cryptosystems.
Due to the necessity of preserving patient confidentiality, such security properties
of cryptographic protocols are mostly relevant for the medical scenario. This thesis
includes secure methods for many of the aspects that are related to patient confi-
dentiality as already mentioned. This includes aspects concerning the three types of
players (patients, medical practitioners, security administrators), group orientation,
hierarchical aspects, access control and EPR access granting, patient consent, pa-
tient anonymity, secure communication and key establishment, hierarchical access
control issues, secure data management and storage, and more.
Preliminaries to Information Security in the Medical Scenario 17
2.8.1 Security issues
The purpose of cryptographic protocols is to provide secure communication on in-
secure computer networks. Wireless networks are regarded insecure in the sense
that communicated messages could easily be eavesdropped by a adversary (passive
attack), or even modified or replaced (active attack). In general, an active adversary
could be capable to suppress, replace, replay and modify messages over the network.
Cryptographic protocols have to ensure that two-party or multi-party computa-
tions can be carried out in agreement with some given security requirements. This
normally includes preservation of confidentiality and privacy; preventing other than
the participants from obtaining the inputs (e.g., the cryptographic user keys) and
the computed results (e.g., a secret session key).
2.8.2 Secure key establishment
Secure communication over computer networks is usually achieved by means of en-
crypting the exchanged messages. The messages could be encrypted by means of
long-term public keys (or long-term shared keys). However, the last case would re-
quire that they share the same secret key which can be achieved by means of some
secure key establishment protocol.
By means of such protocols, two or more individuals can establish shared secret
cryptographic keys over insecure networks. The protocols can be based on secret
key cryptography or public key cryptography. Due to sharing of long-term secret
keys among a number of users is an impractical assumption, most key establishment
protocols that is based on shared key (a.k.a. symmetric key) cryptography require
an online TTP. Hence, each user would share a secret key with the TTP, and all
key establishment messages would go through the TTP. Kerberos [19] and the sym-
metric key protocol of Needham-Schroeder [18] are two well-known examples of key
establishment protocols based on shared secret keys.
As noted in Chapter 2.7.2, it would be a problem to distribute and establish
new shared keys to new users over an insecure network if a key is not already
shared between the new user and the TTP. The advantage of public key ciphers is
simplification of key management and eliminating the need for an online TTP. This
increases considerably the usability for protocols based on public key ciphers, which
have therefore become far more important than symmetric key protocols. Most
public key protocols are based on a few well-known problems in number theory like
the Discrete Logarithm Problem, the closely related Diffie-Hellman Problem, and
the Factorization Problem (i.e., the difficulty of factorizing integers composed of
two very large primes). For example, the RSA public key cryptosystem [29] is based
on the Factorization Problem, and the ELGamal public key cryptosystem [28] is
based on the two closely related Diffie-Hellman Problem and the Discrete Logarithm
Problem [15, p. 294]. All security protocols in this thesis are public key-based.
Key establishment protocols can basically be divided into key transfer protocols
and key agreement protocols. Key transfer is where one entity generates the secret
key and distributes it confidentially to one or more users. Key agreement is where
two or more participants that ”agree” on a secret key by equally contributing to the
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value of the established key. According to the number of participants, such protocols
are categorized as two-party and multi-party protocols.
2.8.3 Group-oriented cryptographic protocols
Secure group communication refers to the scenario in which a group of participants
can communicate securely over some computer network in such a way that the ex-
changed messages would be unintelligible for outsiders and non-pertaining users.
Conference key establishment protocols (also known as multi-party key establish-
ment protocols) allow a number of users to establish a shared session key whereof
secure communication over insecure computer networks can be achieved by encrypt-
ing the exchanged messages. Group-oriented key agreement is a special case of
secure multi-party computation, where n participants, U = {P1, . . . , Pn}, compute
the result of some function f(x1, . . . , xn) and where each Pj ∈ U holds a secret input
xj . The problem is how to compute f without revealing their secret inputs to any
other party, including the other participants. The function could be any function
taking any inputs where the computations are conducted over a distributed network.
No information about the inputs should be learned from the computations. Strictly
speaking, any participant that is legitimately included in the execution of a security
protocol should not learn about the private inputs of the other participant. All that
should be learned is the result of the protocol, in agreement to whom the result is
designated to.1
In addition to key transfer and key agreement, such protocols can also be clas-
sified according to the nature of the group composition, i.e., according to whether
the composition is ad hoc or predefined (long-term).
In Chapter 2.5, we pointed out the hierarchical aspects in the medical context,
including hierarchical user ranking of the medical personnel, and that each data
module of patient records can be assigned a confidentiality level in agreement with
the user hierarchy. For this to be meaningful, hierarchical access control must be
carried out, preventing that users can obtain access to data whose sensitivity level
is above the corresponding hierarchical level of that user.
A relatively large class of hierarchical cryptographic schemes is known as Hi-
erarchical Access Control. The main disadvantage of Hierarchical Access Control
schemes is that such schemes basically provide computation of long-term, predefined
hierarchical keys. This means that the new keys have to be distributed for every
session from the key center. In contrast, secure hierarchical group communication
could be achieved by means of hierarchical key establishment protocols. Such proto-
cols facilitate secure establishment of a number of session keys in agreement with the
given number of user levels. An essential security property is that users of a given
level can compute the hierarchical session keys pertaining to their own and under-
lying security levels, while it is computationally infeasible to compute hierarchical
session keys of overlying security levels.
A hierarchical key establishment protocol is presented in Paper A and Pa-
per I, although the key establishment protocols in the literature are generally non-
1Most protocols distributes the same result for all participants, i.e., the participants collabora-
tively compute one result that is to be shared among them.
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hierarchical.
2.8.4 Cryptographic access control
It is essential that only legitimate medical practitioners should be able to obtain
access to relevant EPRs. An important issue is concerning authorization of EPR
access, how this should be carried out, and who should be the authorizing parties.
In this thesis, we present cryptographic schemes where EPR authorization is based
on patient consent, the consensus of a minimum number of security administrators,
and the consensus of a minimum number of the members of a medical team that
requires access to a certain EPR. These are presented in Papers F-I.
2.8.5 Patient anonymity
Due to the sensitive nature of certain kinds of medical information, like information
about AIDS/HIV status, sexual transmittable diseases, emotional problems, psychi-
atric illnesses, genetic predispositions to diseases, toxic addictions, etc., it may be
desirable in such cases that identities (names, addresses, personal security numbers,
etc.) of patients are hidden [10–12]. This is to prevent, for example, a person’s
name from being associated with possible physical disabilities of a sensitive nature.
A common way of obtaining anonymity is by means of pseudonyms. A pseudonym is
an identifier that could be a random number, and can be established for a long-term
or temporary basis. A temporary pseudonym is preferred since it would prevent
that association between a fixed pseudonym and the medical data of the pertaining
patient can build up over time. There should be no deducible association between
actual identities and patient pseudonyms. A cryptographic access control based on
patient consent that provides patient anonymity is presented in Paper F.
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3.1 An overview of the results
Generic protocols A, B, C, D, E
Protocols confined to the medical context F, G, H, I
Table 1: Papers according protocol relevance
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Generic Medical context
Ad hoc groups A, B F*, I
Long-term groups C, D, E F*, G, H
Table 2: Papers according to group composition and context
Non-hierarchical Hierarchical
Ad hoc groups B, F* A, I
Long-term groups F*, D, E, H C
Table 3: Papers according to group composition and hierarchy. The asterisk *
denotes that temporal team property is irrelevant for this protocol.
Medical teams H
Patients F, G, I
Security administrators G
Table 4: Papers according to granting entity
3.1.1 Considerations and overview
The included papers can be broadly categorized according to whether the included
methods are generic, or apply specifically to the medical context (Table 1). Never-
theless, the generic methods are highly relevant for, but not limited to, the medical
scenario. The presented methods are broadcast-oriented, and are therefore well-
suitable for wireless networks.
Team aspects
The team (or group) aspect is essential in many of the methods of this thesis. We
distinguish between groups according to whether they are ad hoc (short-term) and
long-term. The latter means that the composition of such teams would be predefined
for a long-term basis. Table 2 shows the papers according team lifetime (long-
term/short-term) and context, i.e., generic, or specifically for the medical context.
The protocols presented in Papers A, B, I, support establishment of group-
oriented cryptokeys for ad hoc groups. The key establishment is contributory, i.e.,
each of the pertaining participants contributes equally to the values of the estab-
lished keys.
Long-term teams are characterized by a predefined composition. In this thesis,
such teams are represented by long-term public keys. The protocols presented in
Papers C, D, E, G, H, support long-term teams, whereof the cryptographic methods
are based on threshold-oriented cryptography.
Hierarchical aspects
Both short-term and long-term teams can be hierarchical, meaning that medical
teams would be composed of hierarchically ranked medical personnel like doctors
and nurses. The medical information could be classified into sensitivity levels in
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agreement with the user levels. The papers are categorized in Table 3 according to
the hierarchical property.
Secure hierarchical group communication could be achieved by means of secure
establishment of hierarchical session keys over insecure networks. A generic hierar-
chical key agreement protocol is presented in Paper A whereof an essential security
property is that users of a given level can obtain data that pertains to their own and
underlying security levels, while it must be computationally infeasible to obtain data
pertaining to overlying security levels. Other hierarchical schemes are presented in
Papers C and I.
Authorization of EPR access
The medical scenario is fast-changing and highly dynamic where medical practition-
ers provide care to new patients that are being continuously hospitalized. Since
medical hospitals and institutions could house databases containing patient records
for hundreds of thousands of people, access control can therefore not be based on
long-term, predefined permission assignments between users and data objects. The
presented methods in this thesis enable that such permission assignments can be
established dynamically according to needs. The concept of roles, however, is well-
suitable in context of user hierarchies, since a role could describe the hierarchical
rankings of users. Accordingly, users could be granted access to data whose sensi-
tivity level is in agreement with the user ranking, and to data of a lesser sensitivity
level. It must accordingly be prohibited that participants may obtain access to data
whose sensitivity level is above the privilege level of that participant.
In Chapter 2.4, we discussed that the need-to-know principle as a proper criterion
dynamic establishment of EPR access. We also discussed the complementary issue
of who to be in position of granting medical practitioners access to relevant medical
data. The schemes presented in Papers F, G, H, I, put medical teams, patients and
security administrators as granting authorities for establishment of EPR access.
Other considerations
Patient anonymity is addressed in the cryptographic scheme presented in Paper F.
In this scheme, a patient can grant medical teams access to his or her EPR without
revealing his or her identity. This scheme also provides secure data storage in the
sense that the patient records are stored encrypted at the EPR server. Since there
is no cryptokey tables, the consequent problem of secure key management is evaded
due to that pertaining cryptokeys are confidentially established at the EPR server
by means of the protected inputs of the patients and medical teams.
3.1.2 Contributions of the papers
Paper A: Hierarchical Multi-Party Key Establishment for Wireless Net-
works. In this paper, we present a generic hierarchical multi-party key agreement
(conference key agreement) protocol that is well-suitable for wireless networks. A
common property of practically all multi-party key agreement protocols is that they
are non-hierarchical, i.e., they do not support user hierarchies. However, in the
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medical context, medical practitioners are hierarchically ranked according to their
job position. For example, medical doctors have a higher ranking than nurses,
and it would be reasonable that doctors should access more privileged informa-
tion than nurses. In contrast to existing schemes that provide secure deduction of
hierarchically-arranged long-term keys, this protocol provides secure establishment
of session keys in agreement with user hierarchy, allowing the users of each level to
obtain the session key for their own and underlying levels. Acquisition of session
keys of overlying levels is prohibited.
We also present a closely related hierarchical centralized key distribution protocol
for totally-ordered and partially-ordered security classes.
Paper B: Public Group Key Cryptography. In this paper, we present an
efficient conference key agreement scheme that enables ad hoc user groups to se-
curely establish complementary session-based public/private key pairs. This con-
cept is referred to in this paper as public group key cryptography. A corresponding
multi-party signature provides certification of the public group key, cryptographi-
cally linking it to the originating the group participants. No online trusted third
party is required for session key establishment.
In the medical scenario, secure communication for medical teams could be achieved
by means of this group-oriented cryptosystem. By means of public group keys, EPR
servers can securely transfer medical data to relevant teams of medical personnel.
Paper C: Efficient Hierarchical Group-Oriented Key Establishment and
Decryption. In this paper, we present three related efficient generic cryptographic
schemes for secure communication for hierarchically composed groups. The first
one is a hierarchical key establishment scheme, but in contrast to the scheme in
Paper A, it is not contributory. The scheme, like the one in Paper A, ensure that
users can only obtain hierarchical session keys for their own and underlying levels,
while it is prevented for overlying levels. The scheme is extended to a hierarchical
public key cryptosystem based on the ElGamal cryptosystem, and furthermore to
an ElGamal-based threshold decryption scheme.
The third scheme is a highly efficient broadcast-oriented threshold-decryption
cryptosystem that requires only one round of broadcasting in the decryption phase.
The threshold requirement enforce that at least t of n (where t ≤ n) participants
are required to collaborate in order to perform decryption.
These schemes are relevant for the medical scenario with regard to secure com-
munication of medical data to medical teams of hierarchical composition.
Paper D: Collusion-resistant Threshold Decryption. In this paper, we pro-
pose a method applied to the threshold decryption scheme of Desmedt and Frankel
[20] that prohibits colluding participants to deduce any of the secret coefficients of
the underlying threshold Shamir secret sharing scheme [30].
Due to that medical care is in considerable degree provided by medical teams, se-
cure group-oriented communication is essential in the medical context. As proposed
in Paper G and H, threshold cryptography could be a proper security mechanism
for the medical context. Most threshold-oriented cryptosystems incorporate the
polynomial-based (t, n) threshold secret sharing scheme of Shamir, that is based on
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Lagrange interpolation in order to reestablish the shared secret. However, Lagrange
interpolation enable disclosure of the secret polynomial coefficients (including the
secret shared key) given t user shares. Any participant holding the shared secret can
subsequently carry out threshold-computations individually, thereby bypassing the
threshold security requirement. This could be a serious problem when the threshold
is low, for example 2 or 3. Disclosure of the polynomial coefficients enables estab-
lishment of new user shares. We refer to this as the collusion problem. In this paper,
we propose a method for threshold decryption that prohibits computation of any
of the secret coefficients of the polynomial of the underlying Shamir secret sharing
scheme, and therefore solves the collusion problem in such cryptosystems.
Paper E: Collusion-Resistant Threshold Cryptosystems. This paper is sim-
ilar to Paper D except that the method presented here requires less computations.
Paper F: Anonymity Preserving Authorization Granting In Medical In-
formation Networks. Medical patient data often contains sensitive personal infor-
mation. This could include sensitive information such as AIDS/HIV status, sexual
transmittable diseases, emotional problems, psychiatric illnesses, genetic predisposi-
tions to diseases, drug addictions, etc. Due to this, it could in some cases be desirable
that information identifying patients, e.g., names, addresses, personal identity num-
bers, etc., would not to be linked to electronic patient records. This paper addresses
the need of hiding patient identities — in contrast to only keeping their medical data
confidential. Another issue that is relevant for access control to electronic patient
records, is what should be the criteria for EPR access to be granted. Patient consent
is in general considered to be a reasonable basis for this.
In this paper, we present a scheme that enables consenting patients to anony-
mously grant medical teams authorization to access their EPRs, without revealing
their true identities to the medical practitioners.
Paper G: EPR Access Authorization of Medical Teams Based on Patient
Consent. In this paper, we present a cryptographic EPR access authorization
scheme that incorporates patient consent as a basis for granting EPR access to
medical teams or practitioners. This ensures that only the medical practitioners
specified by a consenting patient are granted EPR access.
This scheme provides an increased level of data security because it assumes that
all EPRs are stored encrypted at the EPR server. Each EPR is encrypted with
its own unique and secret key that is unknown to all participants including the
pertaining patient. The scheme provides secure and confidential establishment of
EPR cryptokeys for subsequent decryption of the pertaining medical records. There
are no cryptokey tables, but the cryptokey for a given EPR is temporarily restored
at the EPR server for each session by means of the computations of the consenting
patient in conjunction with the EPR server. The scheme is secure and prohibits
deduction of the EPR cryptokeys, and that medical data to be disclosed without
the collaboration of the consenting patient and a medical team.
A variation of the scheme allows an emergency or security team to grant EPR
access on behalf of the patient if the patient is unconscious.
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Paper H: Secure Team-Based EPR Access Acquisition in Wireless Net-
works. Medical teams providing care to a patient have a legitimate need to access
the medical data of the concerning patient. The criterion for authorizing EPR access
could be according to the consensus of a minimum number of concerned participants,
like associated medical practitioners, e.g., a medical team. Group consensus could
qualify as a basis for trust, and hence act as a proper basis for a medical team to
acquire access to the required medical data.
In this paper, we present three closely related threshold-oriented cryptographic
protocols providing secure team-based EPR access acquisition according to the con-
sensus of a minimum number of associated medical participants. The schemes are
broadcast-oriented, and are thus well-suitable for wireless networks. All schemes do
also provide secure transfer of medical data.
Paper I: A Decentralized Hierarchical Access Control Scheme for the
Medical Scenario. In this paper, we present a cryptographic access control scheme
allowing patients to grant ad hoc medical teams authorizations to access their med-
ical data. This scheme is based on the scheme in Paper A. The hierarchical aspects
of teams are taken into account so that the modules of the patient record are to
be accessed according to the individual privileges of the medical professionals of
the team. Thus, more privileged users obtain larger portions of the data than less
privileged users.
3.2 Summary of thesis contribution
The medical scenario is a complex and dynamic environment. Electronic informa-
tion management and computer networks enable ubiquitous access possibilities to
medical databases which may comprise hundreds of thousands of electronic patient
records (EPRs). Such records may contain personal and highly sensitive patient
data, and it is therefore necessary to limit the accessibility of such data to concern-
ing medical personnel only. Since there would be a continuously flow of patients
being hospitalized, access cannot be based on long-term, predefined permission as-
signments between medical practitioners and EPRs, but must rather be established
dynamically according to needs.
In this thesis, we have identified legitimacy and the need-to-know principle as
criteria for granting (establishment) of EPR access. This implies that only medical
personnel going to provide medical care to a given patient should be granted access
to the necessary medical data of the concerning patient they are going to provide
care for. Proper enforcement of these principles would prohibit that non-legitimate
personnel (medical or non-medical) would gain access to medical data without a
legitimate reason. A relevant question would be what type of personnel should be
in authority to grant legitimate personnel EPR access. We have considered consent-
ing patients, security administrators (i.e., coalitions of such), and medical teams to
be relevant, and in this thesis we have presented secure EPR access authorization
schemes for each of these assumptions. Of these, there are two schemes based on pa-
tient consent, whereof one provides patient anonymity, and another provides secure
data storage by long-term EPR database encryption without requiring cryptokey
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tables.
The hierarchical ranking of medical practitioners is significant, since higher rank-
ing implies more privileges. Medical practitioners of higher ranking (e.g., medical
doctors) are accordingly in position to be entrusted access to a larger extent of
sensitive information than practitioners of lower ranking (e.g., nurses). An essen-
tial hierarchical security requirement is to ensure that the medical practitioners are
only granted access to EPR data whose confidentiality level is in agreement with
the user ranking, and to EPR data associated with underlying confidentiality levels.
Included are three security schemes complying with user hierarchy. In addition to
the mentioned accessibility issues, protection of communicated data to and among
multiple users is likewise of essential interest. A number of cryptographic methods
are presented in this thesis that provide secure transmission of medical data over
insecure wireless networks.
Due to the noted group-aspects, the proposed security schemes are mainly group-
oriented. Although all apply for wireless medical networks, the schemes in Papers
A-E are generic, and concern mainly secure group communication. Among others,
these include secure establishment of hierarchical session keys by ad hoc groups, and
secure establishment of public/private group keys by ad hoc groups. The schemes
of the remaining Papers F-I apply specifically for the medical scenario.
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Abstract
A common property of practically all multi-party key agreement pro-
tocols is that they are non-hierarchical, i.e., they do not support user
hierarchies. However, in real life it is likely that members of groups and
organizations differ in ranking according to their job positions, where
participants of a lower ranking should be granted access to less privileged
information than participants of higher rankings. Hierarchical access
control (HAC) schemes address this issue, but in contrast to provide se-
cure distribution of hierarchically-arranged short-term session keys, HAC
schemes provide secure distribution of hierarchically-arranged long-term,
predefined keys. In this paper, we present an efficient hierarchical multi-
party key agreement protocol that is well-suitable for wireless networks.
We also present a closely related hierarchical centralized key distribution
protocol for totally-ordered and partially-ordered security classes.
Thus, it is reasonable that participants of a certain ranking could access more
privileged information than participants of lower rankings.
1 Introduction
Key establishment protocols can be categorized into key transfer protocols and key
agreement protocols. Regarding key transfer protocols, one entity generates and
transfer a secret session key securely to one or more participants over an insecure
network. In key agreement protocols, the users actively participate in the establish-
ment of the secret shared session keys by collaboratively contributing themselves to
the values of the keys. Key agreement protocols for groups or teams of more than
two participants are known as multi-party key agreement or conference key agree-
ment protocols. Several conference key agreement protocols has been previously
proposed, see e.g., [1–3, 8], and common for these is that they are non-hierarchical,
which of course is suitable when the group members have same ranking. However,
in real life, people have different rankings according to their job positions, where
individuals of lower ranking usually would be entrusted less confidential information
than those of higher rankings.
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For example, in the medical scenario, medical care is provided by medical teams
that are composed of doctors and nurses where the doctors have a higher ranking
than the nurses. Due to the sensitive nature of personal medical data, it could be
required that medical practitioners of lower rankings should be privileged access to
less sensitive or confidential medical information than those of higher rankings. It
is also necessary that medical data is transferred securely to the legitimate team
members. This could be achieved by means of encryption which requires secure
establishment of shared secret keys according to the user hierarchy.
In this paper, we present a hierarchical multi-party key agreement protocol suit-
able for ad hoc wireless networks. It complies with an hierarchical arrangement of
user classes (or security classes) where each user is associated with one security class
that correspond to his or her job position. The protocol enables the participants to
secretly establish one secret hierarchical session key for each security class – subse-
quently referred to as class key. Moreover, we present a closely related hierarchical
centralized key distribution scheme, where class keys are originates from one party.
An essential security property is that the participants of any given security class
can obtain the secret class keys that are established by their own and underlying se-
curity classes, while disclosure of class keys of overlying security classes is prevented.
2 Related work
The concept of hierarchical key agreement protocols seems to be somewhat absent
in the literature. Hwang et al. [4] proposed a hierarchical key agreement protocol
based on the multi-party key agreement key protocol in [7] that incorporates a
hierarchy of classes that enables the participants to securely establish class keys for
each class. Moreover, the participants of a given class can obtain the class keys of the
underlying security classes, while it is prevented that class keys of overlying security
classes can be disclosed. Unfortunately, the protocol provides no means to verify
the user levels which allows any user to pretend to have a higher ranking than his
or her legitimate ranking. Thus, the protocol fails to provide secure and trustable
user hierarchies. Another major disadvantage is that it is highly inefficient due to
that the number of rounds equals the number of participants. Eskeland proposed
an efficient hierarchical key agreement protocol that requires only two rounds of
broadcasting [5]. An improved version with increased computational efficiency and
improved user authentication was published at the Third International Symposium
on Information Assurance and Security [6] whereof this is an extended paper.
Hierarchical key establishment is not to be confused with hierarchical access
control schemes (HAC) and tree-based key management schemes (TBKM). Hier-
archical access control is a class of cryptographic schemes that supports deduction
of long-term predefined cryptographic keys that are hierarchically arranged, so that
users of a given security class are able to securely compute such keys associated with
their own and underlying security classes, while computation of keys associated with
overlying security classes is prevented.
While the hierarchical key establishment schemes presented in this paper provide
secure ad-hoc establishment of a hierarchy of ”fresh” sessions keys, (referred to as
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class keys), HAC schemes do in contrast enable computation of predefined static keys
from a key hierarchy. Providing computation of hierarchical predefined keys and not
hierarchical sessions keys is reasonably a considerable limitation of the applicability
and usefulness of such schemes.
However, due to access control purposes, many HAC schemes are compliant with
user dynamics, i.e., inclusion and exclusion of users and corresponding renewal of
hierarchical keys for the pertaining security classes. Examples of HAC schemes can
be found in [14–17].
Tree-based key management schemes can be regarded as centralized key distri-
bution where the users of a group establish a key tree where the users are arranged
as leaf nodes of the tree. Due to the to tree structure, it allows them to obtain a
common key that is the root. Thus, such schemes are not hierarchical due to that the
users obtain one shared secret key. Examples are Tree-based Group Diffie-Hellman
agreement [18], and others in [19, 20]. An essential issue about HAC and TBKM
schemes is support of group dynamics (joining and leaving of users) so that protocol
re-run is not necessary for each user update.
3 Preliminaries
3.1 Security requirements
The security requirements of the hierarchical multi-party key agreement protocol
presented in Section 4 are as follows:
Security Requirement 1. Class key confidentiality. Only legitimate participants
(or insiders) must be able to establish and obtain the class keys (or hierarchical
session keys). It must not be possible to compute new class keys by means of former
class keys of any security classes.
Security Requirement 2. User key confidentiality. It must be prevented that
long-term secret user keys can be disclosed.
Security Requirement 3. User authentication. It must be securely established
that each member is a genuine member of the claimed security class. Thus, user
authentication must include certification of the pertaining security class of each user.
Security Requirement 4. Forward secrecy. Compromise of long-term secret user
keys must not reveal formerly established class keys.
Security Requirement 5. Onewayness. The hierarchical multi-party protocol
provides one secret class key for each level of the user hierarchy. It must be provided
that each user of a given security class can only obtain class keys that are associated
to his or her own and underlying security classes, and prevented that class keys of
overlying classes can be disclosed.
The proposed schemes are broadcast-oriented and efficient, and are thus well-
suitable for ad hoc wireless networks. Broadcasting efficiently distributes the key
establishment messages from user user to the others, but allows an adversary to
easily eavesdrop the key establishment messages. We can moreover assume that an
adversary has been a former participant and may hold former keys. Consequently,
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the security requirements must be satisfied in presence of passive adversaries with
such capabilities.
An active adversary can modify (i.e., add, replace, replay) any broadcasted mes-
sages he or she wants. The adversary may, for example, attempt to impersonate any
legitimate user by replaying old messages where the associated former class key is
known. It must be infeasible to compromise the protocol without being detected or
that the protocol does not terminate.
No online trusted party is required for computing class keys.
3.2 Hierarchical preliminaries
Let U = {P1, . . . , Pm} denote a team or group of m participants where each partici-
pant Pi ∈ U is associated with a hierarchy level and where Li denotes the hierarchy
level of Pi. We assume that each security level ` contains one security class S` ⊆ U
that includes all participants of that security level:
S` = {Pj |Pj ∈ U and ` = Lj}
where ` ∈ {1, . . . , λ} and λ denotes the top security level. We have that the security
classes are partitions of U so that
⋃
1≤i≤λ
Si = U and Si ∩ Sj = ∅
where i, j ∈ {1, . . . , λ} and i 6= j. Thus, each participant Pi ∈ U is associated with
one security class such that Pi ∈ S` for some 1 ≤ ` ≤ λ.
We denote the hierarchical ranking of the security classes according to the rela-
tion ≺ so that
Si ≺ Sj if i < j
which indicates that Sj has a higher ranking than Si. The higher security level, the
higher is the ranking in the hierarchy.
4 The protocol
In this section, we present the hierarchical multi-party key establishment proto-
col. It allows any composition of hierarchically ranked participants to establish of
a corresponding hierarchy of conference keys over ad hoc wireless networks. Au-
thentication allows any participant to detect if the hierarchical user arrangement is
compromised, i.e., if a participant pretends to have a higher ranking than his or her
legitimate ranking. The protocol is based on [5, 6] which are partly based on the
multi-party key agreement protocol presented in [1].
4.1 User arrangement
In agreement with the directions in Section 3.2, the users are arranged in increasing
order according to their ranking. Moreover, we assume that within each security
class and across the security classes, the users are linearly ordered. This means that
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the members of U form a sequence or string of users arranged in increasing order
according to their ranking, where P1 ∈ S1 denotes the sequentially first user and
Pm ∈ Sλ denotes the sequentially last user. The users Pi and Pi+1 are adjacent for
1 ≤ i < m.
The sequential user arrangement implies that if Pi ∈ S` is sequentially positioned
first in S`, he or she is adjacent with Pi−1 ∈ S`−1 of the underlying class S`−1. Thus,
` = Li−1+1 = Li. Likewise, Pi ∈ S` is positioned at the end of S` if ` = Li+1−1 = Li.
The participants could, for instance, be ordered within each security class by
sorting according to their identities. To ensure different user order for each session,
the users within each security class could be ordered according to f(IDi, T ) where
f is a hash function and T is a timestamp. Moreover, a change in the hierarchy,
inclusion of new participants or participants leaving requires protocol re-run.
4.2 The protocol
In this subsection, we present the hierarchical key establishment scheme. It consists
of an initialization stage, a key establishment stage with user authentication, and a
key verification stage. The user authentication is analogous to the authentication
scheme presented in [10,11].
Initialization. A trusted authority (TA) is required to provide the long-term secret
user keys which are the basis for the user authentication of the protocol. The TA
has thus not a part in running the protocol.
According to the RSA cryptosystem [9], the TA selects two distinct secret large
prime numbers p and q, and computes the composite modulus n = p · q. The TA
selects a public key e that is relative prime to φ(n) = (p− 1) · (q− 1) and computes
the secret key d so that e · d ≡ 1 (mod φ(n)), where e and n are public. The TA
selects a public element α that is of maximal order in Z∗n.
The TA computes for each user Pi ∈ S` an identifier as the hash of the con-
catenation of user identity IDi and the pertaining user level Li as idi = f(IDi |Li)
where f is a secure one-way function. Based on idi, the TA computes the secret
user key
si = iddi (mod n)
The secret long-term user keys are confidentially distributed to the respective users.
Class key computation. The protocol goes as follows:
Step 1. Each participant Pi ∈ U , 1 ≤ i ≤ m, generates a random secret number
ri ∈ Zn, and computes and broadcasts
xi = αe·ri (mod n)
Step 2. Each participant Pi for 2 ≤ i ≤ m− 1 computes
vi = ki−1,i − k2i,i+1 (mod n)
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where ki−1,i = xrii−1 (mod n) and ki,i+1 = x
ri
i+1 (mod n) are secretly established
Diffie-Hellman keys that are shared between Pi and Pi−1, and Pi and Pi+1, respec-
tively. The squaring of the second term of vi provides the one-way security property
preventing Pi ∈ S` obtaining class keys Kl for higher classes where l > `.
The participants P1 and Pm, who do not have two adjacent users, compute
a number linking to the current session, say, vj = c for j ∈ {1, m} where c =
f(x1|x2| . . . |xm) represents the current session due to the concatenation of the ses-
sion dependent numbers and f denotes a secure one-way function. For authentica-
tion, each user Pi ∈ U computes
wi = si · αri·f(xi,vi,c) (mod n)
Each participant Pi ∈ U broadcasts (IDj , Lj , vi, wi).
Step 3. Authentication. Each participant Pi ∈ U authenticates the other participants
Pj ∈ U , i 6= j, by verifying
wej
?≡ idj · xf(xj ,vj ,c)j (mod n)
where idj = f(IDj |Lj).
Step 4. Class key establishment. We define the class key K` for a given class S` as
the DH key kj,j+1 established by the sequentially first participant Pj ∈ S` of that
class and the adjacent participant Pj+1. Thus, ` = Lj = Lj−1 + 1 where L0 = 0 is
the initial condition.
Due to that the users are sequentially arranged in agreement to the increasing
ordering of the security classes, each participant is able to deduce the DH-keys of the
preceding participants, i.e., participants of underlying security classes. The converse
is prevented according to the one-way security property.
Each participant Pi ∈ S` computes the secret DH keys preceding participants
kj−1,j , i > j, according to the recurrence relation
kj−1,j = vj + k2j,j+1 (mod n)
Accordingly, Pi ∈ S` can compute the class key of his or her security class and
underlying class keys Kγ , 1 ≤ γ ≤ `, according to
Kγ = kj,j+1 = αerjrj+1 (mod n)
where Pj is the sequentially first participant of Sγ , i.e., γ = Lj−1 + 1 where L0 = 0.
Key verification. Each participant Pi ∈ U can verify that preceding participants
Pj ∈ U , j < i, have computed vj according to the protocol. This is done by checking
that
v2j
?≡ k̂2j−1,j − 2 · k̂j−1,j · k2j,j+1 + k4j,j+1 (mod n)
holds where k̂j−1,j is the deduced candidate DH key.
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4.3 Example
To illustrate the protocol and hierarchical user arrangements, here is an example
of 7 members of two security classes, S1 = {P1, P2, P3} and S2 = {P4, P5, P6, P7},
where S1 ≺ S2. In agreement with Step 4, P7 ∈ S2, holding k6,7, computes the class
key of S2 according to
K2 = v5 + (v6 + k26,7)
2 = k4,5 = αer4r5 (mod n)
Next, P7 ∈ S2 computes the class key of the underlying security class S1 according
to
K1 = v2 +
(
v3 + (v4 + k24,5)
2
)2 = k1,2 = αer1r2 (mod n)
5 Security analysis
In this section, we show that the scheme is secure in agreement with the security
requirements presented in Section 3.1.
Security Requirement 1. Class key confidentiality. The secrecy of class keys is based
on the Diffie-Hellman computational problem, meaning that knowing αx (mod p)
and αy (mod p) where p is a large prime, it is computationally infeasible to find
αx·y (mod p). Also note that due to the Discrete Logarithm Problem, it is compu-
tationally infeasible to deduce x given αx (mod p). Accordingly, this holds for our
scheme given where two participants Pi and Pi−1 respectively hold the secrets ri and
ri−1. Given the public numbers αe·ri (mod p) and αe·ri−1 (mod p), the shared secret
αe·ri−1·ri (mod p) is protected due to the Diffie-Hellman computational problem.
Security Requirement 2. User key confidentiality. Note that wi is composed of
two secret factors, si and αri·f(xi,vi,c). Due to the RSA assumption where φ(n) is
unknown because of the unknown factorization of n; given e, it is computationally
infeasible to compute e−1 = d (mod φ(n)). This effectively prevents that secret user
keys can be disclosed as id(e
−1)
i (mod n) given idi.
Accordingly, given xi, it is computationally infeasible to obtain αri since it is com-
putationally infeasible to find f(xi, vi, c)−1 (mod φ(n)) due to the RSA assumption.
Moreover, due to the Discrete Logarithm Problem, it is computationally infeasible
to obtain ri given xi, which prevents establishment of αri . This prevents computa-
tion of the secret factor αri·f(xi,vi,c) which accordingly protects the secret user key
si.
Security Requirement 3. User authentication. User authentication is analogous to
that in [10, 11], and is achieved due to the user signature computed by each user
Pi ∈ U . The user signature is constituted by
xi = αe·ri (mod n)
wi = si · αri·f(xi,vi,c) (mod n)
where ri is secretly known only by Pi ∈ U , and si is the long-term secret user key.
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An adversary may attempt to forge a valid signature wi by raising it to a power
a′j = f(x
′
j , v
′
j , c
′) that represents another context according to
w′j = w
a′j
i (mod n)
This will fail since w′j will correspond to id
′
j = id
a′j
i (mod n) which means that the
adversary must overcome the difficulty of reversing the hash function f by finding
ID′j and L
′
j so that id
′
j = f(ID
′
j |L′j).
A similar authentication scheme is found in [12] where the verification is analo-
gous to
yej
?≡ IDj · xf(T )j (mod n)
where xj = αe·rj (mod n), yj = si · αrj ·f(T ) (mod n) and T is a timestamp. This
scheme is not resistant to the Extended Euclidian Algorithm attack [13]. If e and
f(T ) are relatively prime, we can find two integers u, v, so that e·u = 1+f(T )·v. An
adversary can thus pick a valid idj , and compute xj = IDvj (mod n) and yj = ID
u
j
(mod n). The attack succeeds in the scheme in [12] because
yej = IDj · xf(T )j = (IDuj )e = IDj · (IDvj )f(T ) (mod n)
This attack is thwarted in our scheme since xj is included in certifying power
f(xj , vj , c).
Security Requirement 4. Forward secrecy is defined as when a long-term key is
compromised, class keys that were previously established using that long-term key
should not be compromised too [8, p. 50]. Compromise of long-term user keys would
enable an adversary to obtain αri·f(xi,vi,c) given wi, 1 ≤ i ≤ m. As noted, the secret
ri is protected due to the Discrete Logarithm Problem. Thus, the pertaining ki,i+1
or ki−1,i cannot be deduced by means of long-term user keys, and forward secrecy
is provided.
Security Requirement 5. Onewayness. The one-way property prevents that Pi ∈ S`
can compute Kl if S` ≺ Sl. This is ensured by squaring the last term of vj . Since
n is the product of two large secret primes, the value of φ(n) is unknown, and it is
thus computationally infeasible to find roots in Zn. In order to obtain the succeeding
secret DH key ki+1,i+2, Pi ∈ U , holding ki,i+1, must solve
ki+1,i+2 =
√
ki+1,i+2 − vi+1 (mod n)
=
√
ki,i+1 − (ki,i+1 − k2i+1,i+2) (mod n)
=
√
k2i+1,i+2 (mod n)
which is computationally infeasible since the factorization of n is unknown.
It is essential that each user Pi ∈ U computes vi according to the protocol. The
protocol could be subverted if a malicious user Pi ∈ U would broadcast vj = kj−1,j−
kj,j+1 (mod n) since this would break the onewayness security property, allowing
Pi−1 to deduce ki,i+1. Attempts of such violations will, however, be detected by an
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honest participant who will deduce the candidate DH key as k̂j−1,j = vj + k2j,j+1 =
kj−1,j − kj,j+1 + k2j,j+1. This will cause that the verification
v2j = (kj−1,j − kj,j+1)2 6= k̂2j−1,j − 2 k̂j−1,j kj,j+1 + k4j,j+1 (mod n)
does not hold, and the protocol aborts.
6 Generalizing the protocol
The protocol presented in the previous section can be put in a more general form. In
the general representation, any two-party key establishment scheme, user authen-
tication scheme and one-way function could be used as building blocks, whereas
the given security assumptions would consequently then rely on the actual security
properties of the applied building blocks. Since user authentication may or may not
be integrated to key establishment, we will here only consider the general class key
establishment.
The same assumptions about user alignment apply for the generalized protocol
so that the users are sequentially arranged in increasing order according to their
ranking. Given any secure two-party key establishment protocol, each participant
Pi ∈ U establishes the secret session keys ki−1,i (if i > 1) and ki,i+1 (if i < m) shared
respectively with Pi−1 ∈ U and Pi+1 ∈ U .
Then Pi ∈ U computes and broadcasts
vi = ki−1,i − f(ki,i+1)
where f is a secure one-way function. Note that the computations could be modular
or non-modular. This could in practice depend on the integer size of actual imple-
mentations. However, avoiding the modulus operator would obviously increase the
computational efficiency.
A further generalization pertains operators which has so far been confined to
subtraction and addition. Division (and subsequent multiplication for class key
restoration) would work fine, but should be modular since computations involving
real numbers should be avoided:
vi =
ki−1,i
f(ki,i+1)
(mod p)
Nevertheless, addition is more efficient than multiplication and would thus be more
preferable. Lastly, the bitwise XOR operator could be applied for the best compu-
tational efficiency:
vi = ki−1,i ⊕ f(ki,i+1)
Application of the bitwise XOR operator requires consequently that the number of
bytes of the keys ki−1,i and the output of f are equal.
Computation of preceding keys and class keys would be in agreement with the
respective recurrence relations
kj−1,j =



vj + f(kj,j+1)
vj · f(kj,j+1) (mod p)
vj ⊕ f(kj,j+1)
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where, in agreement with Step 4 of the scheme presented in Section 4, Pi ∈ S` can
compute Kγ = kj,j+1 for 1 ≤ γ ≤ ` if Pj is sequentially first in Sγ , i.e., γ = Lj−1 +1
where L0 = 0.
Note that, for example, if the applied one-way function is a hash-function, the
key verification step in Section 4 would not work.
7 Centralized key distribution
In this section, we present a centralized key distribution scheme that is based on
the key establishment protocol in the previous section. By centralized we mean that
one entity initiates the protocol by means of hierarchical public parameters of the
pertaining group. This is in contrast to the previous protocol where all participants
depend on the others in order to establish and deduce the secret hierarchical session
keys.
As follows, the centralized key distribution scheme is presented respectively for
both totally-ordered and partially-ordered security classes. Moreover, all partici-
pants of each security class share a long-term secret key that is associated to that
class.
7.1 Security properties
In the previous protocol, the hierarchical session keys (or class keys) are estab-
lished and deduced as a function of user inputs where each user contributes with
session-dependant inputs. In the following centralized protocols, the class keys are
established as a function of the public parameters representing a team, the secret
long-term hierarchical keys and a random number. Thus, the correct class key can
only be established by means of the proper secret long-term hierarchical key.
An essential security property of our scheme is that although participants of a
given security class may compute class keys of underlying security classes, it should
be prevented that any given class may deduce secret long-term hierarchical keys of
other classes, i.e., long-term hierarchical key confidentiality. A reason why this is
essential, is that such keys could be used for other applications and purposes as
well whereof participants of other security classes may not be involved with. Con-
sequently, it must be ensured that long-term hierarchical keys remain undisclosed,
even for participants of higher rankings.
Note that since any party could initiate key distribution without not necessarily
possessing any pertaining long-term secret user keys, this party would be prevented
from obtaining the corresponding hierarchical session keys. Since key transfer pro-
tocols allow one party to securely transfer a secret key to other parties, the following
protocol qualifies as a key transfer protocol only if the initiating party possesses the
pertaining long-term secret user keys.
The centralized protocols do not have explicit user authentication like the pre-
vious protocol. However, since user authentication is based on the assumption that
only the legitimate users hold the pertaining secret long-term keys (whereof key
correctness depends), user authentication is an implicit property of the protocol.
Thus, the centralized protocols provide implicit user authentication, key secrecy
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and hierarchical one-way security property. The security properties comply with
the previous protocol except that forward secrecy is not supported.
7.2 Totally-ordered centralized protocol
In this subsection, we present the totally-ordered centralized version of the protocol.
Initialization. Let n = p · q where p and q are two large distinct primes, and let
α be an element of maximal order in Z∗n. The trusted authority (TA) that sets up
the scheme randomly generates λ secret long-term hierarchical user keys, kj ∈ Zφ(n),
j ∈ {1, . . . , λ}, so that each user in the security class Sj is confidentially handed the
pertaining kj . The TA computes for each Sj ⊆ U the public parameters
Y = {yj = αkj−2·kj+1 (mod n) | 1 ≤ j < λ}
Key establishment. One particular party is required to initiate the protocol. We
refer to this party as the registry. This could be any of the participants or an
arbitrary outsider. The protocol goes through the following steps:
Step 1. The registry selects a random number r, computes and broadcasts
zj = yrj (mod n) and R = α
r (mod n)
for each security class Sj ⊆ U .
Step 2. Each participant in S` computes the class key referring to his or her security
class according to
K` = Rk` (mod n)
In general, each participant in S` computes the class keys Ki of his own and the
underlying security classes Si, 1 ≤ i ≤ ` according to
Ki = Rki = zi · z2i+1 · · · z(2
`−1)
j−1 ·R(2
`·k`) (mod n)
= R(2
`·k`) ·
`−1∏
j=0
z
(2j)
i+j (mod n)
Example. Given a 4 level totally-ordered hierarchy, each participant in S4 would
compute K1 = z1 · z22 · z43 ·R8·k4 (mod n), etc.
7.3 Partially-ordered centralized protocol
The protocol for partially-ordered security classes is basically the same as the totally-
ordered centralized protocol other from its more general hierarchical capabilities.
Definitions and notation. Let U = {S1, . . . , Sλ} be λ disjoint security classes.
Let H ⊆ U × U be the binary relation where (Si, Sj) ∈ H iff Si is an immediate
predecessor of Sj and where the users in Si have a higher security clearance than the
users in Sj . A partially ordered set (U ,H) can be represented by a Hasse diagram
where an edge from Si to Sj represents (Si, Sj) ∈ H.
Paper A: Hierarchical Multi-Party Key Establishment for Wireless Networks 47
Let H∗ denote a reflexive transitive closure of H. Let Si ¹ Sj iff (Si, Sj) ∈ H∗.
This means that the users in Si have a security clearance higher than or equal to the
users in Sj . Fig. 1 shows an example of a partially ordered hierarchy defined by the
relation H = {(S6, S5), (S6, S4), (S4, S3), (S4, S2), (S3, S1), (S2, S1)}. For example,
(S6, S4), (S4, S2) ∈ H implies that (S6, S2) ∈ H∗.
Initialization. The TA generates long-term secret user keys as in the previous
subsection, and computes the long-term public hierarchical parameters Y according
partially-ordered hierarchical structure of the group U .
For each edge (Si, Sj) ∈ H, the TA computes the public parameters
Y = {yi,j = αki−2·kj (mod n) | (i, j) ∈ IH}
where IH =
{
(i, j) | (Si, Sj) ∈ H
}
. Thus, |Y | = |H|. The example in Fig. 1
corresponds to Y = {y6,5, y6,4, y4,3, y4,2, y3,1, y2,1}.
Key establishment. The registry selects a random number r, computes and broad-
casts
Z = {zi,j = yri,j (mod n) | yi,j ∈ Y } and R = αr (mod n)
Next, each participant in S` computes the conference key referring to his or her
security class according to
K` = Rk` (mod n)
If there exists an edge (Si, Sj) ∈ H, then Kj can be computed if Ki is known:
Kj = zi,j ·K2i (mod n) where zi,j ∈ Z
Thus, in general, if S`,j ∈ H∗, each participant in S` can recursively compute Kj .
8 Conclusion
In this paper, we have presented an efficient hierarchical multi-party key agreement
protocol that enables an arbitrary number of users of λ security classes to securely
compute a secret class key for each security class. It provides user authentication,
and allows users in a given security class to compute the secret class keys of the same
and underlying security classes, while it is prevented that any user can obtain class
keys of overlying security classes. The scheme is broadcast-oriented and requires
only two rounds of broadcasting, and is thus well-suitable for wireless networks.
We have moreover presented a centralized hierarchical key distribution scheme
based on the former that supports totally-ordered and partially-ordered user hier-
archies.
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Abstract
Several conference key establishment protocols have in the recent years
been proposed for the purpose of secure group communication. In this
paper, we introduce the concept of public group key cryptography
as an extension to regular conference key agreement, and propose an
efficient and practical public group key cryptosystem that enables par-
ticipants of groups, without an online trusted third party, to flexibly
establish public/private key pairs that represent the groups. By means
of private group keys, secure communication is provided internally be-
tween the group members, and moreover, outsiders can by means of
the public group key address the group confidentially. A multi-party
signature provides certification of the public group key towards the
group participants.
1 Introduction
With the evolution of Internet and wireless networks and with increasing focus
on group collaboration, there has been a correspondingly increased focus on
secure group communication, i.e., two or more participants that are physically
located on different locations can confidentially establish on a secret key over an
insecure public network. Key establishment protocols can be categorized into two
concepts: 1) Key agreement, where each participant contributes equally to the
value of the session key, and 2) key distribution (or key transfer), where a trusted
party or participant generates a secret session key and transfers it confidentially
and securely to the legitimate participants. Key agreement protocols involving
more than two participants are called conference key agreement or multi-party
key agreement protocols.
There may be situations when it is desirable that outsiders can address a group
securely and confidentially. A naive approach for this in the context of secure
group key establishment protocols could be to include the outsider into the group,
and then re-run the protocol in order to re-establish a new secret group key. The
confidentiality of the secret information shared within the group would accord-
ingly be compromised, since the new participant would be sharing the key with
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the group and would therefore have access to subsequently exchanged confiden-
tial information that is only to be disclosed to the original members.
A proper solution could be to incorporate a public key that would publicly repre-
sent the group where the complementary secret key would consequently be known
to the group members only. This way, the following is achieved: 1) The group
members can now communicate securely among themselves, and 2) outsiders can
address the group securely by means of the public key.
Centralized solutions involving online trusted third parties (TTP) providing key
generation and secure key distribution, may conform poorly to distributed and
wireless environments. By extending the concept of conference key agreement,
we propose a public group key cryptosystem where group members can collabo-
ratively establish corresponding public/private group keys pairs over a wireless
network without involving an online TTP. In order to make the public keys
trustable, some kind of certification is required. The proposed cryptosystem pro-
vides identity-based signatures that certify public group keys toward identities
of the originating users and time of establishment.
1.1 Related work
Threshold-oriented cryptosystems is class of group-oriented cryptosystems that
are based on the concept of public key cryptography where a group, consisting of
a number of members, is represented by a public key. See see [1–5] for examples
of such schemes. Although our scheme provides a public key representation of
groups, it differs fundamentally from those due to that it is not a threshold
scheme, and that it is identity-based. We will nevertheless discuss a few such
schemes since they partially relates to our scheme.
The first threshold-oriented cryptographic protocol was proposed in [2]. In this
scheme, there is one public key and a number of corresponding secret shares that
together represent the corresponding secret key. The public key represents the
group, and the public key and secret shares are generated by a trusted third party
(TTP). Each participant is handed a share by which each participant computes a
partial decryption of the ciphertext. A minimum number of participants, defined
by the threshold, must combine their partial decryptions in cooperation with a
trusted party to reconstruct the plaintext. Due to the (unsigned) public key, the
scheme provides anonymity, keeping the members of the group anonymous to
outsiders.
In [4,5], a group-oriented cryptosystem is presented. In this system, the outsider
that wants to address the group, encrypts the message with each of the public
keys of the participants of the group, and sends each of these cryptograms to
the corresponding participants. In order to decrypt, a minimum number of the
participants, the threshold, must cooperate to restore the plaintext, without the
help of a trusted combiner function.
The protocol presented in [4] and subsequently updated in [5] is an identity-based
threshold-decryption scheme based on self-certifying public keys [13]. The partic-
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ipants compute the plaintext themselves from their partial decryptions, thereby
eliminating an online trusted party for this. However, this scheme requires the
sender to encrypt the plaintext for each of the members of the corresponding
group that he or she wants to confidentially address. In contrast to encrypting
once by means of one public key, this scheme imposes an unreasonably high
overhead considering computation and bandwidth.
2 Public group key
By means of a public group key, outsiders can confidentially address groups and
the group members can communicate secretly among themselves. The following
list indicates security requirements for the proposed key establishment protocol:
• The protocol must resist passive attacks (i.e., eavesdropping) so that secret
group keys remain confidential to the concerning parties only.
• The protocol must resist active attacks so that attempts of substitution of
and alternation of key establishment messages will be detected.
• The establishment of group keys is to be performed in a distributed and
contributory fashion so that each participant contributes equally to the key,
thereby providing unique and ”fresh” keys for each session.
• Forward secrecy is defined as if a long-term user key is compromised, ses-
sion keys previously established with that long-term user key cannot be
compromised [12, p. 50]. The protocol must provide forward secrecy.
• Public group keys must be certifiable offline (without an online trusted
party) towards the identities of all the originating participants, and time of
establishment.
• No online TTP or combiner functions.
• A nice but not really mandatory property is public reconstruction of the
public group key, making the public group key privately verifiable towards
the secret group key, thereby providing implicit key authentication.
An important property for a public key is to provide proof of context. In order
for a public key to be trustworthy for the outside world or valid, outsiders must
be certain that the owner of this public key is really the person he thinks it is.
Otherwise, an unauthorized individual could cheat and obtain this confidential
information of substituting public keys with his own. It is therefore essential
that the association between public keys and their owners can be verified. In the
context of our scheme, individuals running the protocol would consequently con-
stitute and thereby define the groups that the established keys would represent.
It is highly essential that the association between group-established public group
keys and the identities of the originating group members is certifiable, including
the time of establishment. The issue of statically linking public keys with identi-
ties is addressed by certificates and in [13] by the concept of self-certified public
keys. This does not comply with group key agreement where keys are established
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session-wise by a number of participants, without a TTP. The proposed protocol
employs a homomorphic identity-based signature scheme for establishment of
multi-party signatures verifying the corresponding public group keys.
3 A practical public group key cryptosystem
In this section, the public group key protocol is presented. In 1994, Burmester
and Desmedt generalized the well-known Diffie-Hellman two-party key agreement
protocol into a conference key agreement protocol [6]. In [7], this was moreover
generalized into a multiplicative and an additive variant having the secret keys
on the form respectively as K = k1,2 · k2,3 · . . . · km,1 and K = k1,2 + k2,3 + . . . +
km,1. Our protocol is based on the additive variant and is very efficient as it
requires only two rounds (two broadcasts per participant), and a third round for
establishment of the multi-party public group key signature. Due to broadcasting,
it is well suitable for wireless environments. The protocol is identity-based and
each participant is assigned identity-based long-term secret user keys.
3.1 Setup
A trusted center, a trusted third party (TTP) computes the product of two
secret, large prime numbers n = p · q. According to the RSA cryptosystem, the
center selects a number e that is relative prime to φ(n), and computes a secret
integer d so that e · d ≡ 1 (mod φ(n)). The TTP publishes n and e.
The only purpose for the TTP is to provide long-term secret ID-based user keys.
Long-term user keys are required for user computation of signatures certifying
key agreement messages and public group keys. The TTP computes for each
user Pi the long-term secret user keys, si = IDdi (mod n) and hi = α
d·f(IDi)
(mod n), where f denotes a secure hash-function, d is only known by TTP, and
α is a public primitive root of GF (p) and GF (q).
It is assumed that the user identities consist of meaningful information like
names, addresses, etc., or that the identities are posted in tamper-free tables
or secure bulletin boards for verification. Otherwise, adversaries can produce
fake user keys s′ representing meaningless identities id′ according to id′ = s′e
(mod n).
3.2 Group key computation
The group U = {P1, . . . , Pm}, consisting of m members, is arranged according
to a logical ring structure so that Pm and P1 are an adjacent pair of users, and
that Pm+i = Pi. Note that in general that the indexing is circular, so that if the
index j is j < 1, then it corresponds to the index i = j + m, or if j > m, then
the corresponding index is i = j −m, where 1 ≤ i ≤ m. Thus, the indices j and
j + m are equivalent: j ≡ j + m. The protocol goes as follows:
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Round 1. Each adjacent pair of users, Pi, Pi+1, establish a secret key by means
of a secure two-party key agreement (TPKA) protocol. That is, every user Pi
establishes with users Pi+1 and Pi−1 two secret keys, ki,i+1 and ki−1,i, respec-
tively. An efficient TPKA protocol for broadcasting is to employ authenticated
Diffie-Hellman key agreement.
Each user Pi
1. generates a secret number ri, and computes
xi = αf(IDi)·ri (mod n) and yi = si · hri·f(xi, Ti)i (mod n)
where f is a secure one-way function, Ti is a time-stamp indicating the
current time and xi acts as a verifiable ephemeral public key of Pi.
2. broadcasts (IDi, xi, yi, Ti).
3. verifies for each Pj , j = 1, . . . ,m, that
yej
?≡ IDj · xf(xj , Tj)j (mod n)
and |T ′ − Tj | < ∆T where T’ is the current time and ∆T is a margin due
to time delay and clock inconsistencies.
Round 2. Each user Pi
1. establishes with Pi−1 and Pi+1 two secret keys, respectively
ki−1,i = xrii−1 (mod n) and ki,i+1 = x
ri
i+1 (mod n)
2. computes
vi = ki,i+1 − ki−1,i
Xi = αf(IDi)·ki,i+1 (mod n)
Yi = si · hki,i+1·f(Xi,vi,c)i (mod n)
where c = f(x1, x2, . . . , xm). Note that c is linking the contributions of each
participant of the first round to the second round.
3. broadcasts (IDi, Xi, Yi, vi).
4. verifies whether
Y ej
?≡ IDj ·Xf(Xj ,vj ,c)j (mod n)
holds for j = 1, . . . , m.
5. computes the common secret group key
K = vi−1 + 2 · vi−2 + . . . + (m− 1) · vi+1 + m · f(IDi) · ki,i+1
= m · f(IDi) · ki,i+1 +
m−1∑
j=1
j · vi−j
where vj = vm+j .
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6. computes the public group key according to
P =
m∏
j=1
Xj = αK (mod n)
By verifying that
∏m
j=1 Xj
?≡ αK (mod n), P and K is implicitly authenticated
due to that each Xi, i = 1, . . . , m, is a factor of the public group key.
3.3 Confirmation and certification
In the last round, the participants collaboratively compute a signature for the
public group key P. The signature provides public verification of P, and thus
accordingly confirms the secret group key for the participants.
Round 3. Each user Pi
1. computes and broadcasts an individual signature of public group key
Si = si · hK·f(P,T̄ )i (mod n)
where T is the average of Tj , j = 1, . . . , m, from the first round.
2. verifies the individual signatures for each Pj , j = 1, . . . ,m:
Sej
?≡ IDj · Pf(P, T )·f(IDj) (mod n)
3. computes the multi-party signature S = ∏mj=1 Sj (mod n) that corresponds
to
S = (
m∏
j=1
IDdj
) · αd·K·f(P, T )·
∑m
j=1 f(IDj) (mod n)
Finally, the public group key and its certifying parameters is published:
(P, S, T , id) where id = {IDi | 1 ≤ i ≤ m}. P is certified according to
Se ?≡ (
m∏
i=1
IDi
) · P ·f(P, T )·
∑m
i=1 f(IDi) (mod n)
Since the group key signature will detect errors and inequalities that would be
detected in step 2, step 2 can be omitted.
3.4 Employment
By employing the ElGamal cryptosystem, outsiders are now able to encrypt
messages by means of P so that only the legitimate group members associated
to P are able to individually decrypt. A plaintext message M is encrypted by a =
αr mod n and b = M ·Pr mod n where r is a random number secretly chosen
by the sender, and subsequently decrypted by M = b · a−K mod n. The group
participants can correspondingly communicate secretly by P, or by symmetric
encryption by K.
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4 Security analysis
In this section, we consider the security of the proposed cryptosystem according
to the previously stated security requirements.
Security Requirement 1 The protocol must provide secret group key confiden-
tiality, and must thus be secure against passive attacks.
Proof. The secret values ki,i+1 are established due to authenticated Diffie-
Hellman-based key establishment where secrecy is achieved due to the Compu-
tational Diffie-Hellman Problem. That is, knowledge of αx mod p and αy mod p
does not provide αxy mod p. After the first round, ki,i+1 is known only by Pi and
Pi+1.
In the second round, each Pi broadcasts vi = ki,i+1 − zi−1,i. The values
v1, v2, . . . , vm, constitute the following system of linear equations:
k1,2 − k2,3 = v2
k2,3 − k3,4 = v3
...
km−1,m − km,1 = vm
− k1,2 km,1 = v1
However, a system of linear equations on this form have infinitely many solutions
in real number R. Since Z∗n is large, computing all solutions is therefore infeasible,
and secret group key confidentiality is preserved.
To illustrate by a small example, the numbers vi from the 3 users P1, P2, P3,
constitute the following system of linear equations:
k1,2 − k2,3 = v1
k2,3 − k3,1 = v2
− k1,2 k3,1 = v3
By adding v1 and v3, we see that
k1,2 − k2,3 = v1
k2,3 − k3,1 = v2
− k2,3 + k3,1 = v1 + v3
I.e., v1 + v2 + v3 = 1. The system can therefore not be reduced, and has an
infeasible number of solutions given that Z∗n is large.¤
Security Requirement 2 The employed signature scheme must be secure.
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Proof. The signature scheme is analogous to the authentication scheme of [8]
where the difficulty is to find two integers, x and y, so that yei
?≡ IDi · xxii
(mod n) holds. The signature in the second round is represented by
Xi = αf(IDi)·zi,i+1 (mod n)
Yi = si · hzi,i+1·f(Xi,vi,c)i (mod n)
where zi,i+1 represents a value that may be known by the other participants.
The value of d is unknown. Given a signature Yi where the corresponding long-
term secret user keys (si, hi) are unknown to others than Pi, according to the
Discrete Logarithm Problem, the factor αd·f(IDi)·zi,i+1·f(Xi,vi,c) is computationally
infeasible to obtain from Yi since the value of d is unknown. Since si constitutes
the other unknown factor of Yi, it is thus infeasible to derive the secret user keys
(si, hi) from Yi.
Since the factorization of n is unknown, it is correspondingly not feasible to
obtain ID(e
−1)
j (mod n).
Attempts to forge a valid signature Yi by raising it to the power of a different
context c’ ; Y c
′
i , will not provide a valid signature since (and as long) ID
c′
i does
not constitute a valid identity. ¤
A variant of this authentication scheme is found in [9] where the verification is
according to
yej
?≡ IDj · xf(T )j (mod n)
where T is a time-stamp. This scheme is not resistant to the Extended Euclidian
Algorithm attack [11]. If e and a are relatively prime, we can find two integers
u, v, so that e · u = 1 + f(T ) · v. An adversary can thus pick a valid IDj , and
compute xj = IDvj (mod n) and yj = ID
u
j (mod n). The attack succeeds in the
scheme in [9] because
yej = IDj · xf(T )j = (IDuj )e = IDj · (IDvj )f(T ) (mod n)
In our scheme, this attack is thwarted, since yej
?≡ IDj ·xf(xj ,Tj)j (mod n) and xj
is used as self-verifying parameter by raising it to a power determined by itself
as parameter to the hash-function.
Security Requirement 3 The protocol must provide user key confidentiality.
Proof. The number Yi = si · hzi,i+1·f(Xi,vi,c)i (mod n) contains two unknown fac-
tors where si is a secret user key. Since n is a large number, it is computationally
infeasible to factorize Yi and obtain si. We have that f(Xi, vi, c) is publicly avail-
able. In case si and zi,i+1 were revealed, the secret user key hi is still protected
given Yi due to the unknown factorization of n.
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Also note that given a secret user key hi = αd·f(IDi) (mod n), it is computa-
tionally infeasible to derive αd according to the Factorization Problem. This
could be used to derive the new user key hi. ¤
Security Requirement 4 The protocol must provide forward secrecy.
Proof. The values of the group keys depend on the Diffie-Hellman values zi,i+1,
1 ≤ i ≤ m, established by each of the participants for each session. The secret
group key is the sum of f(IDi) ·zi,i+1, 1 ≤ i ≤ m, where we consequently assume
that any zi,i+1 is unknown to others than the group. The secret group key is thus
not directly linked to the long-term secret user keys (si, hi).
Due to the Discrete Logarithm Problem, it is computationally infeasible to
obtain the secret zi,i+1 given Xi = αf(IDi)·zi,i+1 (mod n). It is also computation-
ally infeasible to obtain zi,i+1 given Yi = si · hzi,i+1·f(Xi,vi,c)i (mod n) and (si, hi)
due to the Discrete Logarithm Problem. Forward secrecy is therefore achieved. ¤
Security Requirement 5 The protocol must be secure against substitution at-
tacks.
Proof. Assuming that the employed signature scheme is secure, it is computa-
tionally infeasible for an adversary A′ to successfully forge any signature Y ′i for
other sessions. Suppose A′ knows the values k′i−1,i, k
′
i,i+1, v
′
i, Xi’ and Y
′
i of a
former session c’. Because k′i−1,i and k
′
i,i+1 refer to a former session, A
′ cannot
set ki−1,i and ki,i+1 of a new session to equal the former k′i−1,i and k
′
i,i+1 due to
the contributory nature of DH key agreement.
Thus, A′ can neither control that v′i will have a valid value, nor the session value
c’ to be equal subsequent sessions c, since c is unique for each session, collabo-
ratively determined by inputs of all participants. Since Y ′i is cryptographically
locked to v′i and c’, replaying former messages will consequently be detected due
to signature verification. Thus, the adversary cannot successfully replay and
substitute messages with former ones. ¤
Security Requirement 6 The proposed protocol must provide unique group
keys for each session.
Proof. Each user Pi contributes equally to the values of the group keys by
the secret ki,i+1. Assuming that at least one participant selects a new and
unique random ri, then ki,i+1 and ki−1,i will be unique, thereby making the
group key pair unique. Moreover, assuming that secure signature scheme
withstands substitution attacks, no single user can enforce old group keys to be
re-established. Thus, key freshness is achieved. ¤
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5 Conclusion
We have proposed an efficient and practical public group key cryptosystem where
groups containing any number of users can flexibly establish public/private key
pairs that represent the groups. No online trusted third party is required neither
for group key establishment nor group key certification. By means of public group
keys, outsiders can address the group confidentially, and secure communication
is provided internally among the group members. The signature scheme provides
identity-based certification of public group keys and key establishment messages
towards the corresponding group participants.
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Abstract
In this paper, we present three related and efficient cryptographic
schemes for secure communication for hierarchically composed groups.
The first provides secure establishment of hierarchically ordered session
keys in agreement for hierarchically composed user groups. An essen-
tial security property is that users can only obtain hierarchical session
keys for their own and underlying levels, while this is prevented for
overlying levels. Moreover, in contrast to many existing hierarchical
schemes, our scheme prevents that users of any class may deduce the
long-term hierarchical keys of other classes.
This scheme is extended to a hierarchical public key cryptosystem
based on the ElGamal cryptosystem, and furthermore to an ElGamal-
based threshold decryption scheme. Due to the threshold security re-
quirement, at least t arbitrary group members are required to carry out
decryption. The threshold scheme requires only one round of broad-
casting in the decryption phase, and is thus well-suitable for wireless
networks.
1 Introduction
Secure group-oriented communication refers to communication that is facilitated
in such a way that only the communicated data can only be intelligibly decoded
by the participants of the pertaining group. Secure group-oriented communica-
tion is commonly achieved by means of group-oriented cryptographic protocols.
There are several concepts and purposes relating to secure group communica-
tion [3]:
• Member identification and authentication. Authentication is important in
order to prevent an intruder from impersonating a legitimate group member.
Thus, authentication mechanisms must be used to allow an entity to verify
whether another entity is really who it claims to be.
• Access control. After a party has been identified, access control is performed
to validate group members before giving them access to some restricted or
privileged information, e.g., some file or group communication.
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• Generation and distribution of key material. It is necessary to change the
key at regular intervals to safeguard its secrecy. Each key must be com-
pletely unrelated to previous and future keys, otherwise compromised keys
may reveal other keys.
Secure key management plays an important role for providing secure communi-
cation among a number of parties, where the basic function is establishment and
maintenance of secret key relationships between concerning and genuine parties.
A great variety of security protocols and methods for secure group communica-
tion has been proposed (e.g., see [1–3]), and common for most of them is that they
are non-hierarchial. This is of course suitable for non-hierarchical groups where
the group members have the same ranking. However, most organizations would
in practice be hierarchically organized. Accordingly, team members would have
various rankings according to their job positions in the organization, where indi-
viduals of lower ranking usually would be entrusted less confidential information
than those of higher rankings. For example, in the medical scenario, medical care
is given by medical teams that are composed of doctors and nurses. Due to the
sensitive nature of personal medical data, it could be required that medical prac-
titioners of lower rankings should be given access to less sensitive or confidential
medical information than those of higher rankings. It is also essential that the
medical data is transferred securely to the legitimate team members. This could
be achieved by means of encryption which would require secure establishment of
secret shared session keys in agreement with the user hierarchy.
In this paper, we present in Section 3 a cryptographic scheme for secure key
establishment for hierarchical groups. The scheme is public key-oriented, allowing
external parties to carry out encryptions using the hierarchical public keys. We
assume that each participant is associated with one user class (or security class)
that corresponds to his or her job position, and (for simplicity) that there is one
security class for each hierarchical level. The scheme enables the participants to
securely establish one secret hierarchical session key, subsequently referred to as
class key, for each security class.
An essential security property is that the participants of any given security class
can compute the secret class keys that are established by their own and un-
derlying security classes, while it is computationally infeasible to obtain class
keys of overlying security classes. In contrast to existing hierarchical access con-
trol schemes providing computation of long-term predefined hierarchical keys of
underlying classes, our scheme is session-oriented and enables computation of
hierarchical session keys, while disclosure of hierarchical long-term keys is pre-
vented.
Each class is associated with a long-term public key, which the hierarchical class
keys are computed as a function of. Using the public keys enable arbitrary in-
dividuals outside and inside the group to securely address any security class.
Participants of the pertaining security classes are permitted to decrypt data per-
taining to their own and underlying security classes, while it is prevented that
ciphertexts pertaining to overlying security classes can be disclosed.
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Section 4 presents a modification, incorporating the ElGamal public key cryp-
tosystem into the key establishment scheme. In Section 5, the hierarchical key
establishment scheme is extended to a hierarchical broadcast-oriented threshold
decryption scheme. The participants broadcast only one message in the decryp-
tion phase, and it is therefore suitable for wireless networks.
2 Related work
In this section, we will attempt to give a brief overview of the field of hierarchical
encryption and to point out how the security schemes presented in this paper
conceptually differ from other hierarchical cryptographic schemes.
Hierarchical conference key agreement seems to be little investigated in the lit-
erature. Hwang et al. [15] proposed a hierarchical key agreement protocol that
enables establishment of keys for each user class. Moreover, the participants of a
given class can obtain the hierarchical session keys (i.e., class keys) of the under-
lying security classes, while it is prevented that class keys of overlying security
classes can be obtained. A major disadvantage is that it is highly inefficient be-
cause the number of rounds equals the number of participants. A more efficient
hierarchical key agreement protocol that requires only two rounds of broadcast-
ing was proposed in [17].
Hierarchical access control is a class of cryptographic schemes that supports
establishment and deduction of long-term predefined cryptographic keys that
comply with some hierarchical user structure (e.g., see [18–21]). This allows
users of a given security class to compute securely such keys associated with
their own and underlying security classes, while computation of keys associated
with overlying security classes is prevented. While the hierarchical key estab-
lishment schemes presented in this paper provide secure ad-hoc establishment of
a number of hierarchically arranged sessions keys, HAC schemes do in contrast
enable a group of hierarchically ranked users to deduce hierarchical predefined
static keys. Computation of such hierarchical long-term predefined keys in con-
trast to hierarchical short-term sessions keys is a considerable limitation to the
applicability and usefulness of such schemes.
Due to access control purposes, most HAC schemes are compliant with user
dynamics, i.e., inclusion and exclusion of users and corresponding renewal of
hierarchical keys for the pertaining security classes.
A class of hierarchical encryption schemes that is related to HAC is hierarchical
identity-based encryption (HIBE). See [22–24] for examples of such schemes. As
with identity-based encryption (IBE), a participant is publicly represented by an
identity, and has a private long-term key that is computed by a trusted party.
HIBE schemes are hierarchical concerning the establishment of the long-term
private keys. A motivation of HIBE seems to be to provide a distributive way
for computation of private user keys in large organizations. A root authority
computes the necessary public parameters for each security class. This allows
users or authorities at a given class to compute the private keys of the underlying
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classes. Like HAC, HIBE correspondingly entails the downside that private user
keys are not prevented from being deduced, since it could be desirable that such
keys could be used for other purposes as well.
Tree-based key management schemes (e.g., see [25–27]) can be regarded as cen-
tralized key distribution where the users of a group establish a key tree. The
users constitute the leaf nodes of the tree, and the tree structure allows them
to obtain the commonly established key that is located at the root. Thus, such
schemes are non-hierarchical due to that all participants obtain the same shared
secret key.
Scheme 1 differs from the above because it is not a key agreement scheme while
it pertains secure establishment of session keys. We have not been able to find
any hierarchical threshold decryption schemes in the literature.
3 Hierarchical centralized key distribution
It is common that corporations and organizations are hierarchically structured,
where the ranking of the personnel would be defined according job positions. Also
relevant is that many tasks are carried out by teamwork. For example, in the
medical scenario, medical care is provided by medical teams that are composed of
doctors and nurses, where the doctors have a higher ranking than the nurses. Due
to the sensitive nature of personal medical data, it could be required that medical
practitioners of lower rankings should only be privileged access to less sensitive
or confidential medical information than those of higher rankings. This assumes
that the medical data in electronic patient records is appropriately categorized
according to sensitively levels, so that the sensitivity levels are in agreement with
the hierarchical ranking of the medical personnel.
In this section, we present a hierarchical key distribution scheme for secure distri-
bution of confidential data to hierarchical teams. For simplicity, we assume that
there is only one class (or security class) of users for each hierarchical level or
security level. The proposed scheme can easily be extended to a partially ordered
hierarchical structure, i.e., hierarchical structures of several classes for each level.
3.1 Security requirements
The security requirements of the key establishment scheme are as follows:
Security Requirement 1. Class key confidentiality. Only legitimate partici-
pants must be able to compute the hierarchical session keys (or class keys). This
property is associated with implicit authentication of the users according to their
security class.
Security Requirement 2. Implicit authentication. It must be ensured that only
the proper users get the pertaining hierarchical session keys and in agreement
with their security classes.
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Security Requirement 3. User key confidentiality. It must be prevented that
long-term hierarchical user keys can be disclosed to outsiders and to members of
others security classes. Although the participants of a given class can compute
the hierarchical session keys of underlying security classes, it must be prevented
that participants of any given class can deduce secret long-term hierarchical user
keys. This is essential since such keys could be used for other applications whereof
participants of other security classes may not be involved with.
Security Requirement 4. Onewayness. Participants of any given security class
can only compute the hierarchical session keys (class keys) pertaining to their
own and underlying security classes, while it is prevented that class keys per-
taining to overlying security classes can be deduced.
3.2 Scheme 1
Assumptions. Let U = {P1, . . . , Pn} be a team of n participants where each
participant is associated with one hierarchical level. Let U be divided into λ
disjoint security classes Si ⊆ U , i.e., Si ∩ Sj = ∅, i 6= j, where i, j ∈ {1, . . . , λ},
so that each level contains one security class. The security classes are totally
ordered so that Si ≺ Sj if i < j. Let Sλ ⊆ U constitute the top security class.
Initializations. A trusted authority (TA) is required to set up the scheme by
providing a secret hierarchical key and a public key for each respective security
class. Initially, the TA selects a large public prime p = 2 · q + 1 where q is also
prime. The TA selects a generator (or primitive element) α to Zq [4, p. 30].
The TA randomly generates a long-term secret key kj ∈ Zq for each security class
Sj ⊆ U . These are securely transferred to the users in the respective classes. The
TA computes the public parameters yj = αkj (mod p), 1 ≤ j ≤ λ.
Key establishment. One particular party is required to initiate the protocol.
We refer to this as the registry. Note that the registry is a semi-trusted party
in the sense that it is capable of computing the secret class keys due to the
knowledge of the secret number r in Step 1.
Step 1. The registry generates a random secret number r from Zq, and computes
and broadcasts
Z = {zj = yrj − α(y
r
j+1) (mod p) | 1 ≤ j < λ}
and
R = αr (mod p)
Step 2. Each participant in Si ⊆ U computes the class key for his or her own
security class Si according to
Ki = Rki (mod p)
and for the underlying security classes Sj , 1 ≤ j < i ≤ λ, according to the
recurrence relation
Kj = zj + αKj+1 (mod p)
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Example. To illustrate, in this example there are 3 security classes S1, S2, S3.
The registry broadcasts z1 = yr1−α(y
r
2), z2 = yr2−α(y
r
3), R = αr. The participants
of S3 computes recursively K3 = Rk3 , K2 = z2 + αK3 , K1 = z1 + αK2 , where all
computations are in Zp.
3.3 Security analysis
In this section, we provide a security analysis showing that the presented scheme
is secure in agreement with the security requirements presented in Section 3.1.
(We assume that all computations are in Zp.)
Security Requirement 1. Class key confidentiality. The confidentiality of class
keys is based on the Diffie-Hellman Computational Problem, meaning that given
αx and αy, it is computationally infeasible to find αx·y. Public values are R = αr
and yi = αkj , 1 ≤ j ≤ λ. Accordingly, it is computationally infeasible to compute
Kj = αr·kj .
The register publicizes zj = Kj−αKj+1 , where Yj and Kj+1 (and hence α(Kj+1))
are unknown.
Let z′j = Kj −Kj+1 where 1 ≤ i < λ. Then λ values zj form a linear equation
system. For example, if λ = 3, we have that
K1− K2 = z′1
K2− K3 = z′2
K3 −K4 = z′3
Since λ such equations contain λ+1 unknowns and , the equation system cannot
be solved, since the number of solutions in Zp would be computationally infea-
sible, since p is a large prime. Since Kj cannot be deduced from a system based
on the form z′j = Kj −Kj+1, likewise Kj cannot be deduced from a system on
the form zj = Kj − αKj+1 .
Security Requirement 2. Implicit authentication. Thus, Kj can only be correctly
established by means of the proper kj , and then subsequently for Ki, 1 ≤ i ≤ j.
This provides accordingly implicit authentication of the users according to their
security class.
Security Requirement 3. User key confidentiality. The public keys are computed
according to yj = αkj . No other numbers computed by means of the hierar-
chical user keys are broadcasted. Due to the Discrete Logarithm Problem, the
hierarchical user keys kj are protected from disclosure.
Security Requirement 4. Onewayness. The one-way security property prevents
that participants in Si can obtain Kj if i < j. Given zj = Kj − αKj+1 , where
Kj is known to the participants in Sj , it is easy to compute αKj+1 . However,
it is computationally infeasible to compute Kj+1 in Zp given αKj+1 due to the
Discrete Logarithm Problem.
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4 A hierarchical ElGamal cryptosystem
In this section, we apply the key establishment scheme from the previous sec-
tion for a hierarchical variant of the ElGamal public key cryptosystem [11]. An
essential security property of this scheme is onewayness, so that participants of
any given security class can only carry out decryption of data that is targeted
to their own and underlying security classes, while it is prevented that they can
decrypt data targeted to overlying security classes.
4.1 Scheme 2
Assumptions and Initializations. See Section 3.2. In addition to α, the TA
selects one more generator (or primitive element) β to Zq.
Encryption. By means of the public keys, any individual (the sender) can en-
crypt data for each security class of U . The sender randomly generates the secret
number r from Zq, and encrypts the message mj , if any, for the security classes
Si ⊆ U , 1 ≤ i ≤ j, according to
C = {cj = mj · β−Yj (mod p) | 1 ≤ j ≤ λ}
and
Z = {zj = Yj − αYj+1 (mod p) | 1 ≤ j < λ}
and
R = αr (mod p)
where Yj = yrj . Then (C,Z, R) is sent to U . Note that βYj corresponds to the
secret encryption factor of the ElGamal scheme.
Decryption. In order for the participants of Si to decrypt the cryptograms
pertaining to its own and underlying classes Sj , 1 ≤ j ≤ i ≤ λ, the secret
encryption factor βYj has to be recovered for each of the pertaining classes in
agreement with the computations of class keys in the previous section.
Each participant in Si ⊆ U computes
Yi = Rki (mod p)
and for the underlying security classes Sj , i < j, according to the recurrence
relation
Yj = zj + αYj+1 (mod p)
Finally, the plaintexts for the relevant classes are restored according to
mj = cj · βYj (mod p)
in agreement with the ElGamal public key cryptosystem.
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4.2 Security remarks
In contrast to computing the cryptotext according to cj = mj · Yj , in full agree-
ment with the ElGamal scheme, it is in this scheme computed as cj = mj ·β−Yj .
The reason for introducing the additional generator β is to obstruct ”guessing”
attacks.
If the cryptotext is computed according to cj = mj · Yj , we have the following
security problem: If the corresponding plaintext mj of a given cryptotext cj is
known by some outsider or by a participant of an underlying security class, this
user could compute the encryption factor as Yj =
cj
mj
. The user could then easily
compute the encryption factors for the underlying levels.
This attack is obstructed in the presented scheme, since this would result in
βYj = cjmj . Due to the Discrete Logarithm Problem, it would be computationally
infeasible to obtain Yj given βYj in Zp, since p is a large prime.
The essential security properties of this cryptosystem are onewayness, user key
confidentiality, implicit authentication and data confidentiality. The data confi-
dentiality security property is equivalent to the secrecy of the encryption factors
βYi . Since establishment of the encryption factors corresponds to establishment
of class keys in the previous scheme, the data confidentiality is consistent with
the security of the ElGamal cryptosystem, and with the security properties of
class key confidentiality and implicit authentication in Section 3.3. Also see Sec-
tion 3.3 for security analysis of the onewayness security property and user key
confidentiality.
5 Broadcast-oriented hierarchical threshold decryp-
tion
In a number of scenarios, it could be desirable or required that certain actions
should be carried out on the condition of a group consensus. Threshold-oriented
cryptosystems enforce such requirements in agreement with the consensus of
a minimum, arbitrary number of participants from a group or organization in
order to carry out a relevant cryptographic computation. The minimum required
number of participants is known as the threshold number t. In contrast, requiring
the consensus and collaboration of a predefined, fixed set of participants to carry
out such a cryptographic computation would be inconvenient, inflexible, and
mostly inapplicable if one or more of the designated users are absent. The concept
of threshold cryptography may also comply to scenarios where some sort of
separation of duty is required, and where individuals should be prevented to
carry out such computations on their own.
An example of such application could be where the holder or originator of some
sensitive information like a secret key, is only willing to disclose it as result of
the consensus of a given number of designated participants. A practical example
could be access to a bank vault, where it would not be desirable that one person
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alone would possess and control the key to the vault due to the risk of fraud,
robbery and extortion. A preferable solution could be a threshold-oriented lock,
requiring for instance at least 3 employees out of 5, each holding a unique and
secret key, in order to unlock the vault.
Threshold cryptosystems are commonly based on the Shamir secret sharing
scheme [10], and on the concept of public key cryptography. In threshold de-
cryption, anyone can confidentially encrypt messages to a group that is publicly
represented by their public key. Such cryptograms can only be decrypted due
to the collaboration of at least t participants of the group. Examples of such
can be found in [5–7]. Likewise, threshold signatures schemes convey that only
a minimum subset of the team can compute signatures due to the threshold
requirement, e.g., see [8, 9].
In the following subsection, we present a hierarchical threshold-decryption
scheme based on the hierarchical scheme in the previous subsection. In the
threshold-variant of this scheme, decryption can only be carried out due to the
collaboration of at least t participants of the team U . It is broadcast-oriented
in the decryption phase, and since each user broadcasts only one message, it is
well-suitable for wireless networks.
5.1 Scheme 3
Assumptions. See Section 3.2.
Initialization. A trusted authority (TA) is required to set up the scheme by
providing a secret hierarchical key and a public key for each respective security
class. Initially, the TA selects a large public prime p = 2 · q + 1 where q is also
prime. The TA selects two generators α and β to Zq.
The basis for the threshold mechanism is Shamir secret sharing scheme [10] where
a secret polynomial of order t defines the threshold requirement. The TA defines
the threshold requirement (t, n), where λ ≤ t ≤ n. The TA randomly generates
the polynomial coefficients aj of the polynomial
f(x) =
t−1∑
j=0
aj x
j
The TA randomly generates λ long-term keys ki ∈ Zq for each security class
Sj ⊆ U which the TA securely hands each user in the respective classes. The TA
computes the public keys
yj = αxj (mod p)
where xj = aj−1 · kj , 1 ≤ j ≤ λ.
The TA computes for each Pi ∈ U a secret user share
si = f(i) (mod q)
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Encryption. In agreement with Section 4, any individual (a sender) can encrypt
data for any security class by means of the public keys. The sender generates
a random secret number r ∈ Zq, and encrypts a message mj , if any, for each
security class Sj ⊆ U according to
C = {cj = mj · β(−y
r
j ) (mod p) | 1 ≤ j ≤ λ}
and
Z = {zj = yrj − α(y
r
j+1) (mod p) | 1 ≤ j < λ}
and
R = αr (mod p)
and then sends (C, Z,R) to U . Note that each cj ∈ C can be decrypted by the
participants in the given and underlying security classes Si ⊆ U , 1 ≤ i ≤ j.
Decryption. Due to the threshold requirement, the computations of a subcoali-
tion T ⊆ U of at least t team members are required in order to restore the
plaintexts. Each participant Pi ∈ T computes and broadcasts
wi = Rsi (mod p)
Let IT = {i | Pi ∈ T}. Lagrange interpolation is given by
f(x) =
∑
i∈IT
si bi(x) where bi(x) =
∏
j∈IT
i6=j
x− j
i− j =
t−1∑
j=0
ci,j x
j
By means of the Lagrange basis coefficients ci,j , we can compute the polynomial
coefficients aj of f(x):
f(x) =
∑
i∈IT
si bi(x) =
∑
i∈IT
si (
t−1∑
j=0
ci,j x
j) =
t−1∑
j=0
(
∑
i∈IT
si ci,j)xj =
t−1∑
j=0
aj x
j
Thus,
aj =
∑
i∈IT
si ci,j (0 ≤ j ≤ t− 1)
By means of Lagrange interpolation, the following λ numbers must be computed:
Aj =
∏
i∈IT
w
ci,j
i =
∏
i∈IT
Rsi·ci,j = Raj (mod p) (0 ≤ j ≤ λ− 1)
(Since these numbers are publicly available, the computation could be performed
by a single party that subsequently broadcasts the results.)
Each participant in Si ⊆ U computes
Yi = Akii−1 = R
ai−1·ki = Rxi (mod p)
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The participant then computes Yj , i > j, for the underlying security classes (if
any) in agreement with the recurrence relation
Yj = zj + αYj+1 (mod p)
Finally, the plaintexts for the relevant classes are restored according to
mj = cj · βYj (mod p)
Example. Let us consider a group U consisting of two (disjoint) security classes
S1 and S2 to illustrate. All computations are in Zp.
Encryption. The sender encrypts and broadcasts c1 = m1 · yr1, c2 = m2 · yr2,
z1 = yr1 − α(y
r
2), R = αr.
Decryption. At least t participants from U compute and broadcast wi. The par-
ticipants of S2 compute by Lagrange interpolation A1 = Ra1 , and then Y2 = Ak21 ,
Y1 = z1 + αY2 . Finally, the plaintexts are restored by m1 = c1 · Y1, m2 = c2 · Y2.
5.2 Security remarks
The essential security properties of the threshold cryptosystem is in agreement
with the schemes presented in Section 3 and Section 4. In addition to this, we
have the threshold requirement which is provided by the Shamir secret sharing
scheme that is incorporated into this scheme.
6 Conclusion
In this paper, we have presented three related efficient broadcast-oriented cryp-
tographic schemes for secure communication for hierarchically composed groups.
The first is a hierarchical key establishment scheme. The second scheme is a
hierarchical public key cryptosystem based on the presented hierarchical key es-
tablishment scheme and the ElGamal cryptosystem. This is further extended to
a threshold decryption scheme, which imposes a threshold security requirement,
requiring the participation of at least t group members in order to carry out
decryption.
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Abstract
Most (t, n) threshold-oriented cryptosystems incorporate the
polynomial-based (t, n) threshold secret sharing scheme of Shamir.
This makes them vulnerable to a collusion problem in the following
ways: 1) A set of t colluding participants can compute the shared
secret (i.e., a secret polynomial coefficient). Any participant holding
the shared secret can subsequently carry out group-oriented threshold-
oriented computations individually, thereby bypassing the threshold
security requirement. 2) A set of t participants can moreover deduce
all the secret polynomial coefficients which enables establishment of
new user shares. In this paper, we propose a method applied to the
threshold decryption scheme of Desmedt and Frankel that prohibits
colluding participants to deduce any of the secret coefficients of the
underlying threshold Shamir secret sharing scheme.
1 Introduction
Threshold cryptosystems is a class of group-oriented cryptosystems that is ap-
propriate for enforcing group consensus. According to the threshold security
requirement, the partial computations of t arbitrarily users of a coalition of n
(where t ≤ n) are required to carry out a given threshold computation. The
threshold property provides flexibility since it allows an arbitrary composed sub-
group of t participants, in contrast to requiring all, i.e., a fixed set of participants,
for such computations. Accordingly, it prevents that single individuals can carry
out such computations on their own.
A practical example of this could be access to a bank vault. It would not be
desirable that one person alone would control the key to the vault due to the
risk of fraud, robbery and extortion. Rather, the vault should only be unlockable
due to consensus of at least t bank employees. However, since absent employees
would be prohibited from participating, a practical and flexible vault locking
mechanism could be based on the threshold property, and open as a function of
the secret keys of t arbitrary employees of certain clearance.
Typical threshold-oriented applications are threshold decryption and threshold
signatures. Threshold decryption cryptosystems enforce that a minimum number
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of t arbitrary participants of a group of n participants are required to carry out
decryptions pertaining to their group. Represented by a public key, outsiders
can confidentially address the group. Only by collaboration in such a way where
the active group members are providing partial computations, the encrypted
message can be decrypted [1–3]. Likewise, regarding threshold signatures [4, 5],
only a minimum subcoalition of the team can compute digital signatures due
to the threshold requirement. Note that threshold signatures do not reveal the
identity of the actual signing group members.1 Another application is conference
key establishment [6, 7]. The term threshold cryptography is sometimes used
interchangeably with group-oriented cryptography, but the latter term has a
more general meaning in the sense that group-oriented cryptosystems are not
necessarily confined to threshold-oriented cryptosystems.
Threshold cryptosystems are in general based on a threshold-oriented secret shar-
ing mechanism. The Shamir threshold secret sharing scheme [8] is by far most ap-
plied in such cryptosystems. Each group member is confidentially handed a secret
user share from the trusted center that sets up the scheme. However, a potential
problem is that a minimum coalition of t participants may collude and compute
the shared secret. This would enable each of the colluders to subsequently bypass
the threshold mechanism and to individually carry out the threshold computa-
tions, in violation of the threshold security property. The coalition can moreover
compute all the secret polynomial coefficients, enabling them to illegitimately
establish new user shares. If the threshold is low, this could be an imminent
problem.
In this paper, we propose a modification to the threshold decryption scheme of
Desmedt and Frankel [1] that prevents the polynomial coefficients of the user
shares from being deduced. To our knowledge, the collusion problem in the
context of threshold cryptosystems has not been previously addressed in the
literature.
1.1 Threshold secret sharing
In the (t, n) threshold secret sharing scheme of Shamir [8], a secret number is
split into n secret user shares. The secret can only be reconstructed by means of
an arbitrarily composed subcoalition of a minimum number of t user shares. A
trusted authority (TA) sets up the scheme by generating a secret polynomial of
order (t− 1):
f(x) =
t−1∑
j=0
aj · xj
Let U = {P1, . . . , Pn} denote a team of n participants. For a given team U , the
TA arbitrarily selects a set of user inputs
A = {xj |Pj ∈ U} ⊆ Zq
1Note the distinction from group signatures (that are not threshold-based) where a single member
signs on behalf of a group in such a way that the identity of the signer cannot be determined, only
that the signer is member of a specific group.
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where q is a large prime, and computes for each Pi ∈ U a secret user share
according to
si = f(xi) (mod q)
where xi ∈ A. Normally, the shared secret is defined as f(0) = a0 but can in
general be f(x) for any chosen x ∈ Zq. Any coalition T ⊆ U of (at least) t
participants can obtain f(x) for any x ∈ Zq by Lagrange interpolation. Also
note that t long-term shares make up a linear equation system:


1 x1 . . . xt−11
1 x2 . . . xt−12
...
...
. . .
...
1 xt . . . xt−1t

 ·


a0
a1
...
at−1

 =


s0
s1
...
st−1


Accordingly, any collusion of t participants can obtain the secret polynomial
coefficients by solving the equation system, and moreover compute new shares
and reconstruct already issued secret shares. The smaller t is, for instance 2 or
3, the more imminent the collusion problem may be.
1.2 A basic threshold decryption scheme
In this subsection, we illustrate the collusion problem by the basic threshold
decryption scheme proposed by Desmedt and Frankel [1], which in turn is based
on the ElGamal public key cryptosystem [9] and Shamir secret sharing [8].
A trusted authority (TA) sets up the scheme by computing the secret user shares
for a team U according to Shamir secret sharing scheme presented in the previous
subsection. The TA selects another large public prime p where p = 2 · q + 1 and
q is also prime. The TA moreover selects a generator α to Zq. The team is
represented by the public key
y = α−a0 (mod p)
where a0 = f(0) is the shared secret, i.e, a secret polynomial coefficient of f(x).
Encryption. By means of the public key y, a sender can encrypt a message
m according to the ElGamal public key cryptosystem. The sender generates a
random secret number r from Zq and computes the cryptogram (c,R) where
c = m · yr (mod p) and R = αr (mod p)
and sends (c,R) to U .
Decryption. To decrypt (c,R), the partial computations of a subcoalition T of
the team U of at least t participants are required. Each Pi ∈ T computes and
sends
Yi = Rsi (mod p)
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confidentially, i.e., via secure channels, to the other participants (or alterna-
tively via secure channels to a trusted party). After having received the partial
computations, the plaintext is restored according to Lagrange interpolation:
m = c ·
∏
j∈IT
Y
bj
j (mod p)
where
bi =
∏
j∈IT
i 6=j
xj
xj − xi (mod q)
and IT = {i |Pi ∈ T}. This corresponds to m = (m · α−a0 r) · αr a0 .
One of the main purposes of threshold-oriented cryptography is to enforce col-
laboration between some entities in order to do a cryptographic computation.
However, a coalition T can apply Lagrange interpolation directly on their secret
user shares to obtain the shared secret a0 =
∑
j∈IT sj ·bj (mod q). The members
of the coalition are now able to individually decrypt all preceding and future
cryptograms pertaining to the team by applying a0 directly to obtain m as
m = c ·Ra0 (mod p)
and thus, bypassing the threshold requirement.
1.3 Security requirements
In order to provide collusion-resistance, the following security requirements must
be maintained:
Security Requirement 1. Protection of the secret coefficients. Disclosure of
one or more polynomial coefficients from f(x) given any number of user shares
must be prevented.
Security Requirement 2. Protection of the user shares. Disclosure of existing
or computation of new user shares given any number of user shares must be
prevented.
Security Requirement 3. Protection of encrypted data. The cryptographic
security must be in agreement with the underlying threshold cryptosystem.
The last security property pertains to the security of the actual underlying cryp-
tosystem.
2 Collusion-resistant threshold decryption
In this section, we propose a modification of the classical threshold decryption
scheme of Desmedt and Frankel [1] that prohibits deduction of the shared secret
or any of the secret polynomial coefficients from f(x) given any number of user
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shares, thus preventing that the threshold requirement can be bypassed with-
out the application of at least t user shares. Thus, it prevents violation of the
threshold requirement and moreover computation of new user shares.
2.1 Initialization
Let U = {P1, . . . , Pn} denote a team of n participants. According to the number
of participants of U , the trusted authority (TA) randomly generates a set
K = {k1, . . . , km} ⊆ Zq
of m = dlog2 ne secret numbers and where q is a large prime. The TA selects
another large public prime p such that p = 2 · q +1 and a generator α to Zq, and
computes the corresponding set of public parameters
B = {tj | tj = αkj (mod p) and kj ∈ K}
for public representation of U .
Let (bm, bm−1, . . . , b1) denote binary representation of the user index i. Let
Ii(j) = bj
represent bit j of the user index i. Then, the TA randomly selects a secret
polynomial
f(x) =
t−1∑
j=0
aj · xj
and computes for each Pi ∈ U a secret user share according to
si = f(i) · w−1i (mod q)
where wi =
∑m
j=1 kj · Ii(j) and kj ∈ K.
The team is represented by the public key y = α−a0 (mod p) where a0 = f(0) is
the shared secret. Note that since the elements of K are unknown, any coalition
T ⊆ U is prohibited to reconstruct the coefficient a0.
2.2 Encryption
By means of the public key y, a sender can encrypt a message m according to
the ElGamal public key cryptosystem. The sender generates a random secret
number r from Zq and computes the cryptogram (c, Z) where
c = m · yr (mod p)
and
Z = {zj | zj = trj (mod p) and tj ∈ B}
and sends (c, Z) to U .
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2.3 Decryption
To decrypt the cryptogram, the partial computations of a subcoalition T ⊆ U of
at least t participants are required. Each Pi ∈ T computes and sends
Yi =
( ∏
j∈ID
z
Ii(j)
j
)si·bi (mod p)
where
bi =
∏
j∈IT
i 6=j
xj
xj − xi (mod q)
and IT = {i |Pi ∈ T} and ID = {i | zi ∈ Z} through secure channels to the other
participants. By confidentially sharing their partial computations, the partici-
pants compute the secret encryption factor
Y =
∏
j∈IT
Yj (mod p)
that corresponds to Y = αa0·r. Subsequently, the plaintext is restored according
to
m = c · Y (mod p)
in agreement to the ElGamal public key cryptosystem [9].
2.4 Security analysis
In this section, we provide a security analysis showing that the presented scheme
is secure in agreement with the security requirements presented in Section 1.3.
Security Requirement 1. Protection of the secret coefficients. Each user share is
computed on the form si = f(i) · w−1i where the factors f(i) and wi are unique
and unknown to each user Pi ∈ U . If wi is the same for all users, any coalition of t
users could obtain the secret coefficients by using their secret shares to solve the
linear equation system formed by their user shares. However, since the values of
wi, 1 ≤ i ≤ n, are distinct, the coefficients of the secret user shares (s1, . . . , sn)
form a set of Diofant equations
b1,0 + x1 b1,1 + . . . + xt−11 b1,t−1 = s1
...
bn,0 + xn bn,1 + . . . + xt−1n bn,t−1 = sn
where the unknown coefficients bi,j = aj · w−1i , 1 ≤ i ≤ n, 0 ≤ j ≤ t − 1, are
all distinct from each other. Given the public parameters tj = αkj ∈ B, we have
that kj ∈ K is accordingly protected due to the Discrete Logarithm Problem.
The equation system is composed of (t · n) unknown coefficients which makes it
is infeasible to solve since there are too many unknowns. This has two important
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security implications: 1) Since the equation system is thus prohibited from being
solved, the secret polynomial coefficients are successfully being protected. This
prohibits bypassing of the threshold requirement and thus, Security Requirement
1 is preserved. 2) Since the coefficients cannot be deduced, it is prohibited that
any user coalition can illegitimately establish new user shares or reestablish ex-
isting secret user shares, thus complying with Security Requirement 2. Though
any user coalition may compute αaj , 0 ≤ j ≤ t− 1, the exponent aj is protected
due to the Discrete Logarithm Problem.
Security Requirement 2. Protection of the user shares. In agreement with analy-
sis of Security Requirement 1, disclosure of the secret coefficients (a0, . . . , at−1)
and the secret factor wi is prevented. Since new user shares can only be estab-
lished by means of these coefficients, it is prevented that any user coalition can
illegitimately establish new user shares or reestablish existing secret user shares.
In the decryption phase, each participant Pi ∈ T computes Yi by applying his
or her secret share si as an exponent modulo p. Obtaining the secret user share
from Yi is equivalent to solving the Discrete Logarithm Problem.
Security Requirement 2 is hence preserved.
Security Requirement 3. Protection of encrypted data. Given zj = trj mod p, j ∈
{1, . . . , m}, it is computationally infeasible to obtain the secret r due to the
Discrete Logarithm Problem. This corresponds to the cryptographic trapdoor of
the ElGamal cryptosystem. Thus, the difficulty of obtaining the secret encryption
factor αa0·r is equivalent to breaking the ElGamal cryptosystem.
3 Conclusion
In this paper, we have presented the collusion problem related to threshold-
oriented cryptosystems. The underlying threshold secret sharing scheme of
threshold cryptosystems does not prohibit a minimum number of colluding par-
ticipants to compute the shared secret or any of the polynomial coefficients.
Obtaining the shared secret enables a user to bypass the threshold requirement
and to carry out threshold-oriented cryptographic computations on an individ-
ual basis. Obtaining all the secret polynomial coefficients would moreover enable
establishment new user shares.
In this paper, we have proposed a method applied to the threshold decryption
scheme of Frankel and Desmedt that prohibits deduction of any of the secret
polynomial coefficients of the underlying secret polynomial, and thereby pre-
venting violation of the threshold security requirement.
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Abstract
Threshold-oriented cryptosystems require at least t arbitrary partic-
ipants of a group of n (where t ≤ n) to carry out computation of
a cryptographic function, e.g., threshold decryption or threshold sig-
nature computation. Such cryptosystems commonly incorporate the
secret sharing scheme of Shamir which is based on the secrecy of a
polynomial. Given t user shares, Lagrange interpolation enables dis-
closure of the secret polynomial coefficients, whereof one constitutes
a secret shared key. Knowledge of the shared key enable bypassing of
the threshold security requirement, so that such computations can be
carried out on an individual basis. The threshold security requirement
would thus be violated, and it cannot be guaranteed that allegedly
subsequent threshold computations have actually been carried out by
means of collaboration and not by a single individual. Moreover, dis-
closure of the polynomial coefficients enables establishment of new
user shares. We refer to this as the collusion problem. This could be a
serious problem when the threshold is low, for example 2 or 3.
In this paper, we present a method that prevents computation of any of
the secret coefficients of the polynomial of the underlying Shamir secret
sharing scheme, thus preventing the collusion problem in threshold
cryptosystems.
1 Introduction
In the threshold secret sharing scheme of Shamir [12], a secret key is shared (or
split) among n members of a group so that each is allocated a unique share of
the secret. Each user share is computed from a secret polynomial, where the
secret key would normally be the least-order coefficient of the secret polynomial.
The shared secret can then later on be recovered from at least t arbitrary user
shares computed from the same polynomial, while less than t shares reveal no
information about the shared secret. The threshold property provides flexibil-
ity since it enables an arbitrary composed subgroup of t out of n participants
to collaboratively carry out computation of a given cryptographic function. In
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contrast, assuming that a predefined, fixed set of specific participants are to be
required to carry out a cryptographic action, would be a major disadvantage,
particularly since such an action would be impeded in any case of absence of one
or more of the pertaining participants.
Threshold cryptosystems are generally based on the threshold-secret sharing
scheme of Shamir, which provide the security requirement that computations
can only be carried out by group consensus and hence collaboration of a mini-
mum number of associated parties. We refer to this security requirement as the
threshold requirement. An essential security objective of threshold cryptosystems
is therefore to prevent that individuals can carry out threshold-computations in-
dividually.
This security property is desirable in scenarios where some sort of separation of
duty is required. A practical example of this could be access to a bank vault.
It is not desirable that one person alone would control the key to the vault due
to the risk of fraud, robbery and extortion. Rather, the vault should only be
unlockable by agreement and cooperation of at least t bank employees. However,
since employees could be prohibited from attending work due to sickness, death,
or any other reason, a practical and flexible vault locking mechanism could be
based on the threshold property, and open as a function of the secret keys of t
arbitrary employees of certain clearance.
Threshold cryptosystems based on the Shamir secret sharing scheme allow the
secret polynomial coefficients, including the shared secret, to be restored by La-
grange interpolation given t arbitrary user shares. Disclosure of the shared secret
would allow anyone holding the shared secret to later on carry out threshold-
computations on an individual basis. The threshold security requirement would
thus be violated. Consequently, although t participants have to collude in the first
place, this means that it cannot be guaranteed that subsequent alleged threshold
computations have actually been carried out by means of collaboration and not
by a single individual.
Disclosure of all the secret polynomial coefficients would moreover enable ille-
gitimate establishment of any user share si = f(i) for any i, where f is the
pertaining polynomial. We refer to this as the collusion problem. The smaller
the threshold is, for instance 2 or 3, the more imminent the collusion problem
may be.
The collusion problem regarding threshold cryptosystems was first addressed
in [3], where a collusion-resistant threshold decryption scheme was proposed.
Its computational overhead for encryption is log2 n additional exponentiations
to the underlying threshold cryptosystem, where n denotes the total number of
participants in the group.
In this paper, we propose a collusion-resistant threshold decryption scheme,
whose novelty is the use of rational functions for providing collusion resistance
to any number of colluding participants. The proposed scheme has a very small
computational overhead of only one additional exponentiation to the underlying
threshold cryptosystem.
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2 Background
Typical threshold-oriented applications are threshold decryption and threshold
signatures. Threshold decryption cryptosystems enforce that a minimum num-
ber of t arbitrary participants of a group of n participants are required to col-
laboratively carry out decryptions pertaining to their group. When a group is
represented by a public key, outsiders can confidentially address the group. Only
by collaborating in such a way that the active group members are each con-
tributing with their partial computational results, the encrypted message can
be decrypted. See [5–7] for relevant threshold decryption cryptosystems. A dis-
cussion of diverse theoretical issues related to threshold cryptography is given
in [4]. Likewise, threshold signature schemes (e.g., [8, 9]), require a minimum
coalition to compute digital signatures due to the threshold requirement. Note
that threshold signatures do not reveal the identity of the actual signing group
members.2 Another threshold-oriented security application is conference key es-
tablishment [10,11].
2.1 Shamir secret sharing
In the (t, n) threshold secret sharing scheme of Shamir [12], a secret number is
split into n secret user shares. The secret can only be reconstructed by means of
an arbitrarily composed subset of minimum t user shares, while less than t shares
reveal no information about the shared secret. A dealer or trusted authority (TA)
sets up the scheme by generating a secret polynomial of order (t− 1):
f(x) =
t−1∑
j=0
aj · xj
Let U = {P1, . . . , Pn} denote a group of n participants. For a given U , the TA
computes for each Pi ∈ U a secret user share si according to
si = f(i) (mod q)
where q is a large prime. Normally, the shared secret is defined as f(0) = a0, but
it can in general be f for any x ∈ Zq.
By means of at least t user shares, all polynomial coefficients (a0, . . . , at−1) can
be restored by Lagrange interpolation (see Appendix A for more details), or by
solving the linear equation system


1 x1 . . . xt−11
1 x2 . . . xt−12
...
...
. . .
...
1 xt . . . xt−1t

 ·


a0
a1
...
at−1

 =


s0
s1
...
st−1


corresponding to t user shares.
2Note the distinction from group signatures (that are not threshold-based), where a single mem-
ber signs on behalf of a group in such a way that the identity of the signer cannot be determined,
only that the signer is member of a specific group.
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2.2 Threshold decryption
In this subsection, we illustrate the threshold decryption scheme proposed by
Desmedt and Frankel [5]. This scheme is equivalent to the ElGamal public key
cryptosystem [13], where the private key is split by means of Shamir secret
sharing [12].
A trusted authority (TA) sets up the scheme by computing the secret user shares
for a given user group U according to Shamir secret sharing scheme. The TA
selects two large public primes p and q, where p = 2 · q + 1. The TA moreover
selects a generator α to Zq. The team is represented by the public key y =
α−a0 (mod p), where a0 = f(0) represents the private, shared group key. The
encryption and decryption functions are defined as follows:
Encryption. By means of the public key y, an encrypting entity (or sender)
encrypts a message m according to the ElGamal public key cryptosystem. The
sender generates a random secret number r from Zq, and computes the cryp-
togram (c,R), where
c = m · yr (mod p) and R = αr (mod p)
and sends (c,R) to U .
Decryption. To decrypt (c,R), the partial computations of a subcoalition T ⊆ U
of at least t participants are required, i.e., |T | ≥ t. Each Pi ∈ T computes and
sends
Yi = Rsi (mod p)
confidentially, i.e., via secure channels, to the other participants of T . Let IT =
{i |Pi ∈ T}. By means of the partial computations, the plaintext is restored by
using Lagrange interpolation on the exponents:
m = c ·
∏
j∈IT
Y
bj
j = c ·R
∑
j∈IT sj ·bj = c ·Ra0 (mod p)
where bi =
∏
j∈IT
i6=j
j
j−i (mod q).
2.3 Bypassing the threshold requirement
As noted above, one of the main purposes of threshold-oriented cryptographic
schemes is to enforce a consensus requirement as a condition for computation
of a cryptographic function. However, a user coalition T ⊆ U can compute the
shared private group key a0 by using Lagrange interpolation, as a0 =
∑
j∈IT sj bj
(mod q). Disclosing a0 would allow any user holding it to individually decrypt
of all preceding and future cryptograms pertaining to the team given (c,R):
m = c ·Ra0 (mod p)
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Thus, the threshold requirement is violated. The lower t is, for instance 2 or 3,
the more imminent could this be.
In the rest of this subsection, we will describe an inefficient collusion-resistant
variant of the threshold decryption scheme. A straight-forward way to make
the threshold decryption scheme collusion-resistant could be to hide f(i) by
multiplication of a secret factor ki that is unique for each user Pi ∈ U . The user
share for each Pi ∈ U would be s∗i = ki · f(i) mod q. This would prevent that
Lagrange interpolation can be computed by such user shares due to that q is a
large prime, and the polynomial coefficients of f(x) would therefore be protected.
However, Lagrange interpolation could be achieved by exponential computation
given the public numbers yi = α(k
−1
i ) mod p for each Pi ∈ U . Due to the Discrete
Logarithm Problem, it would be computationally infeasible to compute the secret
ki given yi.
The encrypting entity (the sender) computes zi = yri mod p for each user Pi ∈ U .
Each Pi ∈ T would subsequently compute vi = zs
∗
i
i = R
k−1i (ki·f(i)) = Rf(i) mod
p. These computational results would then be used for subsequent Lagrange
interpolation on the exponents according to Section 2.2. Although αf(x) mod p
can be computed for any x, it would be computationally infeasible to deduce
f(x) due to the Discrete Logarithm Problem. However, this method is relatively
inefficient, since it requires n = |U| exponentiations on the sender side and
transferral of n additional numbers.
3 Preliminaries
In this section, we present the security requirements for the proposed scheme,
and some mathematical observations relevant for understanding it.
3.1 Security requirements
In order to provide collusion-resistance to threshold cryptosystems based on the
Shamir secret sharing scheme, the following security requirements must be sat-
isfied:
Security Requirement 1. Collusion-resistant security of polynomial coeffi-
cients. It must be computationally infeasible to restore any polynomial coef-
ficients of the polynomial constituting the underlying Shamir scheme, given any
number of user shares.
Security Requirement 2. Collusion-resistant security of user shares. It must
be computationally infeasible to deduce existing or compute new user shares
given any number of user shares.
Security Requirement 3. Cryptographic security. The cryptographic security
must be in agreement with the underlying threshold cryptosystem.
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The second security requirement is tightly connected with Security Require-
ment 1 since the user shares are computed as a function of the secret polynomial,
but it should nevertheless be explicitly stated. The last security requirement per-
tains to the security of the actual underlying cryptosystem.
3.2 Relevant mathematical observations
Let us consider the following rational function consisting of two first order poly-
nomials
si =
f(i)
g(i)
=
a0 + a1 · i
d0 + d1 · i (1 ≤ i ≤ n)
where we assume that the polynomial coefficients of f and g are unknown. In
order to find (a0, a1, d0, d1), we can write this as an equation a0 + i a1 = si d0 +
i si d1 ⇔ a0 + i a1 − si d0 − i si d1 = 0.
For instance, given 4 user shares (s1, . . . , s4) we can set up the equivalent system
of linear equations:


1 1 −s1 −s1
1 2 −s2 −2 s2
1 3 −s3 −3 s3
1 4 −s4 −4 s4

 ·


a0
a1
d0
d1

 =


0
0
0
0


Let ord(f) ≥ 1 and let ord(g) = 1, where ord(f) denotes the polynomial order
of f . Let the polynomial order of f define the threshold t, i.e, t = ord(f) + 1.
Generalizing with respect to a threshold t is equivalent to the following linear
system requiring t + 2 user shares (s1, . . . , st+2):


1 . . . 1 −s1 −s1
1 . . . 2t−1 −s2 −2 s2
...
1 . . . (t + 1)t−1 −st+1 −(t + 1) · st+1
1 . . . (t + 2)t−1 −st+2 −(t + 2) · st+2


·


a0
...
at−1
d0
d1


=


0
0
...
0
0


Such linear equation systems where the constant terms constitute a zero-vector
are known as homogenous linear systems. Homogenous linear systems are equiv-
alent to linear equation systems where the number of equations is lower than
the number of unknowns (see Appendix B for an example), and have therefore
in general either a zero solution or infinitely many solutions (e.g., [1, p. 377]).
Thus, if all polynomial coefficients are other than zero, we are left with an infinite
number of solutions. The equation system is therefore underdefined, and cannot
be solved. Hence, the secret coefficients (a0, . . . , at−1, d0, d1) are prevented from
disclosure.
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4 Collusion-resistant threshold decryption
In this section, we present the efficient collusion-resistant threshold decryption
scheme.
Initializations. Let U = {P1, . . . , Pn} denote a team of n participants. A trusted
authority (TA) selects two large public primes p and q such that p = 2 · q + 1,
and a generator α to Zq (e.g., [2, p. 30]). The TA defines the threshold t, and
randomly generates two distinct secret polynomials:
f(x) =
t−1∑
j=0
aj · xj and g(x) = d0 + d1 · x
The TA computes a secret user share
si =
f(i)
g(i)
(mod q)
for each Pi ∈ U . Furthermore, the TA computes
y = α−a0 (mod p), z0 = αd0 (mod p) and z1 = αd1 (mod p)
where a0 = f(0) is the shared secret.
Encryption. In order to encrypt the message m, the encrypting entity (the
sender) generates a random secret number r from Zq and computes
c = m · yr (mod p) and W = {wj = zrj mod p | j ∈ {0, 1}
}
and sends (c,W ) to U . Note that there is only one additional exponentiation
compared to the ElGamal public key cryptosystem.
Decryption. To decrypt the cryptogram, the partial computations of a sub-
coalition T ⊆ U of at least t participants are required. Each Pi ∈ T computes
vi =
(
w0 · wi1
)si = (αr·g(i))
f(i)
g(i) = αr·f(i) (mod p)
and confidentially shares the result with the the other participants of T. Let
IT = {i |Pi ∈ T}. Using the Lagrange interpolation method on the exponents,
the secret encryption factor is restored according to
Y =
∏
j∈IT
v
bj
j = (α
r)
∑
j∈IT f(j)·bj = αr·a0 (mod p)
where bi =
∏
j∈IT
i6=j
j
j−i (mod q), and subsequently the plaintext
m = c · Y (mod p)
in agreement with the ElGamal public key cryptosystem [13].
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4.1 Security analysis
In this section, we provide a security analysis showing that the presented scheme
is secure in agreement with the security requirements presented in Section 3.1.
Security Requirement 1. Collusion-resistant security of polynomial coefficients.
The secret polynomial coefficients (a0, . . . , at−1, d0, d1) provide the basis for com-
puting secret user shares si, Pi ∈ U . The public parameters (y, z0, z1) are com-
puted based on the secret polynomial coefficients (a0, d0, d1), respectively. These
secret coefficients are protected in agreement with the following:
• Using the secret user shares as exponents, the value Rf(i) (mod p) can be
computed for any Pi ∈ U :
Rf(i) =
(
w0 · wi1
)si = (Rg(i))
f(i)
g(i) = vi (mod p)
Computing f(i) from Rf(i) mod p is equivalent of solving the Discrete Log-
arithm Problem. Since it is prevented that f(i) for any Pi ∈ U can be
disclosed, it is therefore prevented that the secret polynomial (a0, . . . , at−1)
can be disclosed.
• Regarding the public parameters (y = αa0 mod p, zi = αdi mod p, i ∈
{0, 1}), the secret (a0, d0, d1) are protected due to the Discrete Logarithm
Problem.
Since the number of colluding participants does not affect the hardness of the
Discrete Logarithm Problem, this leaves the following problem. According to
Section 3, t + 2 or more user shares constitute a homogenous linear equation
system. Solving such an equation system results in a linear equation system
where the number of equations are less than the number of unknown coefficients,
which results in an infinite number of solutions. The equation system is therefore
underdefined, and cannot be solved given any number of user shares.
Computation of any of the secret coefficients (a0, . . . , at−1, d0, d1) is is therefore
prevented regardless of the number of colluding participants. Security Require-
ment 1 is therefore preserved.
Security Requirement 2. Collusion-resistant security of user shares. In agreement
with the analysis of Security Requirement 1, disclosure of the secret coefficients
(a0, . . . , at−1, d0, d1) is prevented. Since new user shares can only be established
by means of there coefficients, it is prevented that any user coalition can illegit-
imately establish new user shares or reestablish existing secret user shares.
In the decryption phase, each participant Pi ∈ T computes the partial encryption
factor vi by applying his or her secret share si as an exponent modulo p. Com-
puting si given vi is equivalent to solving the Discrete Logarithm Problem, and is
therefore computationally infeasible. Since the number of colluding participants
do not affect the hardness of the Discrete Logarithm Problem, collusion-oriented
computation of user shares is is therefore prevented regardless of the number of
colluding participants. Thus, Security Requirement 2 is preserved.
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Security Requirement 3. Cryptographic security. This security property corre-
sponds to security of the underlying threshold cryptosystem. The security is
based on the difficulty of computing the secret encryption factor Y = yr =
αr·a0 mod p, where a0 and r are secret, and W is public. Computing r from
W is equivalent to solving the Discrete Logarithm Problem. Computing the se-
cret encryption factor Y is equivalent to breaking corresponding the ElGamal
cryptosystem, which is the basis for the threshold cryptosystem. Thus, Security
Requirement 3 is preserved.
5 Conclusion
In this paper, we have shown that the underlying Shamir secret sharing scheme of
threshold-cryptosystems does not prevent a minimum number of colluding par-
ticipants to compute the shared secret key or any of the polynomial coefficients.
By using the shared secret key, a user can bypass the threshold requirement
by carrying out threshold-oriented cryptographic computations on an individual
basis. We have presented a collusion-resistant threshold decryption scheme that
prevents computation of any of the secret polynomial coefficients of the underly-
ing secret polynomials. violation of the threshold security requirement is thereby
prevented. Future work could be to develop a scheme for collusion-resistance
threshold signatures.
Appendix A.
Lagrange interpolation. Let IT = {i | Pi ∈ T}. The Lagrange polynomial is
given by
f(x) =
∑
i∈IT
si bi(x) where bi(x) =
∏
j∈IT
i6=j
x− j
i− j =
t−1∑
j=0
ci,j x
j
Thus, by multiplying out the factors of bi(x), we obtain the Lagrange basis
coefficients ci,j whereof we can compute the polynomial coefficients aj of f(x):
f(x) =
∑
i∈IT
si bi(x) =
∑
i∈IT
si (
t−1∑
j=0
ci,j x
j) =
t−1∑
j=0
(
∑
i∈IT
si ci,j)xj =
t−1∑
j=0
aj x
j
Appendix B.
In this section, we present a small example of the proposed scheme represented
by the equivalent linear system that it constitutes. The case demonstrates how
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the corresponding equation system can be reduced with respect to the coefficients
and how effectively the coefficients are protected. For this example, we assume
that all numbers are in R.
Let sx = a0+a1 xd0+d1 x where a0 = 3, a1 = 7, d0 = 5, d1 = 4 and whereof we get
four user shares s1 = 109 , s2 =
17
13 , s3 =
24
17 , s4 =
31
21 . We represent this as linear
equation system in augmented matrix form, and solve it according to Gauss-
Jordan elimination3(see e.g., [1, p. 362]):


1 1 −s1 −s1
1 2 −s2 −2 s2
1 3 −s3 −3 s3
1 4 −s4 −4 s4
∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣
0
0
0
0

 =


1 1 −109 −109
1 2 −1713 −3413
1 3 −2417 −7217
1 4 −3121 −12421
∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣
0
0
0
0


M2(13)
M3(17)
M4(21)
−→


1 1 −109 −109
13 26 −17 −34
17 51 −24 −72
21 84 −31 −124
∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣
0
0
0
0


A1,2(−13)
A1,3(−17)
A1,4(−21)
−→


1 1 −109 −109
0 13 −239 −1769
0 34 −469 −4789
0 63 −233 −3023
∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣
0
0
0
0


M2
(
1
13
)
M3(9)
M4(3)
−→


1 1 −109 −109
0 1 − 23117 −176117
0 306 −46 −478
0 189 −23 −302
∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣
0
0
0
0


A2,1(−1)
A2,3(−306)
A2,4(−189)
−→


1 0 −107117 − 46117
0 1 − 23117 −176117
0 0 18413 −23013
0 0 18413 −23013
∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣
0
0
0
0


M3
(
13
184
)
M4
(
13
184
)
−→


1 0 −107117 − 46117
0 1 − 23117 −176117
0 0 1 −230184
0 0 1 −230184
∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣
0
0
0
0


A3,1
(
107
117
)
A3,2
(
23
117
)
A3,4(−1)
−→


1 0 0 −34
0 1 0 −74
0 0 1 −230184
0 0 0 0
∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣
0
0
0
0


The last matrix corresponds to
a0 −34 d1 = 0
a1 −74 d1 = 0
d0 −230184 d1 = 0
Since we have more unknowns than equations, the system has an infinite number
of solutions, effectively hiding the actual values of the coefficients.
3Notation. 1) Mi(c) means multiply the ith row by c. 2) Ai,j(c) means multiply the ith row by
c and add it to the j th row.
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Abstract
Due to the sensitivity of personal medical information, this paper ad-
dresses the need of hiding patient identities — in contrast to only
keeping their medical data confidential. Thus, it could in some cases
be desirable that personal and meaningful patient identity informa-
tion like names, addresses, personal identity numbers, etc., would not
to be linked to disclosed electronic patient records (EPR). To achieve
this, we propose a scheme that enables patients to anonymously grant
medical teams authorization to access their EPRs without revealing
their true identities to the medical practitioners. An essential benefit
is that it enables patients to exert control over their own medical data.
A security evaluation is included.
1 Introduction
With the emerge of information technology in health care, there has been exten-
sive focus on the security issues of electronic patient records (EPR) in medical
environments. These issues include how to ensure that only legitimate personnel
can access no more than the required electronic patient records in order to pro-
vide medical care to the concerning patients, and moreover, how to ensure that
medical information is preserved and managed confidentially.
Although medical patient data remain confidential, it may be cases when it is
desirable that the identities of patients remain confidential as well, even after
disclosure of patient data. Concerning personal information about AIDS/HIV
status, sexual transmittable diseases, emotional problems, psychiatric illnesses,
sexual divergencies, genetic predispositions to diseases, information about toxic
addictions, and so on [1], it is likely that some patients wish to remain anony-
mous. Thus, meaningful identity information such as names, birthdays, personal
identity numbers, addresses etc., must not be linked to corresponding disclosed
EPRs. Likewise, for purposes such as medical research, disclosed medical data
should not be linked to the concerning patients. Access control should neverthe-
less be maintained properly so that EPRs are not accessible to other medical
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employees than legitimate medical teams providing medical care to the concern-
ing patients.
The problem boils down to how to link patients with their respective EPR with-
out revealing personal identity information. In this paper, we propose a crypto-
graphic solution that enables patients to grant medical teams authorization to
access their corresponding EPRs in such a way that the real identity of the pa-
tients are not disclosed. Thus, patients remain anonymous, and patients, teams
and EPR security server can nevertheless authenticate each other.
Patients granting authorization implicitly state consent and exert control over
their own medical data by controlling who can access their corresponding EPRs.
Moreover, by removing personal identity information from EPRs, privacy is pre-
served when medical data is disclosed for medical research.
In the case that a patient is unconscious and therefore unable to consent access
to the EPR, the security system can include an emergency mode where one, or
preferably a minimum coalition of two (or three) security administrators, approve
a medical team access on behalf of the concerning patient.
2 Previous work
It has been previously proposed to remove personal identity information (names,
addresses, phone numbers, etc.) to provide anonymity in medical environments
[2]. However, this may not rule out the possibility that it may be possible to
correlate anonymous medical data to the corresponding individuals. Sweeney [3]
proposes methods of substitution of data to prohibit such correlations. In order
to enforce access control, explicit identifiers are required to link data records. It
is assumed in this paper that the medical data themselves contain no explicit
references to the patient.
In [4,5], the authors propose anonymization of patient data based on encrypted
anonymous identifiers or pseudonyms. Patients can consent to disclose their med-
ical data by supplying their pseudonyms, but have, however, no technological
enforcement about who is to access the medical data. Another problem is the
staticness of the pseudonyms, and that there is no challenge-response mecha-
nisms ensuring online certification of requests. Thus, an adversary can obtain
an encrypted anonymous identifier by eavesdropping. By replaying this, the se-
curity server will not be able to distinguish whether a request originated from
the patient or not. Moreover, there is no mechanism that ensures the security
server that no other than legitimate medical professionals, and not an adversary,
is targeted to access the EPR.
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3 Anonymous authentication and authorization
3.1 A framework for patient anonymity
In medical networks, access to EPRs includes known identities of patients. This
could be meaningful public identifiers like names and/or personal security num-
bers. Such identifiers would then be known to the parties involved in the authen-
tication and authorization process. Consequently, the medical personnel that
provides medical care depends on knowing such identities in order to provide the
right care to the right patients.
In circumstances where patients require confidentiality and want to remain
anonymous, consequently, it is essential that names and social security num-
bers (SSN) cannot be associated with their corresponding EPRs. This means
that it is not desirable to have fully trusted administrators who can obtain such
relations. Moreover, the EPR server must not link (or contain a table that links)
patient names/SSNs with corresponding EPRs. In contrary, in this paper we
propose an approach where the EPR server associates each EPR entry with a
specially generated anonymous EPR identifier (AEID). The AEID is partly based
on a secret long-term key held by the corresponding patient. This secrecy of this
key prohibits any other party including administrative personnel from obtaining
associations between patients and their EPRs. Basically, given a patient name or
SSN, it must be infeasible to obtain the corresponding EPR entry and the EPR
of the patient without knowing the key.
A semi-trusted administrator (STA) may be needed to assign available and ap-
propriate medical professionals for treatment of incoming patients. It may be
necessary that the STA knows names and SSN of hospitalized patients, but
there is no need for this party to access EPRs. In our approach, the STA, being
an administrative and coordinating entity having knowledge of names and SSN
of hospitalized patients, has not a role and authority to assign authorizations on
behalf of patients for medical professionals access their EPRs, nor to be able to
associate names/SSNs of patients with their medical records.
The EPR server contains a table that links the anonymous EPR identifiers
(AEID) and the associated EPR entries of each patient. This table does not
provide any relationships between patient names and AEIDs. Furthermore, none
of the involved parties, including patients, know or can obtain the association
between an AEID and actual patient identities.
To ensure patient anonymity, medical personnel is not given any name/SSN
information of patients, but patients are instead referenced by means of a tem-
porary anonymous patient identifier (TAPI). The duration of the hospitalization
reflects the lifetime of a TAPI, and a new unique TAPI must be established for
each hospitalization.
The correspondence between TAPI and AEID can only be obtained by the EPR
server. Thus, if STA has obtained access to the AEID/EPR entry table where
each record is referenced by AEID, the STA has no way to determine which
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Entity Identifier
STA TAPIi, SSNi
S TAPIi, AEIDi
Pi TAPIi, SSNi
T TAPIi
Table 1: Relationship between identifiers known by which entities
1
3
P
STA S T
5
5
5
3
2
4
Figure 1: The hospitalization process
record that is associated by any TAPI. Table 1 shows which identifiers known
by the involved entities, and the association of the identifiers. The entity STA
denotes a semi-trusted administrator, S denotes the EPR server, Pi denotes a
patient and T a medical team.
The hospitalization process of a patient is summarized in Fig. 1 and as follows:
1. First at hospitalization, the patient may identify himself by name and SSN
to the STA for administrative purposes like billing.
2. The patient anonymously certifies himself to the EPR server by means of
his or her secret key, and generates TAPI.
3. The patient supplies the value of TAPI to STA. The EPR server acknowl-
edges by supplying TAPI to STA. The STA compares the to received values
– match indicates that the patient is legitimate.
4. STA assigns a medical team for the patient referenced by TAPI.
5. The team, EPR server and patient (by means of TAPI) authenticates each
other. By completing the authentication, the patient is granting the medical
team authorization to access his EPR.
An important property here is that the patient’s involvement is required in order
to obtain access to his or her EPR. Since only the corresponding patient holds
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the private key, this provides the patient the authority to grant arbitrary teams
of medical professions access to his EPR.
3.2 Security properties and requirements
In the problem setting considered in this paper, there are three active entities:
The medical team T, the granting patient P, and the EPR security server S. We
have the following security requirements:
Authentication: The involved parties must mutually authenticate each other.
Authorization: Only P can authorize T to access his or her EPR.
Anonymity: The identity of P must be hidden from T and S.
Unlinkability: It is infeasible to deduce that various TAPIs may refer to the
same P.
The first security requirement embraces the following aspects:
• T and S must authenticate themselves to P, preventing that an adversary
masquerading as T or S could illegitimately obtain authorization
• P anonymously authenticates himself to S to prohibit that an adversary
may successfully masquerade as P. Likewise, T must authenticate them-
selves to S.
• S must authenticate itself to T and thereby confirming whether P is a
valid patient and whether T is granted authorization. Recall that the real
identity of P is hidden to T, and that P is referenced by TAPI.
Successful and completed execution of the proposed anonymity-preserving au-
thentication and authorization protocol provides granted authorization. Thus,
the patient must authenticate the medical team and security server first, since
the patient is the granting entity. Subsequently, the EPR server authenticates
the patient and team.
The third security requirement means that the given patient is not referenced by
his name/SSN, but rather a temporary TAPI. It should be infeasible to obtain
associations between any patients and their TAPIs. This is related to the fourth
which is to ensure unlinkability between TAPI and AEID of the same patient
for all other than patients and EPR server. It is likewise infeasible to obtain
relationships between any names/SSNs and AEIDs.
Assuming that the network is not secure, it can be assumed that all messages
exchanged over the network can be eavesdropped by an adversary. Thus, the
protocol must resist passive attacks like eavesdropping, and active attacks by
manipulation and substitution of messages where the adversary may be mas-
querading as a legitimate entity.
Public keys should be certifiable, for example represented by digital certificates
or be identity-based so that substitution attacks of public keys will be detected.
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Successful replacement of public keys would consequently break the security of
the protocol (and any other protocol).
Since all entities hold private keys that are actively involved in the authentication
and authorization process, these should be held and stored securely, for example
in secure tamper-free devices. Computations should be done in these devices so
that the personal keys are never disclosed. Personal smartcards are a possible
solution to satisfy these requirements. However, this part is outside the scope of
this paper.
4 The anonymity preserving authorization protocol
The objective of this protocol is to enable patients to anonymously grant med-
ical teams authorization to access their EPRs without revealing identities. The
protocol is three-fold. Initially, patients are anonymously registered at the cur-
rent hospital where an EPR is created for each patient associated with a unique
long-term anonymous EPR identifier (AEID) (Fig. 2).
For each subsequent hospitalization, each patient establishes a valid temporary
anonymous identifier (TAPI) (Fig. 3) by which the patient can anonymously
grant medical personnel EPR access according to the anonymity-preserving au-
thentication and authorization (AAA) protocol (Fig. 4).
Intuitively, a naive way for Pi to anonymously convince S about ownership of a
certain EPR is by using some kind of reference that anonymously links to the
patient’s EPRs. Let aidi denote such reference. Assuming that such a reference
aidi is known only to the patient Pi and S, Pi could use it to authenticate himself
or herself to S.
Pi could send aidi encrypted to S along with a timestamp. S would then decrypt,
check the timestamp, and authenticate the validity of aidi by checking if there
exists an EPR that is referenced by aidi. The problem about such authentication
is two-fold: 1) The EPR table referencing aidi and the corresponding EPR must
be kept secret. 2) The number aidi is equivalent to a long-term secret user key,
whereas secret keys should never be disclosed. An adversary getting hold of aidi
could obtain the same by encrypting aidi along with a valid timestamp. Thus,
this approach would not be appropriate. In the protocols shown in Fig. 2 and
Fig. 3, anonymous authentication is achieved by exchanging blinded messages
without submitting identifying information directly. Blinding refers to hiding
data usually by multiplication of a secret secret number. This allows subsequent
operations like exponential operations to be performed on the blinded data by
another party while effectively hiding the original data.
In the rest of this paper, we assume that all cryptographic computations are in
a finite field Zp determined by a large prime p where α is a generator to p. Both
p and α are public.
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1) S → Pi : rS = (α ·N)xS , N
2) Pi → S : ES(rxiS , Nxi , N)
S : AEIDi = rxiS · (Nxi)−xS = αxSxi
Figure 2: The AEIDi initialization protocol for Pi
4.1 Initialization
The initialization protocol (Fig. 2) is utilized when a patient Pi for the first
time is registered at the hospital and his or her EPR is created. In the protocol,
AEIDi is blindly established jointly by Pi and S, and being associated to the
his or her new EPR.
In the first step, the patient randomly generates a private long-term key xi, which
should preferably be stored in tamper-proof hardware like a personal smartcard,
and cannot be disclosed. Alternatively, it could be xi = h(P ′i s password) where
h denotes a secure hash function. The value αxi is essential for long-term anony-
mous identification of Pi, because the anonymous AEIDi is computed by S
according to AEIDi = (αxi)xS where xS is the private key of S. In this protocol,
the disclosure of αxi is insignificant.
Initially, S generates a nonce N . Then S computes and submits rS = (α ·N)xS
and N to the patient Pi. Based on this, Pi computes rxiS and N
xi , and returns
ES(r
xi
S , N
xi , N). (The notation EX(m) denotes that a message m is encrypted
with the public key of entity X.)
S receives the message from Pi, decrypts it and obtains rxiS and N
xi and N . S
verifies whether the nonce N matches with what was sent to Pi in the previous
message. In case of no match, S aborts initialization. Otherwise, S computes
AEIDi = rxiS · (Nxi)−xS = (α ·N)xSxi · (Nxi)−xS
= αxSxi ·NxSxi ·N−xixS = αxSxi
It is computationally infeasible to for S to obtain xi due to the Discrete Loga-
rithm Problem. Then S creates an empty EPR for Pi, and creates a new row in
the AEID/EPR entry table linking the anonymous AEIDi and the new EPR.
The difference of proposed initialization protocol from the Diffie-Hellman key
agreement protocol [10] lyes in the fact that AEIDi acts as an identifier, while
the purpose of Diffie-Hellman is for two parties to establish secret keys that are
not to be known by other than the two parties. Although that the table of AEIDi
should be kept secret at the EPR server, only knowledge of the private key xi
can provide EPR authorization, knowledge of the respective AEIDi cannot.
4.2 TAPI establishment
When patients are getting hospitalized, a semi-trusted administrator (STA) pro-
vides related administrative tasks and coordination by assigning available and
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1) S → Pi : rS = αxS ·NxS , N
Pi : TAPIi = αpi
2) Pi → S : ES(rxiS , Nxi , N, TAPIi)
S : AEIDi = rxiS · (Nxi1 )−xS
3) S → Pi : TAPIi
Figure 3: The TAPI establishment protocol
appropriate medical personnel to provide care to the patient. The patient may
(or may not) identify themselves with names and SSN to the STA for adminis-
trational purposes like billing, but the STA will be unable to link any names to
the records of the patients.
The protocol for establishing an temporary anonymous patient identifier (TAPI)
(Fig. 3) is similar to the one described in the previous subsection, except that in
this one, the patient Pi is anonymously authenticated towards AEIDi, and that
the patient provides TAPIi by which the patient will be referenced throughout
the current hospitalization.
Initially, S generates a nonce N , computes rS = (α ·N)xS , and sends rS and
N to Pi. Pi computes rxiS and N
xi . Pi generates a large secret random number
pi, and computes TAPIi = αpi . Then Pi encrypts rxiS , N
xi , N , TAPIi with the
public key of S.
The nonce N ensures S that message 2 is not a replay of a previous session, and
blinds αxS (due to the Discrete Logarithm Problem). S decrypts the message,
verifies correctness of the received nonce N , and computes
AEIDi = rxiS · (Nxi)−xS = (α ·N)xSxi · (Nxi)−xS
= αxSxi ·NxSxi ·N−xixS = αxSxi
Then S checks in the AEID/EPR table whether there is an entry that matches
AEIDi. If such entry exists, then S sends back TAPIi as an acknowledgment
to STA and Pi to confirm that a record exists according to the request.
TAPIi is an anonymous identifier that identifies the patient Pi during the hospi-
talization where its validity is approved by S. However, in the proposed approach,
it is not only for referencing the patient anonymously, but also to function as an
anonymous ephemeral public key. During subsequent execution of the AAA pro-
tocol, the patient is authenticated by means of TAPIi (which is already approved
by S), acting as a anonymous ephemeral public key where pi is the corresponding
private key. Correspondingly, both S and T are associated with respective public
keys, although not anonymous.
For subsequent execution of the AAA protocol, the EPR server needs to make
a temporary association between TAPIi and AEIDi to facilitate subsequent
quick database look-up. However, S must not disclose this association to ensure
unlinkability.
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1) Pi → S : NPi , TAPIi
2) S → T : NS , [NS , NPi , TAPIi]S
3) T → Pi : NT , [NT , NS , S]T ,
[
NT , [NS , NPi , TAPIi]S
]
T
4) Pi → S : [NPi , NT , T ]Pi ,
[
NPi , [NT , NS , S]T
]
Pi
5) S → T : [NS , [NPi , NT , T ]Pi
]
S
Figure 4: The anonymity-preserving authentication and authorization protocol
4.3 Anonymity-preserving authentication and authorization
Fig. 4 shows the anonymous authentication protocol. The notation [m]X denotes
entity X ’s signature of m. NX denotes a nonce generated by X. The protocol
is circular in the sense that the three parties, Pi, S, T, form a circle where all
messages are sent in one direction. The messages flow according to Pi → S →
T → Pi → S. Thus, each entity receives messages only from the preceding entity,
and sends messages only to its succeeding entity.
In this protocol whenever a patient Pi needs to sign a message, he or she utilizes
TAPIi = αpi as a public key and pi as a private key (see the previous subsection).
Due to the form of the public/private key, the choice of possible signature schemes
is restricted to an ElGamal-based signature scheme [8] or similar like Schnorr’s
signature scheme [9] or the Digital Signature Standard scheme [11] which are all
based on the Discrete Logarithm Problem.
The protocol proceeds as follows:
1. Pi generates a nonce NPi , and sends TAPIi, NPi to S.
2. S generates a nonce NS , signs [NS , NPi , TAPIi], and then sends
NS , [NS , NPi , TAPIi]S to T.
3. Upon receiving message 2, T extracts [NS , NPi , TAPIi] and verifies the
consistency of the message by comparing NS of the signature with the
unsigned NS .
If both match, T generates a nonce NT , then signs
[NT , NS , S] and
[
NT , [NS , NPi , TAPIi]S
]
, and sends
NT , [NT , NS , S]T ,
[
NT , [NS , NPi , TAPIi]S
]
T
to Pi.
4. Upon receiving message 3, Pi extracts [NT , NS , S], and[
NT , [NS , NPi , TAPIi]S
]
by using public key of T . Then Pi extracts
[NS , NPi , TAPIi] using public key of S, and verifies the correctness of the
challenge NPi . Pi then verifies that the message is consistent by checking
that all three instances of NT match, and that both instances of NS match.
If they are correct, Pi signs [NPi , NT , T ] and
[
NPi , [NT , NS , S]T
]
with his
private key pi, and sends [NPi , NT , T ]Pi ,
[
NPi , [NT , NS , S]T
]
Pi
to S.
5. Upon receiving message 4, S extracts [NPi , NT , T ] and
[
NPi , [NT , NS , S]T
]
using TAPIi, the anonymous public key of Pi. S extracts moreover
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[NT , NS , S] by using the public key of T, and verifies the correctness of
the challenge NS . S then verifies that the message is consistent by checking
whether both instances of NPi match with NPi of message 2, and whether
both instances of NT match.
If they are correct, S signs
[
NS , [NPi , NT , T ]Pi
]
, and sends[
NS , [NPi , NT , T ]Pi
]
S
to T.
6. Upon reception of message 5, T extracts
[
NS , [NPi , NT , T ]Pi
]
by using pub-
lic key of S and verifies that NS match the values of NS of message 2. Then
T moreover extracts [NPi , NT , P ] from [NPi , NT , T ]Pi by using TAPIi, and
verifies that NPi match NPi of message 2, and the correctness of the chal-
lenge NT .
The protocol complies to that the participating entities authenticates each other
in such a way the Pi remains anonymous. The team T is represented as an
entity, but correspondingly consists of a number of collaborating team members.
In order for S and P to be certain that indeed a certain minimum number of the
participants of T actually are present, and that not just one individual is acting
on behalf of T, a threshold group-oriented cryptosystem should be employed
by T. In a threshold group-oriented cryptosystem, a group is represented by a
public key, but a specific minimum number of the participants must collaborate
to decrypt messages encrypted by the threshold-based public key [6, 7].
5 Security analysis
5.1 The TAPI protocol
First, we need to show that using TAPIi cannot be associated with Pi and
therefore utilization of TAPIi as the patient’s public key will preserve patient’s
anonymity. According to the algorithm, the patient generates the private pi ran-
domly. Therefore, the corresponding TAPIi = αpi is also random. The associa-
tion between TAPIi and patient Pi (via AEIDi) is sent encrypted to S with the
public key of S. Assuming that the employed public key cryptosystem is secure,
we can conclude that TAPIi preserves the patient anonymity, and unlinkability
as it is defined in the beginning of this paper is provided.
In both the AEID and TAPI protocols, the value of AEIDi is blindly established
where Pi signs by means of his or her private key xi the blinded value rS issued by
S. Since only S holds the secret key xS , S can recover AEIDi as an application
of the ElGamal cryptosystem [8].
5.2 The AAA protocol
The function of the AAA protocol is for the three parties, Pi, S, and T, to mutu-
ally authenticate each other. Pi is anonymously represented by his or her public
key TAPIi. Each party generates a nonce acting as a challenge. For all three
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parties, the two other parties sign the nonce issued by a first party. Subsequent
verification of the signatures establishes the authenticity of the participants. Each
signature includes the nonce issued by the originating party in order to prevent
that an adversary can obtain illegitimate signatures [12, p. 109].
In a given session, each participant issues a unique random nonce in messages
1–3. Each of the succeeding messages is cryptographically linked to each other by
means of the nonces. Redundancy of nonces in each messages (except for message
1) ensures that each message is consistent. Pi receiving message 3 can certify the
authenticity of S and T according to the signed challenge NPi originated at Pi.
Moreover, the nonces NS and NT ensures that the consistency of message 3 can be
certified. By consistency, we mean that the parts of the message must correspond,
where certification of consistency reveals that a message has been tampered with
by modification of substitution of a part of the message. Likewise S can, upon
receiving messages 1 and 4, certify Pi and T and certify the consistency of the
message. Finally, T upon receiving messages 2 and 5, certifies Pi and S.
6 Conclusion
In this paper, we have addressed the need of keeping patient identities anonymous
in regard to their medical data, in contrast to only keeping their medical data
confidential. This is essential in cases where patients wish that their identities
(like names, addresses, personal identity numbers, etc.) cannot to be associated
with information about for example related diseases, physical or genetic defects,
drug addictions, etc., stated in their respective patient records. To achieve that
personal identity information is not to be linked with disclosed medical data, we
have proposed a scheme that enables patients themselves to anonymously grant
medical teams authorization to access their EPRs without revealing their iden-
tities to the teams, by instead using certifiable anonymous identifiers. Another
benefit of this scheme is that it allows patients to exert control over their own
medical records.
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Abstract
Electronic patient records (EPR) may contain highly confidential
and personal medical information. It is therefore essential that med-
ical data is properly protected and managed. Today, it is widely
recognized that patients have a right to self-determination and to
exert control of their own medical data by consent. In this paper,
we present a cryptographic EPR access authorization scheme that
incorporates patient consent as a basis for granting EPR access to
medical teams or practitioners. This ensures that only the medical
practitioners specified by a consenting patient are granted EPR ac-
cess. If a patient is unconscious, the variation of the scheme allows
an emergency or security team to act on behalf of the patient.
1 Introduction
With the emergence of information technology in health care, there has been
extensive focus on security and confidentiality issues of electronic patient
records (EPR) in medical environments [1–4]. An important issue here con-
cerns proper access control. A basic criterion for this is legitimacy, i.e., only
medical personnel providing medical care to a given patient (or patients)
should access only the necessary medical data of the concerning patient they
are providing care to [6]. Another significant security issue concerns secure
and confidential management, handling and storage of personal medical in-
formation [1].
In a typical medical information scenario, electronic patient records could be
stored in EPR servers that are managed and controlled by one or few secu-
rity administrators. These administrators would normally possess all privi-
leges with respect to the patient data. They would perform functions such
as authorizing and assigning medical practitioners access to the EPRs of
the concerning patients that are to be provided care for. Consequently, each
security administrator would have full access to all personal medical data.
However, as patient records may contain highly sensitive and confidential
personal information, it is very important to ensure that such information
remains confidential. In this scenario, the patients have no actual control over
their medical data and are in practice left no other option than to simply
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trust that their data will not be disclosed to illegitimate personnel nor ma-
nipulated. However, patient consent identifies what nowadays has generally
been recognized as patients’ rights to exert control over their own medical
data [5–8]. Patient consent has today become an important principle in med-
ical ethics and access control policies. Even though this has lately been a
widely recognized aspect concerning patients’ self-determination and right to
exert control over their own personal medical data, patient consent is in prac-
tice enforced by means of filling out paper forms. Since this does not impose
an actual obstacle against illegitimate EPR access, it is therefore important
that patient consent should be integrated in medical access control systems.
As medical data in general should be protected from disclosure to unautho-
rized personnel, certain data are more sensitive than others. Since medical
records may possibly contain information about AIDS/HIV status, sexual
transmittable diseases, emotional problems, psychiatric illnesses, sexual di-
vergencies, genetic predispositions to diseases, information about toxic ad-
dictions, and so on [1], it essential that such information should be pro-
tected from disclosure including to security personnel except when legiti-
mately needed by medical practitioners. To ensure the privacy of medical
data, the EPRs could be stored encrypted at the EPR server. Alternatively,
assuming that the EPR is arranged into blocks or modules, a proper arrange-
ment could be that only certain EPR modules containing particulary sensitive
data are encrypted. Encryption imposes, however, the problem of secure key
storage and management. For example, if a cryptokey is revealed, the en-
crypted data can be decrypted and revealed. If a cryptokey is lost, the data
is lost. A straight-forward solution is that one or few security administrators
would control all EPR cryptokeys. Due to the fact that security adminis-
trators would be individually entrusted with the responsibility of managing
possibly thousands of secret EPR keys, which could impose a considerable
risk of human error, fraud, attacks and possibly high workloads.
A naive and insufficient solution could be to use a threshold-based (t, n) secret
sharing scheme where t ≤ n and the corresponding key is split into n secret
shares [10]. The shares are distributed to n authorities, so that each individual
holds one share. The secret key can only be reconstructed when at least t of
the participants pool their shares together. However, there are at least three
shortcomings with this approach: 1) The same secret key is associated to all
EPRs. 2) When reconstructed, the single secret key is revealed once and for
all. 3) The participants must reveal their secret shares to each other in order
to reconstruct the secret key. Thus, there is no confidentiality regarding the
secret shares.
In this paper, we present a cryptographic access authorization scheme that
incorporates the concept of patient consent. We consider the function of pa-
tient consent to be equivalent with the function of granting or authorizing
EPR access.
Note that EPR access could be granted to individuals, except to the patients
themselves, instead of teams like to a specific doctor (specialist, general prac-
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titioner, etc.). This provides proper distribution of trust since the patient is
in charge of disclosing his or her EPR by consent. However, the medical data
cannot be accessed by the patients themselves without special arrangements.
We assume that each EPR is encrypted by a unique and distinct key un-
known to all participants including the pertaining patient. The scheme pro-
vides secure and confidential establishment of EPR cryptokeys for subsequent
decryption of the pertaining medical records. There are no cryptokey tables,
but the cryptokey for a given EPR is temporarily restored at the EPR server
for each session by means of the consenting patient holding a secret user key
(not the EPR cryptokey) in conjunction with the EPR server. The scheme
is secure and prohibits deduction of secret user keys or EPR cryptokeys. Ac-
cordingly, medical data is protected due to that electronic patient records
(or modules) can be stored encrypted at an EPR server, prohibiting medical
data to be disclosed without the collaboration of the consenting patient and
a medical team. Encryption of updated medical data could be done at the
EPR server or by medical practitioners by means of a corresponding public
key.
The EPR cryptosystem presented in [9] seems to be the only EPR cryp-
tosystem incorporating patient consent for EPR authorization of medical
teams. However, a serious security weakness about this cryptosystem is that
the EPR server does not have an active function in EPR cryptokey recon-
struction, enabling a colluding patient and team to reveal the secret EPR
cryptokey independently of the EPR server.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows: In Section 2, we give a brief
introduction to threshold cryptography. In Section 3, we present the crypto-
graphic scheme. In case a patient is unconscious, he or she would not be in a
position to actively and consciously grant anybody EPR access. In Section 4,
we present a variant of this scheme for the emergency case, allowing a coali-
tion of security administrators or emergency team to grant medical personnel
EPR access on behalf of the patient.
2 Group-orientation and threshold cryptosystems
The motivation of threshold cryptosystems is to enforce that a given mini-
mum number of participants from a group are required to compute a cryp-
tographic operation, in contrast of requiring all the participants, i.e., a fixed
set of users, for this. Thus, the term threshold denotes the minimum number
of participants of required for this. This is desirable in scenarios where group
consensus is required, for example that the holder or originator of some sen-
sitive information like a secret key, is only willing to disclose it as result of
the agreement and consensus of a given number of associated participants.
Accordingly, it is prevented that single individuals can obtain the secret on
their own. As a practical example, we can consider access to a bank vault
where it is not desirable that one person alone would possess and control
the key to the vault due to the risk of fraud, robbery and extortion, but the
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participation of at least 2 or 3 persons out of for instance 4, each holding
a unique and secret key, should be required in order to unlock the vault.
This is a desirable requirement in security systems involving consensus and
collaboration of several participants.
Typical threshold-oriented applications are threshold decryption and thresh-
old signatures. A threshold decryption cryptosystem is a cryptosystem re-
quiring an arbitrary composed subset of a minimum number of participants
of a given group to collaboratively perform decryption. Represented by a
public key, outsiders can confidentially address the group. Only by collabora-
tion where the active group members are providing partial computations, the
encrypted message can be decrypted [12–14]. Likewise, regarding threshold
signatures [15, 16], only a minimum subset of the team can compute signa-
tures due to the threshold requirement.
3 EPR access authorization based on patient con-
sent
In this section, we present the cryptographic EPR access authorization
scheme. It assumes that the medical records are stored encrypted on a server.
Each EPR is encrypted by a unique secret key and there are no cryptokey
tables. The proposed scheme has mainly two purposes: The first is to en-
able patients to securely grant EPR access to medical teams and medical
practitioners. The second purpose is to provide secure and temporarily re-
construction of the secret cryptokey for a given EPR at the EPR server from
the process of a patient granting a medical team access to his or her EPR.
The scheme enables reconstruction of a predefined EPR cryptokey (which
thus is the same for each session), based on the computations involving the
secret keys of the pertaining patient and the EPR server. The server subse-
quently decrypts the given EPR. The protocol prevents disclosure and de-
duction of restored EPR cryptokeys to any party other than the EPR server.
It moreover prevents that any secret inputs or keys of the participants can
be deduced by any participating or external party.
The patient grants a medical team EPR access by basically generating a
secret cryptographic challenge in agreement with the public key of the per-
taining team. The EPR server will only be able to reconstruct the secret EPR
cryptokey provided a valid response. Since only associated members of the
addressed medical team can collaboratively provide the correct response to
the challenge, this ensures that no one other than the genuine team can ob-
tain access to the patient’s EPR. Otherwise, the pertaining EPR cryptokey
cannot be restored. An eligible minimum number of active team participants
is defined by applying a threshold mechanism.
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3.1 Protocol initializations
A trusted authority (TA) is responsible for providing the required public
key infrastructure. Let U = {P1, . . . , Pn} denote a medical team of n mem-
bers. The TA defines the minimum number of active participants t that are
required in order to obtain the EPR access granted by the patient. This sub-
coalition is denoted T ⊆ U where |T | ≥ t. According to the Shamir secret
sharing scheme [10], the TA generates a unique secret polynomial of degree
(t− 1):
f(x) =
t−1∑
j=0
aj x
j
that represents the team U . The TA computes one personal long-term secret
share for each team member as follows: For each Pi ∈ U , the TA arbitrarily
selects a input xi from Zq, and computes the secret user share
si = f(xi) (mod q)
where q is a large public prime. The team U is externally represented by the
public key
y = αa0 (mod p)
where a0 = f(0) and α is a generator to Zp. Note that p = 2 · q + 1 is a large
public prime.
Let S denote the EPR security server and Gi denote the patient (the granting
entity). The TA moreover provides the EPR server S with the secret key
ks and each patient Gi with the secret key ki where ks, ki ∈ Zq. The TA
computes the secret EPR cryptokey
Ki = αks·ki (mod p)
by which the TA encrypts the EPR of Gi by means of a proper cryptographic
algorithm. The TA deletes Ki subsequently.
3.2 Protocol description
In this section, we describe the cryptographic EPR access authorization
scheme. This is moreover presented in Figure 1, and goes as follows:
Step 1. The protocol is initiated by S that generates the secret random num-
bers r1, r2 ∈ Zq, and computes for Gi
as = αr1 (mod p), bs = αksαr1·r2 (mod p)
Step 2. The patient Gi grants EPR access to a medical team U (the grantee)
by means of the team’s public key y. Gi generates a random secret number
ri ∈ Zq, computes and returns (ci, di, Ri, y) to S where
ci = bkis (mod p), di = y
ri akis (mod p) and Ri = α
ri (mod p)
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The public key y is included in the message, indicating to the medical team
that Gi claims to be the grantee. Whether y is the genuine key applied in the
computation of di, is certified according to the correctness of Ki computed
in Step 5. Note that since yri is an unknown factor of di and ri is secret, this
can only be resolved by the partial computations of team members holding
the secret user shares, collectively computing (αr)a0 which corresponds to
yri .
Step 3. S checks that y is a public key of a genuine and approved medical
team or medical practitioner. Otherwise, Gi could grant EPR access to ille-
gitimate persons, knowingly or unknowingly. If y is accepted, S broadcasts
the challenge
us = (α ·Ri)r2 (mod p)
Otherwise, terminate.
Step 4. To correctly respond to the challenge us, the partial computations of a
subcoalition T ⊆ U of at least t participants are required. Each team member
Pj ∈ T receives us, and computes and returns the partial computations
zj = u
sj
s (mod p).
Step 5. Key computation. S applies Lagrange interpolation to the partial
computations of T according to
Yi =
∏
j∈IT
z
bj
j (mod p) where bi =
∏
j∈IT
i6=j
xj
xj − xi (mod q)
and IT = {i |Pi ∈ T}. By means of the secret r2, only S is capable of
reconstructing the EPR cryptokey as follows:
Ki = αki·ks = ci · Yi · (di · y)−r2 (mod p)
= (αks·ki · αr1·r2·ki) · (αri·r2·a0 · αr2·a0) · (yri · αr1·ki · y)−r2
= (αks·ki · αr1·r2·ki) · (yri·r2 · yr2) · (y−ri·r2 · α−r1·r2·ki · y−r2)
by which it subsequently decrypts the pertaining EPR. The EPR can be
securely transferred to T ⊆ U , for example by encrypting it with public key
of U .
Given that r2 is secret prohibits anyone but S to obtain Ki. Note that in
Step 2, Gi indicates the public key of the grantee. Since this is included in
the key reconstruction phase, the correctness of Ki is ensured according to
that only T ⊆ U represented by y can provide the correct response in Step
4.
Note that the function of this protocol is very different from the function
of key establishment protocols which provide secure establishment of non-
predefined random secret shared keys over insecure networks. Participants of
such protocols are usually authenticated towards their public keys. Our pro-
tocol differs since its function is to securely establish a predefined secret key
whereof its correctness implies authenticity of the participants. For example,
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only Gi, holding ki, can contribute to establish the correct Ki, disregarding
the emergency case. Further user/key authentication is thus not required.
S Gi Pj ∈ T
r1, r2 ∈R Zq ri ∈R Zq
as = αr1
bs = αks+r1·r2 (as, bs)−−−−−−−−−−→ ci = b
ki
s
di = yriakis
(ci, di, Ri, y)←−−−−−−−−−− Ri = α
ri
us = (α ·Ri)r2 us−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−→
zj←−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−− zj = u
sj
s
Ki = ci · Yi · (di · y)−r2
Figure 1: EPR cryptokey reconstruction due to the proposed scheme. All computa-
tions are in Zp.
3.3 Security discussion
In this subsection, we will show that the proposed protocol preserves both
authenticity and key secrecy.
Authenticity. The protocol provides a legitimate user to securely recon-
struct the secret EPR cryptokey associated to him or her at the EPR server
and no one else. Thus, if an illegitimate user tries to establish a given key,
it will fail. It is essential that the protocol preserves the authenticity of the
users, resisting any masquerading attack so that no entity (internal or ex-
ternal) may successfully masquerade as another entity. Since the goal is to
establish a fixed secret EPR cryptokey, explicit user authentication is not
required since the key is established as a function of the secret user keys held
by the participants and is therefore implicitly provided.
Like most cryptographic authentication protocols, user authentication is pro-
vided on the assumption that only the genuine user and no one else is holding
a specific secret whereof the genuineness of his or her identity is based. The
protocol provides the ability for the user to prove that he or she actually holds
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the specific secret according to the correctness of the result. Accordingly, the
protocol must prevent that anybody else can establish or obtain the correct
result and therefore illegitimately obtain access to a patient’s EPR.
Note that (as, bs) are cryptographically bound to the secrets r1 and r2 only
known by S. This binding prevents replay attacks where an adversary at-
tempts to successfully run the protocol by masquerading. An adversary re-
playing the numbers ci, di, Ri from a former session would cause inconsistency
in the key recovery phase since r2 is distinct and unique for each session, and
only the genuine value of r2 can resolve the EPR cryptokey.
Key secrecy. There are two aspects regarding key-secrecy. First, it is re-
quired that no secret user keys or secret user shares can be deduced from
the messages. Secondly, it must be infeasible to deduce EPR cryptokeys for
anybody except S.
Regarding the first key secrecy requirement, no user input must be revealed
from the computations. This is obtained due to the Discrete Logarithm Prob-
lem that protects the secret key ks of S in Step 1, the secret key ki of Gi in
Step 2 and the secret user shares of each Pj ∈ T in Step 4.
Considering the secrecy of the EPR cryptokey, disclosure of αks must be
prevented, otherwise a patient could compute Ki = (αks)ki . Regarding as =
αksαr1·r2 and bs = αr1 in Step 1, due to the Diffie-Hellman assumption, it is
computationally infeasible to obtain αr1·r2 given αr1 and αr2 where r1 and
r2 are unknown. However, an adversary could try to attack the protocol by
returning α−r1 to S in Step 3. Since S would then compute us = α−r1·r2αr2
in Step 4, the adversary would only obtain as · us = αki · αr2 where αr2 is
unknown. Thus, the attack would fail.
The EPR cryptokey is the first factor in ci = αks·ki · αr1·r2·ki . Likewise, it is
protected by the unknown second factor αr1·r2·ki where it is computationally
infeasible to obtain αr1·r2 .
Note that αki could be a public key of Gi though it would have no function in
this protocol. An adversary would have no use of this due to that knowledge
of the secret ki is required for the exponentiations for computing ci and di in
Step 2.
4 The emergency case
There could be situations when patients are in a coma, or situations of car
accidents, fire, terrorist acts, etc., where patients may be unconscious and
may therefore not be able to actively grant any medical practitioners access
to his or her EPR. In this section we describe a modified version of the
protocol presented in the previous section to handle such emergency cases.
In emergency cases, a coalition of security administrators or an emergency
team could act on behalf of the patient to grant EPR access. Note that there
should be a minimum threshold in order to prohibit that any single individual
may solely grant or obtain access to personal medical data.
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In normal situations, the patient would by means of his or her secret key
grant any team access to his or her EPR. For the emergency case, each
patient could be represented by an associated public parameter or identifier
that the security team would use to reference the patient.
The emergency case could be handled as follows: The TA defines the mini-
mum threshold t′ of security administrators that is required to actively grant
on behalf of a pertaining patient that is disabled. The TA generates a random
secret polynomial g(x) of order (t′ − 1) that represents the team of security
administrators SA. The TA computes for each administrator Ai ∈ SA a
secret share according to
ti = g(i) (mod q)
The secret keys of each patient Gi is computed according to
ki = g(h(Gi)) (mod q)
where Gi denotes the identity of the patient and h is a secure one-way func-
tion.
The protocol is as the previous except that SA coalition acts on behalf of the
patient which introduces a second team aspect. The protocol goes as follows:
Step 1. The protocol is initiated by S that generates the secret random num-
bers r1, r2 ∈ Zq, and forwards to SA the challenges
as = αr1 (mod p), bs = αks+r1·r2 (mod p)
Step 2. The SA grants a medical team U EPR access on behalf on Gi by
means of the team’s public key y. Each Aj ∈ SA generates a random secret
number rj ∈ Zq, and computes and returns (cj , dj , Rj) to S where
cj = b
tj ·bj
s (mod p), dj = a
tj ·bj
s y
rj (mod p) and Rj = α−rj (mod p)
Note that
bj =
∏
k∈ISA
j 6=k
h(Gi)− k
j − k (mod q)
and ISA = {j |Aj ∈ SA}. Also note that the computations of SA agree to
Lagrange interpolation on exponents (Step 3) which corresponds to applying
ki as an exponent to (as, bs) as in Section 3.
Step 3. S receives the messages from SA and computes Lagrange interpolation
on the exponents by multiplication
ci =
∏
j∈ISA
cj (mod p), di =
∏
j∈ISA
dj (mod p) and R =
∏
j∈ISA
Rj (mod p)
and forwards the challenge R to U .
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Step 4. To correctly respond to the challenge R, the partial computations of
a subcoalition T ⊆ U of at least t participants are required. Each Pj ∈ T
receives R, and computes and returns Yj = Rsj (mod p).
Step 5. Due to the fact that ri is secret, S is required to obtain Yi by Lagrange
interpolation of the partial computations of T according to
Yi = yri =
∏
j∈IT
Y
bj
j (mod p) and bi =
∏
j∈IT
i 6=j
xj
xj − xi (mod q)
where IT = {i |Pi ∈ T}. Finally, S reconstructs the secret key
Ki = c·(d·Yi)−r2 = (αks·ki ·αr1·r2·ki)·(y−ri·r2α−r1·k1·r2)·(yri·r2) = αki·ks (mod p)
by which it subsequently decrypts the pertaining EPR.
5 Conclusion
In this paper, we have presented a cryptographic EPR access authorization
scheme that incorporates patient consent as a basis for granting EPR access.
This ensures that only the medical practitioners specified by a consenting
patient are granted EPR access. If a patient is unconscious, a variation of
the scheme allows an emergency or security team to act on behalf of the
patient.
The security scheme assumes that electronic patient records (or specific parts
of patient records) are stored encrypted at the EPR server and each EPR
is encrypted with a unique and secret key. The key management problem
is precluded due to the fact that there are no cryptokey tables and no one,
including patients, hold or can obtain the cryptokey that can decrypt his or
her EPR. However, each patient holds a long-term secret user key. Instead,
the protocol enables secure reconstruction of a secret EPR cryptokey at the
EPR server from the cryptographic interaction between the EPR server and
the pertaining patient granting a medical team access to his or her EPR.
This allows the EPR server to subsequently decrypt the pertaining EPR.
The scheme is secure in the sense that it prohibits that secret user key and
EPR cryptokeys can be deduced and disclosed.
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Abstract
Electronic patient records (EPR) may contain highly confidential
and sensitive medical data, and it is therefore essential that such
information is properly protected. Medical teams that are provid-
ing care to a patient have a legitimate need to access the medical
data of the concerning patient, and is a valid criterion for medi-
cal professionals to obtain access to such data. Group consensus
could qualify as a basis for trust, and hence act as a criterion for
a medical team to acquire access to the required medical data.
In this paper, we present three closely related threshold-oriented
cryptographic protocols providing secure team-based EPR access
acquisition, based on the consensus of a minimum number of asso-
ciated medical practitioners. The schemes are broadcast-oriented,
and are thus well-suitable for wireless networks. All schemes do
also provide secure transfer of medical data.
1 Introduction
Today, personal medical data is commonly incorporated on an electronic
platform so that the electronic patient record (EPR) is replacing the old
paper-based patient record. Due to the sensitive nature of medical data to-
gether with the increased availability of such data on networked computer
systems, the confidentiality and security aspects of medical information
in EPR systems has become an essential issue [1–5].
A major issue concerns enforcement of proper access control. The sensi-
tivity of personal health information necessitates that such information
remains undisclosed except concerning legitimate purposes. Thus, a fun-
damental criterion for provision of access to medical data is the actual
legitimacy of whom access is to be granted. Reasonably, this could be in
agreement with the need-to-know-principle, i.e., that only medical per-
sonnel providing medical care to a given patient (or patients) should only
be able to access the medical data of the concerning patients they are
providing care to [1]. Thus, EPR access should be confined to that which
is necessary to provide proper medical care. Access to medical data could
therefore be denied to anybody, including medical practitioners, that does
not have a legitimate need to access such data.
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An access control policy based on legitimacy could for example be main-
tained by: 1) Patient consent. The patient must consent to that one or
more medical practitioners may access his or her EPR [6, 7]. 2) One or
more security administrators are required to grant, on behalf of a patient,
one or more medical practitioners access to the EPR of this patient. A
combination of these could be relevant considering emergency cases when
a patient could be unconscious and is unable to authorize EPR access.
In the medical scenario, medical care is typically provided by medical
personnel organized in teams. Consensus among a given number of as-
sociated medical practitioners could qualify as a reasonable criterion for
authorization of EPR access. A medical team, consisting of a number
of individuals working for the same cause, could thus be recognized as a
proper basis for trust. Such a criterion would accordingly prevent that sin-
gle individuals could illegitimately obtain access to EPRs unless holding
special privileges.
In this paper, we present three closely related threshold-oriented crypto-
graphic schemes that enable medical teams to acquire access to EPRs as a
function of group consensus of an arbitrary predefined minimum number
of participants. The protocols are broadcast-oriented, and are therefore
well-suitable for wireless networks. Protocol 1 deals with the case where
data is stored as plaintext on the EPR server, but provides secure EPR
acquisition and transfer to a corresponding team.
It could be desired to preserve a more overall level of information con-
fidentiality, not only with respect to access control (i.e., to whom EPR
access should be granted), but also concerning the long-term storage of
the medical data. For example, it could be argued that long-term encryp-
tion of medical data may provide an increased level of confidentiality than
if stored as plaintext. Nevertheless, this assumes that the corresponding
cryptokeys would have to be ”out of reach” since encryption imposes
the problem of secure key management and key storage. If a cryptokey
is compromised, its encrypted data would correspondingly be considered
compromised. Storage and management of cryptokeys would therefore
impose a potential security risk since that whoever that is controlling the
cryptokeys also controls the corresponding data.
In this context, we propose two related schemes (Protocol 2 and 3) where
it is assumed that the EPRs are stored as cryptotext at the EPR server.
We assume that each EPR is encrypted by a unique long-term secret EPR
cryptokey that is unknown to all group participants (i.e., the members
of the medical teams) including the pertaining patients. Protocol 2 and
3 provide privacy-preserving EPR cryptokey reestablishment for subse-
quent decryption and restoration of the of the pertaining EPR. This is
achieved by the computations and collaboration of a predefined minimum
(i.e., the threshold) of the participants of the concerning medical team
and without revealing the long-term EPR cryptokey. There are no cryp-
tokey tables that has to be securely maintained. The schemes prohibit
deduction and disclosure of the secret EPR cryptokeys and the threshold
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requirement provides the essential distribution of trust for acquiring EPR
access.
2 Threshold cryptosystems
The motivation of threshold cryptosystems is to enforce that a given
minimum number of participants from a group are required to compute
a cryptographic operation, in contrast of requiring all the participants,
i.e., a fixed set of users, for this. The term threshold denotes the mini-
mum number of participants of the group or team required to carry out
the threshold computation. This is desirable in scenarios where group
consensus is required, for example that the holder or originator of some
sensitive information like a secret key, is only willing to disclose it as result
of consensus of a given number of associated participants. Accordingly, it
is prevented that single individuals can obtain the secret on their own.
As a practical example, we can consider access to a bank vault. It may
not be desirable that individuals could solely access the vault due to the
risk of fraud, robbery and extortion. The safety would be considerably
improved by a threshold-oriented security system, where the participation
of at least 2 or 3 persons out of for instance 4, each holding a unique and
secret key, should be required in order to unlock the vault. In threshold
cryptosystems, each active participant carries out some partial compu-
tation that they succeedingly ”pool” together in order to compute the
threshold computation. Enforcement of the threshold requirement is de-
sirable in security systems involving consensus of several participants.
Threshold cryptosystems are commonly based on the Shamir secret shar-
ing scheme [14]. Typical threshold-oriented applications are threshold de-
cryption and threshold signatures. A threshold decryption scheme is a
cryptosystem requiring the partial computations of an arbitrary composed
subset of t of n associated participants to carry out decryption. Repre-
sented by a public key, outsiders can confidentially address the group.
Only by collaboration where the active group members are providing the
partial computations, the encrypted message can be decrypted [9–11].
Likewise, regarding threshold signatures [12, 13], only a minimum subset
of the team can compute signatures due to the threshold requirement.
A broadcast-oriented conference key establishment scheme based on a
threshold secret sharing was proposed in [15].
3 Secure acquisition of plaintext medical data
In this section, we propose a threshold-oriented EPR access acquisition
scheme, where the medical data is stored as plaintext on the EPR server.
The scheme is basically a broadcast-oriented threshold decryption scheme
based on the ElGamal public key cryptosystem [16], and is thus suitable
for wireless networks. By means of threshold decryption, data can be
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securely transferred from one party to a team of associated users without
prior establishment of or knowledge of a secret key. It requires that at
least t associated participants or team members collectively compute and
share their partial decryptions in order to decrypt pertaining encrypted
messages. Accordingly, it precludes that single individuals can obtain the
secret data on their own.
3.1 Protocol 1
Initialization. A trusted authority (TA) is required to set up the scheme,
i.e., to provide secret user keys and a public key representing each respec-
tive team. Let U = {P1, P2, . . . , Pn} denote a team of n participants. The
TA selects large public prime p = 2 · q +1, where q is also prime. The TA
selects a generator (or primitive element) α to Zq (see e.g., [8, p. 30]).
The basis for the threshold mechanism is Shamir secret sharing scheme
[14]. The TA defines the threshold t which conveys the requirement that
minimum t participants are required to carry out the threshold computa-
tion. For each team, the TA a secret polynomial of order t in agreement
with the (t + 1, n) threshold requirement:
f(x) =
t∑
j=0
aj x
j
Let t coordinates,
(
j, f(j)
)
, j ∈ {1, . . . , t}, from f(x) constitute the coef-
ficients of a second polynomial g(x):
g(x) =
t∑
j=1
f(j) xj−1
The TA computes for each Pi ∈ U a secret user share
si = g(i) (mod q)
in agreement with a (t, n) threshold requirement, and an additional secret
user share
ft+1 = f(t + 1) (mod q)
that is common for all participants of U . The TA computes the public
key representing U as
y = α−f(0) (mod p)
where f(0) = a0.
EPR request. First, the team U sends a request to the EPR server S
to acquire access to a specific EPR denoted m.
Secure EPR transfer. This procedure consists of the following steps:
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Step 1. Let y denote the public key of the requesting team. S generates a
random secret number r, and subsequently encrypts m according to the
ElGamal cryptosystem as
c = m · yr (mod p) and R = α−r (mod p)
Due to the threshold requirement, a subcoalition T ⊆ U of at least t team
members is required to collaboratively obtain EPR access.
Step 2. Each Pi ∈ T receives (c,R), computes and broadcasts
vi = Rsi (mod p)
Step 3. Let IT = {i |Pi ∈ T}. After receiving vj , j ∈ IT , each participant
in T applies Lagrange interpolation on the exponents according to
Bi =
∏
j∈IT
v
bj(i)
j = α
−r·f(i) (mod p) (1 ≤ i ≤ t)
where
bi(x) =
∏
j∈IT
i6=j
x− j
i− j (mod q)
Each Pi ∈ T , holding the secret ft+1, privately computes
Bt+1 = Rft+1 (mod p)
and subsequently restores the secret encryption factor by Lagrange inter-
polation
Y =
t+1∏
j=1
B
b′j(0)
j (mod p) where b
′
i(x) =
t+1∏
j=1
i6=j
x− j
i− j (mod q)
Finally, the participants restore the electronic patient record according
to
m = c · Y = (m · yr) · α−r f(0) (mod p)
Since Y can only be computed by means of Bt+1 by Lagrange interpola-
tion in agreement with the t+1 threshold, m can only be restored by the
members of U holding the secret ft+1.
3.2 Security analysis
In this subsection, we present a security analysis to demonstrate that
the security of the presented protocol is in agreement with the following
security properties. We assume that all computations are in Zp.
Theorem 1.1. (Long-term user share confidentiality.) It is computation-
ally infeasible to obtain secret user shares from user generated messages.
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Sketch of proof. During decryption, each participant Pi ∈ T broadcasts
vi = Rsi (mod p). Due to the Discrete Logarithm Problem, it is compu-
tationally infeasible to obtain a secret user share sj from vi in Zp. Note
that no information is broadcasted that is computed from the secret share
ft+1.
Theorem 1.2. (Secure EPR transfer.) Only a subcoalition T ⊆ U of at
least t participants can decrypt an encrypted message that is addressed
to the given team U .
Sketch of proof. The presented protocol is according to the ElGamal public
key cryptosystem [16], where the cryptotext is represented by c = m ·y−r
and R = αr where y = αa0 , a0 and r are unknown. The ElGamal cryp-
tosystem is based on the difficulty of finding the secret encryption factor
Y = yr. This is equivalent with the difficulty of the Diffie-Hellman Prob-
lem which is that given αx (mod p) and αy (mod p), it is computationally
infeasible to establish axy (mod p).
Shamir secret sharing is considered to be perfect, meaning that given a
(t, n) secret sharing scheme and t− 1 or less secret shares are known, no
information about the shared secret (i.e., the secret polynomial) can be
deduced.
Since the polynomial order of f(x) is t, no information about the se-
cret polynomial is provided given the computations based on t or less
shares. The values of Bj = Rf(j) (mod p), j ∈ {1, . . . , t}, can be publicly
computed by means of Lagrange interpolation. Because this is below the
threshold t + 1 of f(x), it is computationally infeasible to establish Rf(j)
(mod p), j /∈ {1, . . . , t}, by Lagrange interpolation on the exponents.
Thus, only by means of the additional Rf(t+i) that is secretly computed
by the participants of T ⊆ U , the secret encryption factor Y = Rf(0) can
be computed and subsequently the EPR restored.
4 Secure acquisition of encrypted medical data
It could be argued that a more overall level of information confidentiality
should be preserved, so that confidentiality is not only considered regard-
ing to whom EPR access should be granted, but that medical data could
also have a general protection with regard to the long-term storage of
such data. For example, it could be pointed out that a medical informa-
tion system whose medical data is encrypted at a long-term basis may
provide an increased level of confidentiality than if the data is stored as
plaintext. Nevertheless, this assumes that the corresponding cryptokeys
would have to be ”out of reach”. This could be achieved so that there
would be no cryptokey tables, but that such cryptokeys could only be
restored as a function of the consensus and the subsequent computations
of a minimum number of participants or security administrators. In the
remainder of this paper, it is assumed that each EPR is encrypted by a
unique and secret key and stored encrypted at the EPR server. There are
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no tables of cryptokeys, and the following schemes allows restoration of
medical data due to a threshold security requirement. The secret EPR
cryptokeys are prevented from being disclosed to the participants.
In this section, we present two complementary broadcast-oriented schemes
for secure acquisition of long-term encrypted medical data, whereas the
EPR decryption is respectively undertaken at the server side and at the
user side. Server-side EPR restoration provides establishment of the se-
cret long-term encryption key at the EPR server for subsequent EPR
decryption with a following short-term encryption for secure data distri-
bution to the given medical team. The third scheme requires fewer rounds
of broadcasting since EPR restoration is performed at the user-side.
Practical performance considerations show that symmetric secret key en-
cryption has a considerably higher performance than public key encryp-
tion. In practical realizations, it would therefore be appropriate to imple-
ment symmetric key-based long-term EPR encryption whereas each sym-
metric key would be encrypted according long-term public key encryption,
in contrast to public key-based long-term EPR encryption. Accordingly,
user-side EPR decryption would reveal the corresponding long-term se-
cret symmetric keys which could be considered a security weakness. Nev-
ertheless, since both schemes are closely related, it could be of interest to
include both.
4.1 Protocol 2. Server-side EPR restoration
The following scheme has two functions: 1) Restoration of the secret EPR
cryptokey at the EPR server for subsequent decryption of the pertaining
EPR, and 2) subsequent confidential transferral of the pertaining EPR to
the team by means of threshold decryption.
Initialization. A trusted authority (TA) is required to set up the scheme,
i.e., to provide secret user keys and a public key representing each respec-
tive team. Let U = {P1, P2, . . . , Pn} denote a team of n participants. The
TA selects large public prime p = 2 · q + 1 where q is also prime, and
selects a generator (or primitive element) α to Zq (see e.g., [8, p. 30]).
The basis for the threshold mechanism is the Shamir secret sharing
scheme. The TA defines the threshold t which conveys the requirement
that minimum t participants are required to carry out the threshold com-
putation. For each team, the TA a secret polynomial of order t correspond-
ing to a (t + 1, n) threshold requirement:
f(x) =
t∑
j=0
aj x
j
where aj is selected randomly such that β = f(1) =
∑t
j=0 aj is equal for
all teams. Let t coordinates
(
j, f(j)
)
, j ∈ {1, . . . , t}, from f(x) constitute
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the coefficients of g(x):
g(x) =
t∑
j=1
f(j) xj−1
The TA computes for each Pi ∈ U a secret user share
si = g(i) (mod q)
in agreement with a (t, n) threshold requirement, and an additional secret
user share
ft+1 = f(t + 1) (mod q)
that is shared by all participants of U . The TA computes the public key
that represents U as
y = α−f(0) (mod p)
where f(0) = a0.
Each patient is represented by a unique identity id where each id 6= α.
The EPR m of patient id is encrypted according to the ElGamal public
key cryptosystem [16], and stored as cryptotext on the EPR server due
to
z = m · w−1 (mod p)
where w = idβ·k (mod p) is a long-term secret EPR encryption factor,
and k is a long-term secret key of S.
EPR request. First, the team U sends a request (id, y) to the EPR
server S to acquire access to a specific EPR denoted m. Let y denote the
public key of the requesting team and id the identity of the patient whose
EPR is requested.
Secure server-side EPR restoration.
Step 1. S generates two random secret numbers r1 and r2 from Zp, and
computes and broadcasts the challenge
c = idk · αr1·r2 (mod p) and R = α−r1 (mod p)
Step 2. The team members receives (c,R). Each Pi ∈ T computes and
broadcasts
ui = csi (mod p) and vi = Rsi (mod p)
Step 3. Since only S holds the secret r2, S exclusively restores the secret
encryption factor according to Lagrange interpolation
w =
∏
i∈IT
(ui · vr2i )bi(1) (mod p)
= (idk·f(1) · αr1·r2·f(1)) · (α−r1·r2·f(1)) = idk·β (mod p)
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where
bi(x) =
∏
j∈IT
i6=j
x− j
i− j (mod q)
Secure EPR transfer. S computes and broadcasts
A = z · w · yr1 = m · yr1 (mod p)
Each participant in T applies Lagrange interpolation on the exponents
according to
Bi =
∏
j∈IT
v
bj(i)
j = α
−r1·f(i) (mod p) (1 ≤ i ≤ t)
Each participant, holding the secret number ft+1, privately computes
Bt+1 = Rft+1 (mod p)
and subsequently restores the secret encryption factor by Lagrange inter-
polation
Y =
t+1∏
j=1
B
b′j(0)
j (mod p) where b
′
i(x) =
t+1∏
j=1
i6=j
x− j
i− j (mod q)
in order to restore the electronic patient record m according to
m = A · Y = (m · yr1) · (α−r1·f(0)) (mod p)
Note that since Y can only be computed by means of Bt+1 by Lagrange
interpolation in agreement with the t+1 threshold, m can only be restored
by the members of U holding the secret ft+1.
4.2 Security analysis
In this subsection, we present a security analysis to demonstrate that
the security of the presented protocol is in agreement with the following
security properties. We assume that all computations are in Zp.
Theorem 2.1. (Long-term user share confidentiality.) It is computation-
ally infeasible to obtain secret user shares from user generated messages.
See the security analysis for Theorem 1.1. for sketch of proof.
Theorem 2.2. (Confidentiality of the long-term encryption factor.) (Se-
cure server side EPR restoration.) The protocol prevents that the secret
long-term encryption factor w to any other than S.
Sketch of proof. Due to the threshold requirement, the contributions (i.e.,
the partial decryptions) from a subcoalition T ⊆ U of at least t partici-
pants are required to establish the secret encryption factor w.
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The first broadcast of c = idk · αr1·r2 and R = α−r1 where (r1, r2) are
secret, is equivalent to the ElGamal cryptosystem [16], and thus the secret
factor idk is protected.
After Step 3, the numbers (idk·β · αr1·r2·f(1)) and α−r1·f(1) can be pub-
licly established by means of Lagrange interpolation. However, due to the
ElGamal cryptosystem, the encryption factor w = idk·f(1) can only be
restored by means of r2, which is known by S only. Thus, it is prevented
that w is revealed to other than S.
Theorem 2.3. (Secure EPR transfer.) Only a subcoalition T ⊆ U of at
least t participants can decrypt an encrypted message that is addressed
to the given team U .
See the security analysis for Theorem 2.1 for sketch of proof.
4.3 Protocol 3. User-side EPR restoration
This scheme is more efficient than the previous since both the restoration
(decryption of the long-term encrypted EPR) and secure transfer of the
EPR are done in the same step.
Initialization. Same as Protocol 2. Recall that z = m ·w−1 (mod p) and
w = idβ·k (mod p). Additionally, K = αβ (mod p) is a public parameter.
EPR request. First, the team U sends a request to the EPR server S
to acquire access to a specific EPR denoted m.
Secure EPR transfer and user-side restoration.
Step 1. S generates two random secret numbers r1 and r2 from Zp, and
then computes and broadcasts (c, d, e) where
c = z ·Kr1 (mod p)
d = idk · α−r1 · yr2 (mod p)
e = K−r2 (mod p)
Due to the public key y, this can only be handled by the pertaining team
U .
Step 2. After receiving (c, d, e), each Pi ∈ T computes and broadcasts
ui = dsi (mod p) and vi = esi (mod p)
Step 3. After receiving the computational results from the other partici-
pants in Step 2, each participant in T computes by Lagrange interpolation
A =
∏
i∈IT
u
bj(1)
i = d
β (mod p)
and
Bi =
∏
j∈IT
v
bj(i)
j = α
−β·r2·f(i) (mod p) where bi(x) =
∏
j∈IT
i6=j
x− j
i− j (mod q)
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for i ∈ {1, . . . , t}. Each participant in T, holding the secret number ft+1,
privately computes
Bt+1 = eft+1 (mod p)
and computes by Lagrange interpolation
C =
t+1∏
j=1
B
b′j(0)
j = α
−β·r2·f(0) = y−β·r2 (mod p) where b′i(x) =
t+1∏
j=1
i6=j
x− j
i− j (mod q)
and then privately restores the EPR according to
m = c ·A · C (mod p)
i.e., m = (m · id−β·k · αβ·r1) · (idk·β · yr2·β · α−r1·β) · (y−β·r2). Note that m
can only be restored by means of C in agreement with the t+1 threshold.
This can only be computed by the members of U only, holding the secret
share ft+1.
4.4 Security analysis
In this subsection, we present a security analysis to demonstrate that
the security of the presented protocol is in agreement with the following
security properties. We assume that all computations are in Zp.
Theorem 3.1. (Preservation of the confidentiality of long-term server-
side data.) It is computationally infeasible to obtain w and idk.
Sketch of proof. An essential security property is to preserve the secrecy
of the secret long-term encryption factor w and idk also after that m has
been restored at the user side. S broadcasts
c = z ·Kr1 = (m · w−1) · (αβ)r1
d = idk · α−r1 · yr2
e = K−r2
where r1 and r2 are secretly known by S.
Due to the Discrete Logarithm Problem, it is computationally infeasible
to obtain r2 given e.
Regarding c, the long-term secret encryption factor w is protected by the
secret factor Kr1 , even if m is revealed. Regarding d, the secret factor
idk is protected by the secret factors α−r1 and yr2 . Note that the secret
r1 cryptographically binds c and d, and the secret r2 cryptographically
binds e and d. We see that all the factors of (c, d, e) are distinct.
The factor Kr1 must be known to deduce w. Kr1 could be computed from
αr1 which is a secret factor of d. However, this is protected by the secret
yr2 .
Theorem 3.2. (Secure EPR transfer.) Only a subcoalition T ⊆ U of
minimum t participants can obtain m given (c, d, e).
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Sketch of proof. The cryptotext is represented as (c, d, e). However, multi-
plying c and d gives c′ = m·yr2·β. The cryptogram (c′, e) (where e = αβ·r2)
is in full agreement with the ElGamal public key cryptosystem [16]. Thus,
the team participants are required to collaboratively compute C = ef(0)
in agreement with the threshold requirement to establish m. See Theo-
rem 1.2. for more on the threshold issue.
As noted, preserving the secrecy of w and idk is an essential security prop-
erty. However, if the factors w and idk would become compromised, we get
by multiplication, respectively c · w = m ·Kr1 , and d · id−k = α−r1 · yr2 .
These two results contain both two unknown factors which cannot fur-
ther be disclosed. Thus, it is computationally infeasible to obtain m given
(c, d, e, w, idk).
5 Conclusion
In this paper, we have focused on the importance of preserving the confi-
dentiality of personal medical data. We have pointed out that legitimacy
should be a main criteria for medical professionals to obtain access to
medical patient data, and that the consensus of a minimum number of
associated practitioners in medical teams is a reasonable basis for such
practitioners to acquire access to medical data.
In this context, we have presented three closely related cryptographic
protocols for secure team-based EPR access acquisition over wireless
networks. The first is basically a novel broadcast-oriented threshold-
decryption scheme enabling the EPR server to securely transfer medical
data to medical teams. The data can only be decrypted and obtained
if the number of active team members is in agreement with the thresh-
old requirement. For the remaining two protocols, it is assumed that the
EPRs are stored encrypted at the EPR server, and that each is encrypted
with a unique secret key. There are no cryptokey tables, but the protocols
enable medical teams to acquire and restore the requested EPR without
that the pertaining cryptokey is revealed. The second protocol provides
decryption of the EPRs at the server side while the third provides decryp-
tion at the user side. All schemes are secure in the sense that they provide
secure team-based acquisition and secure transfer of medical data.
Future works could be to consider team-based EPR access acquisition for
ad-hoc teams, i.e., temporary coalitions of medical practitioners that are
not issued a long-term public key in advance.
References
[1] American Medical Association. Patient Confidentiality. See
http://www.ama-assn.org/ama/pub/category/4610.html.
[2] T. Rindfleich. Privacy, Information Technology and Health Care.
Communications of the ACM, 1997, Vol. 40 (8).
138 Security in Wireless Medical Networks
[3] J. Biskup and G. Bleumer. Cryptographic protection of health infor-
mation: cost and benefit. International Journal of Bio-Medical Com-
puting, 43:61–67, 1996.
[4] M. Eichelberg et. al. A survey and analysis of Electronic Healthcare
Record standards. ACM Computing Surveys, Vol. 37(4), 2005.
[5] G . Serour. Confidentiality, privacy and security of patients’ health
care information: FIGO Committee for the Ethical Aspects of Human
Reproduction and Women’s Health. International Journal of Gynecol-
ogy & Obstetrics, Vol. 93, Iss. 2, pp. 189-190, 2006.
[6] J. Bergmann, O. Bott, D. Pretschner, and R. Haux. An e-consent-
based shared EHR system architecture for integrated healthcare net-
works. International Journal of Medical Informatics, 76(2-3):130 –
136, 2007.
[7] S. Eskeland, V. Oleshchuk. EPR Access Authorization of Medical
Teams Basded on Patient Consent. 2nd European Conference on
eHealth, 2007.
[8] J. Pieprzyk, T. Hardjono, J. Seberry. Fundamentals of computer se-
curity. ISBN 3-540-43101-1, Springer-Verlag, 2003.
[9] Y. Desmedt, Y. Frankel. Threshold cryptosystems. Advances in Cryp-
tology, Proc. of Crypto’89, LNCS, pp. 307–315, Springer-Verlag, 1990.
[10] T. Pedersen. A threshold cryptosystem without a trusted party
(Extended Abstract). Eurocrypt ’91, LNCS, Vol. 547, pp. 522–526,
Springer-Verlag, 1991.
[11] S. Saeednia, H. Ghodosi. A Self-Certified Group-Oriented Cryptosys-
tem Without a Combiner. LNCS, Vol. 1587, pp. 192–201, Springer-
Verlag, 1999.
[12] L. Harn. Group-oriented (t, n) threshold digital signature scheme
and digital multisignature. Computers and Digital Techniques, IEE
Proceedings. Vol. 141, No. 5, pp. 307-313, 1994.
[13] C. M. Li, T. Hwang, N. Y. Lee. Threshold-Multisignature Schemes
where Suspected Forgery Implies Traceability of Adversarial Share-
holders, Eurocrypt 1994, pp. 194–204.
[14] A. Shamir. How to Share a Secret. Communications of the ACM,
Vol. 22, No. 11, pp. 612–613, 1979.
[15] J. Pieprzyk, C. H. Li. Multiparty key agreement protocols. IEE Pro-
ceedings, Computer and Digital Techniques, Vol. 147, No. 4, pp. 229–
236, 2000.
[16] T. ElGamal. A public key cryptosystem and a signature scheme
based on discrete logarithms. IEEE Transactions on Information The-
ory, Vol. 31, No. 4, pp. 469–472, 1985.
Paper I
A Decentralized Hierarchical Access Control
Scheme for the Medical Scenario
Sigurd Eskeland and Neeli Prasad
139
140 Security in Wireless Medical Networks
A Decentralized Hierarchical Access Control
Scheme for the Medical Scenario
Sigurd Eskeland
University of Agder
Grooseveien 36
N-4876 Grimstad, Norway
sigurd.eskeland@uia.no
Neeli Prasad
Center for TeleInFrastructur (CTIF), Aalborg University
Niels Jernes Vej 12
DK-9220 Aalborg, Denmark
np@kom.auc.dk
Abstract
Electronic patient records contain highly personal and confiden-
tial information that it is essential to keep private. Thus, only the
medical professionals providing care to a patient should access
the patient record of the concerning patient. As personal medical
data can be considered to be the property of the corresponding
patient, it is justified that patients should have the opportunity
to exert control over their own data. In this paper, we propose
a cryptographic access control scheme allowing patients to grant
medical teams authorizations to access their medical data. More-
over, the hierarchical aspects of teams are taken into account so
that the modules of the patient record are to be accessed accord-
ing to the individual privileges of the medical professionals of the
team. Thus, more privileged users obtain larger portions of the
data than less privileged users.
1 Introduction
With the increased application of information technology in health care,
there has been extensive focus on the security issues of electronic patient
records (EPR) in medical environments [1, 2]. These issues include the
pushing need for protecting personal medical data. Many security sys-
tems are based on predefined and preassigned credentials or permissions
like roles or entries in access control lists, issued by an authority [3, 4].
This works fine in environments characterized by relatively fixed work
tasks, and where changes in assignments of permissions and authoriza-
tions happen relatively infrequently. In contrast, medical environments
are characterized by being highly dynamical, incorporating a high num-
ber of professionals providing care to temporary hospitalized patients.
The medical scenario would normally require an active security adminis-
trator granting EPR access to legitimate medical professionals on behalf
Paper I: A Decentralized Hierarchical Access Control Scheme 141
of the patients, which could be a demanding task due to complexity and
workload. A major issue here is that all patient records must be man-
aged properly and confidentially with respect to the private and sensitive
information they hold.
Due to the confidential nature of personal medical data, such information
should only be disclosed to legitimate medical personnel, i.e, the EPR of
a patient should only be disclosed to those medical practitioners that are
currently providing care to that patient. Since EPRs contain the personal
medical data of patients, they can be considered to be the property of the
patients, and it could therefore be justified that patients should have the
opportunity to exert control over their own data. This could be realized by
providing patients the privilege to grant medical personnel access to their
own medical data by consent, and thereby the privilege of controlling
whom is to access their data. Access control schemes for the medical
scenario that include the patient as a consenting and granting entity seem,
however, to be virtually absent in the literature.
Medical teams involves not only the multi-party aspect but also the hi-
erarchical aspect due to that various types of medical practitioners have
different rankings. For instance, doctors are ranked above nurses. In this
context, it is reasonable or even necessary that practitioners of lower rank-
ings should be privileged access to less sensitive or confidential medical
information than those of higher rankings.
The contribution of this paper is two-fold. Firstly, we present a decen-
tralized hierarchical key multi-party agreement protocol. By decentral-
ized we mean that the protocol is contributory, i.e., that each participant
contributes to the values of the established secret keys in contrast to cen-
tralized key transfer. Secondly, it includes an EPR granting step where
the patient acknowledges to the EPR server whether or not the given
team should be authorized access to the patient’s EPR. Successful com-
pletion of this stage signifies hence that the medical data of interest will
be securely shared with each of the corresponding team members, and
the data is then subsequently encrypted using the newly computed hier-
archical session keys and transferred to the team.
The hierarchical key agreement protocol provides secure establishment
of a hierarchy of session keys in agreement with the privilege levels of
the team members. The hierarchical key agreement protocol allows team
members to obtain the session keys of their own and underlying security
levels while the opposite is prevented, thus ensuring that the personnel
individually get access to data in agreement with their ranking and priv-
ileges.
The scheme assumes consequently that the EPRs consists of data modules
that are each assigned a confidentiality/sensistivty level reflecting the
sensitivity level of its medical data. The EPR sensitivity hierarchy is
hence in agreement with the user hierarchy. Accordingly, this facilitates
that each medical participant is to only receive access to medial data that
are in agreement with his or her ranking.
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After the patient has successfully verified and consented to the composi-
tion and authenticity of the members of the pertaining medical team, the
EPR server encrypts the EPR modules by means of the corresponding hi-
erarchical session keys in agreement with the confidentiality level of each
respective EPR module, and then transfers the encrypted medical data
to the pertaining medical team. Hence, secure access control and secure
transport of the data over insecure networks are provided.
2 Related work
Hierarchical access control (HAC) is a class of cryptographic schemes that
supports establishment and deduction of long-term, predefined crypto-
graphic cryptokeys in agreement with a predefined user hierarchy. Users
of a given security class are able to securely compute such keys associ-
ated with their own and underlying security classes, while computation
of keys associated with overlying security classes is prevented. In con-
trast, the presented scheme provides secure establishment of a hierarchy
of ”fresh” sessions keys for ad-hoc hierarchical groups. Computation of
hierarchical predefined keys and not hierarchical sessions keys is reason-
ably a considerable limitation of the applicability and usefulness of such
schemes. Many HAC schemes are compliant with user dynamics, i.e., in-
clusion and exclusion of users and corresponding renewal of hierarchical
keys for the pertaining security classes. Examples of HAC schemes can
be found in [5–8].
Regarding tree-based key management schemes, the users are logically
organized according tree structures, where they are represented as leaf
nodes of a binary tree. Due to the to tree structure, this allows them to
obtain a common key that is at the root. Thus, such schemes are not
hierarchical due to that the users obtain one shared secret key. Examples
are Tree-based Group Diffie-Hellman agreement [11], and others in [9,10].
3 Preliminaries
3.1 Security requirements
The proposed hierarchical key establishment protocol is based on the
following cryptographic security requirements:
• The protocol must be secure against passive attacks. Only legitimate
users must be able to establish secret hierarchical session keys. Mes-
sages of former sessions and old session keys cannot be used to deduce
future session keys.
• The protocol must be secure against substitution attacks. Each par-
ticipant must be authenticated and cryptographically linked to the
current session certifying the identity and the assigned hierarchical
level of the participant.
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• Onewayness. The participants of each level can compute the same hi-
erarchical session key and session keys of lower security levels, while
computation of hierarchical session keys of higher security levels must
be prevented. The user authentication must thus verify that the al-
leged security level of each user is legitimate, as well as the user
himself.
• Forward secrecy. Compromise of long-term secret user keys must not
reveal former hierarchical session keys.
• Key freshness. It must be guaranteed that hierarchical session keys are
unique and ”fresh” for each run of the protocol. Thus, the protocol
must be contributory so that all participants contribute equally to
the values of the hierarchical session keys of their respective security
level.
The security requirements must be satisfied in presence of passive ad-
versaries possessing these capabilities. An active adversary may be able
to modify (i.e., add, replace, replay, change) any broadcasted messages.
Attempt to impersonate any legitimate user by replaying old messages
must be infeasible.
3.2 Hierarchical preliminaries
The participants are denoted U = {P1, . . . , Pm}, where P1 represents the
patient, {P2, . . . , Pm−1} represent the members of the medical team, and
Pm represents the EPR server. Each participant Pi ∈ U is associated
with one hierarchical user class (or security class) S`, i.e., Pi ∈ S`. Let Li
denote the security level of Pi. Each level ` contains one security class
S` = {Pj |Pj ∈ U and ` = Lj}
where 1 ≤ ` ≤ λ, that includes all participants of that level.
Let U = {S1, . . . , Sλ} be divided into λ disjoint hierarchical security
classes where Sλ denotes the top security class. The security classes are
hierarchically ranked according to the relation ≺ so that Si ≺ Sj if i < j.
This indicates that Sj has a higher ranking than Si.
4 The protocol
The contribution of this paper is two-fold. Firstly, it constitutes the hi-
erarchical key establishment protocol involving the team, server and pa-
tient which is executed first. Secondly, it includes an EPR granting step
where the patient acknowledges to the EPR server whether or not the
given team should be authorized access to the patient’s EPR. Successful
completion of this stage signifies hence that the medical data of interest
will be securely shared with each of the corresponding team members,
and the data is then subsequently encrypted using the newly computed
hierarchical session keys and transferred to the team.
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Figure 1: Hierarchical key deduction
The presented protocol authenticates each user and their ranking. A com-
promised user arrangement where someone pretends to have a higher
ranking than his real ranking will be detected by signature certification.
The protocol is based on the scheme presented in [14].
4.1 User arrangement
In agreement with Section 3.2, the users are arranged in increasing order
according to their ranking. We moreover assume that the users are linearly
ordered so that all participants of U are organized sequentially, forming a
logical line, where P1 ∈ S1 (the patient) is sequentially first and Pm ∈ Sλ
(the EPR server) is sequentially last and hierarchically topmost. The
users Pi and P1+1, 1 ≤ i < m, are an adjacent pair of users, regardless of
whether they are in the same security class or in adjacent security classes.
The hierarchical arrangement is represented in Fig. 1.
The sequential ordering of the users implies that participants positioned
first and last in a given level are adjacent with a participant of the re-
spective adjacent underlying and overlying security levels (if any).
The participants could, for instance, be ordered within each security level
according to identity. To ensure a different user order for each session, the
participants could be ordered according to f(IDi, T ) within each security
level, where f is a secure one-way-function and T is the current time.
A change in the hierarchy, inclusion of new participants or participants
leaving, requires protocol rerun.
4.2 The hierarchical key agreement protocol
It is assumed that all participants in U are arranged with respect to
increasing privilege level as previously described.
Initializations. A large public prime number p is selected where p = 2·q+1
and q is also a prime. Let α be a public generator to Zq (e.g., see [13, p.
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30]). This can be done by an offline trusted third party (TTP) that also
sets up the certification and signature scheme.
Round 1. Each user Pj ∈ U , generates a random number r ∈ Zq and
computes and broadcasts the ephemeral DH public key zj = αrj (mod p).
Round 2. Each user Pj , 2 ≤ j ≤ m − 1, establishes two secret DH keys,
kj−1,j = z
rj
j−1 (mod p) and kj,j+1 = z
rj
j+1 (mod p), with each adjacent
participant, respectively.
A participant is sequentially positioned first in S` if ` = Li−1 + 1 = Li.
The sequentially first participant of each security class computes
vj = k̂j−1,j − f(kj,j+1) (mod p)
where f is a secure one-way function. The hat in k̂j−1,j denotes it is an
”entrance key” whereof knowledge enables participants to deduce hierar-
chical session keys of underlying levels.
The application of the one-way function in the last term of vj enforces the
hierarchical one-way security property, preventing participants to deduce
hierarchical session keys of overlying security levels, while the converse is
permitted.
Subsequently positioned participants Pj ∈ S`, compute
vj = kj−1,j − kj,j+1 (mod p)
The patient (P1) and the EPR server (Pm) who do not have two ad-
jacent users, compute an arbitrary value, say, v1 = vm = c where
c = f(z1, . . . , zm) represents the current session itself and f is a secure
one-way-function. All users Pj ∈ U compute a signature Sigj(vj , c) that
binds the user (identity and privilege level) with vj and the current ses-
sion itself c. To complete the second round, each user Pj ∈ U broadcasts(
IDj , vj , Sigj(vj , c)
)
. It is assumed that the user privilege level is crypto-
graphically incorporated into the user identity or user certificate.
Authentication and hierarchical session key computation. Each user Pj ∈
U certifies the signature for the other participants, and makes sure
that the hierarchical user arrangement is not compromised. It must
moreover be verified that the ”entrance keys” are computed accord-
ing to the protocol. To do this, first compute a candidate entrance key
k′j−1,j = vj + f(kj−1,j). Now it can be verified if
v2j
?≡ k′2j−1,j − 2 k′j−1,j f(kj,j+1) + f(kj,j+1)2 (mod p)
holds. This verification will detect whether the participant has cheated.
Each user Pi ∈ S` is now able to compute the hierarchical session key
K` = (k − j) · zrjj−1 +
j−1∑
l=i+1
(l − j) · vl −
j∑
l=k+1
(k − l) · vl
= ki,i+1 + ki+1,i+2 + . . . + kk−2,k−1 + kk−1,k (mod p)
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The indices i and k refer respectively to the sequentially first and last
user indices of S`, where ` = Li+1 + 1 = Li = Lk = Lk+1 + 1.
The secure one-way-function could be a cryptographic hash function with
byte numbers that conform in size with p, or exponentiation by for a given
αkj−1,j (mod p) due to the Discrete Logarithm Problem.
Computing lower-level hierarchical session keys. A user Pk ∈ S` deduce
lower-level session keys by first computing the entrance key for the un-
derlying level as
k̂i−1,i = vi + f(kj−1,j) (mod p)
where kj−1,j =
∑k−1
j=i+1 vj + kk−1,k (mod p) for the subordinate security
class S`−1. For each subsequent class Sδ between target Sγ and S`, γ < δ,
iteratively compute the entrance key of Sδ−1 where kk−1,k refers to the
entrance key of Sδ. The target session key is finally computed as
Kγ = (k − 1) · k̂k−1,k +
k−1∑
l=i+1
(k − l) · vl (mod p)
= ki,i+1 + ki+1,i+2 + . . . + kk−2,k−1 + kk−1,k (mod p)
where i and k refer to the start and end user indices of Sγ .
4.3 Validation and granting
The preceding subsections describe the arrangements for hierarchical key
computation. It is upon this basis that the patient (P1) will be able to
certifiably evaluate the composition of the concerning team and thereby
approve authorization for EPR access. The server (Pm) obtains k1,2 ac-
cording to the alleged (but the not yet validated by the patient) composi-
tion of the team. The server (Pm) then signs the hash of k1,2, a list of the
alleged identities of the team (ID) and a random nonce Nm, and sends
this to the patient (P1). The patient (P1) certifies the signature with the
public key of the server (Pm). If valid, the patient checks the team list
(ID), and if the patient (P1) consents to that the team should be autho-
rized access to his EPR, he or she signs the nonce and the (non-secret)
k1,2, and returns the result to the server. Otherwise, he or she aborts.
The server (Pm) certifies the message of the patient (P1) by means of the
patient’s public key and the value of f(k1,2). The team validation and
granting is as follows:
1. Pm → P1: Nm, Sigm
(
ID, f(k1,2), Nm
)
2. P1 → Pm: Sig1
(
f(k1,2), Nm
)
In the last step, if the signature is verifiably correct, the EPR server
provides the team access to the given EPR, encrypted by the secret hier-
archical session keys.
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4.4 Example
To illustrate the scheme, in this example eight users are located in two
security levels, S1 = {P1, P2, P3, P4} and S2 = {P5, P6, P7, P8} where
S1 ≺ S2. Now P8 ∈ S2 can compute K2 according to
K2 = v6 + 2 v7 + 3 k7,8
= (k5,6 − k6,7) + 2 (k6,7 − k7,8) + 3 k7,8 (mod p)
= k5,6 + k6,7 + k7,8 (mod p)
Next, P8 ∈ S2 derives the entrance key k̂4,5 according to
k̂4,5 = v5 + f(v6 + v7 + k7,8 mod p) (mod p)
Finally, he or she computes
K1 = v2 + 2 v3 + 3 (v4 + k̂4,5) (mod p)
= k1,2 + k2,3 + k3,4 (mod p)
5 Security analysis
In this section, we show that the scheme is secure in agreement with the
security requirements presented in Section 3.1.
Security Requirement 1. The protocol must be secure against passive at-
tacks.
Proof. According to the computational DH assumption, it is computa-
tionally infeasible to compute any ki−1,i for 1 < i ≤ m after Round 1
without the secret ri−1 or ri. In Round 2; given ki−1,i − ki,i+1, no in-
formation is revealed about ki−1,i and ki,i+1. Since hierarchical session
keys are established by knowledge of the secret ki−1,i for a given level, it
is computationally infeasible to passively obtain any hierarchical session
keys.
Security Requirement 2. The protocol must be secure against substitution
attacks.
Proof. A given session is represented by the value of c. The individual con-
tributions of each participant in Round 2 are vi. The signature of Pi ∈ U
cryptographically links c and to his or her public key. Assuming the sig-
nature scheme is secure, and that the participants’ private long-term keys
are secret, it is computationally infeasible for an adversary to compute a
forged signature for an illegitimate v′i and the session c. The adversary
cannot reuse old signatures that are linked to corresponding former values
of vi and c, because the adversary can neither control the secret DH keys
due to the contributory nature of DH key agreement, and thus not the
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values of vi and c, since he cannot substitute the ephemeral DH keys of
the other participants without being detected, due to signatures.
If the adversary reuses a former vi (and thereby corrupting deduction of
the hierarchical session keys), along with the concerning signature, the
fraud will be detected by certifying the signatures, since it does not match
the current c. Thus, because the signature scheme prevents substitution
attacks, the adversary cannot succeed reusing old messages and signa-
tures.
Security Requirement 3. The protocol must provide the hierarchical one-
way security property.
Proof. Due to vi = ki−1,i − f(ki,i+1), it is computationally infeasible to
obtain ki,i+1 if f is secure.
If P (1)i ∈ S` attempts to violate the hierarchical one-way security property
by broadcasting vi = ki−1,i − ki,i+1 instead of vi = ki−1,i − f(ki,i+1), this
would be detected by verifying
v2j
?≡ k′2j−1,j − 2 k′j−1,j f(kj,j+1) + f(kj,j+1)2 (mod p)
for a candidate entrance key k′j−1,j . If the verification fail, such a violation
is detected and the protocol therefore aborts.
Security Requirement 4. The protocol must provide forward secrecy. For-
ward secrecy is defined in [12, p. 50] as compromise of a long-term user
key will not lead to compromise of session keys that were previously es-
tablished by means of that long-term user key.
Proof. The values of established keys depend solely on the random num-
ber generated by the participants for each session. I.e., the long-term
user keys do not influence the values of the hierarchical keys. Only the
broadcasted key establishment messages, vi and c, are signed. Thus, the
signatures contain no other hierarchical key information than the already
broadcasted key establishment messages. Assuming that a secure signa-
ture scheme is employed (Assumption 2); if a corresponding long-term
user key is known, it is infeasible to deduce any information of ki−1,i,
ki,i+1 and ri from the corresponding signature Sigi(vi, c). Forward se-
crecy is therefore achieved.
Security Requirement 5. The protocol must provide hierarchical session
keys that are unique for each session.
Proof. Each user in each security level S` contributes equally to the values
of the corresponding hierarchical key K`. According to Security Require-
ment 2, employment of a secure signature scheme withstands substitution
attacks. Thus, no single user can enforce old keys to be reestablished.
Thus, key freshness is ensured.
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6 Conclusion
In this paper, we have addressed that since personal medical data can
be considered to be the property of patients, it is justified that patients
should have the opportunity to exert control over their own data. We
have proposed a cryptographic access control scheme allowing patients to
grant medical teams authorizations to access their respective electronic
patient records. Moreover, the hierarchical aspects of teams are taken
into account so that the modules of the patient record are to be accessed
according to the individual privileges of the medical professionals of the
team. Thus, more privileged users obtain larger portions of the data than
less privileged users. The hierarchical key establishment protocol is well-
suited for wireless networks due to the broadcasting, and is highly efficient
due to only two rounds.
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